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MERGER OF LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE REVISED 
MARYLAND RULES: DOES IT THREATEN TRIAL 
BY JURY? 
Richard W. Bournet 
John A. Lynch, Jr.* 
With the merger of law and equity effected by revisions to Mary-
land's Rules of Civr1 Procedure, adopted on July 1, 1984, the 
Maryland judiciary must define the scope of trial by jury to be 
permitted in the now merged civil actions. This article examines 
the federal and various state approaches and sets forth alterna-
tives available to Maryland courts. The authors posit that 
Maryland's judges should define the scope of the jury trial right 
in the merged system by recognition of established equitable 
functions. The right to trial by jury should be preserved, not by 
blindly following the federal approach, but by applying Mary-
land's traditional limitations on equitable jurisdiction. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is the rare trial judge who has not, at some time in his judicial 
career, wished to dispense with jury trials in civil cases. When romantic 
notions about the contributions of juries• are tempered by experience 
in judicial administration, the civil jury may be legitimately regarded 
1. See Brown, The Law/Equity Dichotomy in Maryland, 39 Mo. L. REv. 427, 473-74 
(1980). 
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as a burdensome constitutional luxury/ the costs of which must be less-
ened by restriction.3 No doubt there are judges happy with the com-
mon sense justice of civil juries but are, nevertheless, wary of exposing 
its inner workings through resort to the special verdict.4 Defending the 
federal civil jury,5 Justice Rehnquist opined: 
Those who passionately advocated the right to a civil jury 
trial did not do so because they considered the jury a familiar 
procedural device that should be continued; the concerns for 
the institution of jury trial that led to the passages of the Dec-
laration of Independence and to the seventh amendment were 
not animated by a belief that use of juries would lead to more 
efficient judicial administration .... Those who favoredJ'u-
ries believed that a jury would reach a result that a ju ge 
either could or would not reach. 6 
Whatever one's regard of civil jury trials, it is necessary to ac-
knowledge that with the adoption of the Revised Maryland Rules of 
Procedure (revised rules), which merge law and equity, the Maryland 
judiciary has been given an unprecedented opportunity, indeed, a re-
sponsibility, to define the scope of trial by jury.7 
The combination of legal and equitable issues and claims for pur-
poses of pleading and common adjudication entails the joining in one 
case of claims and issues, some of which are triable by jury and some of 
which are not.8 For the first time, it is necessary for Maryland trial 
judges to determine whether a right to jury trial attaches to any part of 
2. MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 23, provides in relevant part: 
The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in the 
several Courts of Law in this State, where the amount in controversy 
exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars, shall be inviolably preserved. 
This right has been subjected to the condition that it be properly demanded. See 
Bettum v. Montgomery Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 262 Md. 360, 277 A.2d 600 
(1971); Mo. R.P. 2-325(a), (b). See also Md. R.P. 343(a), (b) (1977). The revised 
Maryland Rules of Procedure, revised July I, 1984, are hereinafter cited Mo. R. 
P .. The former Maryland Rules of Procedure are hereinafter cited Md. R.P. 
(1977) (1977 denotes the most recent replacement volume of the Maryland Anno-
tated Code of 1957 in which the rules appear). 
3. Finding the societal costs of jury adjudication too high in the area of health care 
malpractice, the legislature encumbered the jury's fact-finding role in the Health 
Care Malpractice Claims Act, Mo. CTS. & Juo. PRoc. CODE ANN.§§ 3-2A-Ol to 
-09 (1984). This has been held not to violate the right to trial by jury. Attorney 
Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978). 
4. For an explanation of the special verdict, see Mo. R.P. 2-522(c). 
5. The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution preserves the right to 
trial by jury. · 
6. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343-44 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
7. Mo. R.P. 2-301 provides: "There shall be one form of action known as 'civil 
action.'" · 
8. The right to trial by jury in civil cases guaranteed by the Maryland and federal 
constitutions applies only to actions at law. In Maryland there is no right to trial 
by jury in equity cases. Chase v. Winans, 59 Md. 475 (1883). 
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such cases and whether to fix the order of trial of the legal and equita-
ble issues so as to preserve the availability of jury adjudication of legal 
issues.9 Since separate law and equity courts no longer exist, it is no 
longer possible for a trial court to assume simply that there is a right to 
trial by jury if it is sitting as a court of law, and that there is no right to 
trial by jury if it is sitting as a court of equity. 10 
The merger of law and equity caused a protracted controversy in 
the federal courts regarding the scope of the right to trial by jury in 
civil cases and the need to protect that right through the order of trial. 11 
The Supreme Court has taken a dynamic view of the interaction be-
tween merger and the traditional doctrine that equity will intervene 
only when the remedy at law is inadequate. The result has been a con-
traction of the historical scope of equity and an expansion of the right 
to trial by jury. The federal courts have generally adhered to the no-
tion that "only under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances 
which in view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules [of Civil 
Procedure] we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of 
legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims." 12 
In a suit where legal and equitable claims or issues are combined, 
nothing compels the Maryland judiciary to contract the scope of equity. 
The jury's fact-finding role with respect to issues and claims which 
have historically been cognizable in courts of law might just as plausi-
bly be restricted. Many of the other states which have merged law and 
equity have contracted the right to trial by jury by adjudicating suits in 
which legal and equitable claims or issues are combined as suits in eq-
uity.13 Much in Maryland jurisprudence supports such an approach. 14 
This article examines the merger of law and equity in Maryland 
and considers possible judicial approaches to the scope of jury trial. It 
will also examine the experience in the federal and state courts as well 
as the relationship between the scope of equity and the right to jury 
trial in Maryland. Finally, the article will consider approaches to trial 
of actions involving both legal and equitable issues in light of federal 
and state experience and prior Maryland practice. 
9.' Such an issue arose under previous practice with Md. R.P. BF40 (1977) which 
permitted a court of law to issue an injunction as ancillary relief in an action at 
law. The jury's fact-finding role was protected in such a proceeding because the 
judge was bound by the jury's findings. Beane v. McMullen, 265 Md. 585, 291 
A.2d 37 (1972). 
10. The Advisory Committee note to Mo. R.P. 2-301 provides: "The effect of this 
Rule is to eliminate distinctions between law and equity for purposes of pleadings, 
parties, court sittings, and dockets. It does not affect the right to jury trial." 
11. McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study o/ Beacon Thea-
tres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 15 (1967). 
12. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-ll (1959) (footnote omitted). 
13. See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 810 (2d ed. 1977). 
14. See Brown, supra note 1, at 450. 
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II. CONSOLIDATION OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE CLAIMS 
UNDER THE REVISED RULES: PERMITTED OR 
REQUIRED? 
The elimination of the distinction between law and equity brings 
Maryland into line with the liberal federal policy concerning joinder of 
claims. For the most part, the joinder provisions of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) are permissive. 15 Most of the join-
der provisions of the revised rules also are permissive. 16 Unlike the 
Federal Rules, but like the previous Maryland Rules, the revised rules 
do not deem any counterclaims to be compulsoryY Other parts of the 
revised rules foster joinder of claims. The removal provision, which 
replaces former Rule 542, is no longer limited to actions at law. 18 Re-
vised Maryland Rule 2-506(a) replaces former Rules 54l(a)(l) and 582, 
two considerably different rules regulating voluntary dismissal in law 
15. See FED. R. C1v. P. l3(b), (g), 14, 18, 20, 23, 24. Exceptions to this rule are l3(a), 
which provides for compulsory counterclaims, and 14(a), which requires a third 
party defendant to assert counterclaims against the third party plaintiff. 
16. Mo. R.P. 2-212(a) provides: 
All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert a right to 
relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect to or arising out of 
the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occur-
rences, and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons 
will arise in the action. All persons may be joined in one action as de-
fendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the al-
ternative any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and if 
any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the 
action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or 
defending against all relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one 
or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief and 
against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities. 
Mo. R.P. 2-303(c) provides: 
A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alter-
nately or hypothetically. When two or more statements are made in the 
alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, 
the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more 
of the alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate 
claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based 
on legal or equitable grounds. 
See also Mo. R.P. 2-33l(b) (cross-claim against co-party), 2-33l(c) (joinder of ad-
ditional parties), 2-332(a) (defendant's claim against third party), 2-214(b) (per-
missive intervention). 
17. Mo. R.P. 2-331 provides: 
A party may assert as a counterclaim any claim that party has against 
any opposing party, whether or not arising out of the transaction or oc-
currence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. A 
counterclaim may or may not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by 
the opposing party. It may claim relief exceeding in amount or different 
in kind from that sought in the pleading of the opposing party. 
Mo. R.P. 2-332(c), however, requires a plaintiff to assert against the third party 
defendant a claim arising out of the transaction which is the subject matter of his 
claim against the third party plaintiff. 
18. Mo. R.P. 2-505(a). 
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and equity actions. 19 Former Rule 343, which regulated election for 
trial by jury in actions at law, has been replaced by Rule 2-325(a) which 
contemplates jury trial of legal issues in mixed legal and equitable 
suits.20 
Although the revised rules facilitate consolidation of claims as 
never before, they do not require it. Since the consolidation of legal 
and equitable claims in the same suit poses the greatest threat to the 
scope of trial by jury, it is arguable that this threat can be avoided by 
not consolidating such claims. Thus, a plaintiff who asserts claims for 
specific performance of a contract and for damages against the same 
defendant arguably might protect the right to trial by jury with respect 
to the damages claim by filing separate suits. Likewise, a defendant in a 
suit for rescission of a contract who ordinarily would wish to counter-
claim for damages for breach of contract might protect his right to trial 
by jury by asserting it in a separate action. 
Viewing the rules in isolation, however, renders a distorted picture 
of a party's latitude with respect to consolidation of litigation in Mary-
land. The revised rules must be read in conjunction with the extraordi-
narily broad view taken by the Maryland appellate courts concerning 
res judicata. This doctrine, also referred to as direct estoppel,2 1 was set 
out by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Alvey v. A/vey:22 
(A] judgment between the same parties and their privies is a 
final bar to any other suit upon the same cause of action, and 
is conclusive, not only as to all matters that have been decided 
in the original suit, but as to all matters which with propriety 
could have been litigated in the first suit, where the court had 
. . d" . 23 JUns 1ct1on . . . . 
It is quite clear in Maryland that a plaintiff must assert all claims aris-
ing out of a particular transaction against a particular defendant or be 
barred in a subsequent suit from asserting any claim not asserted in the 
first suit.24 Up to this point, Maryland's view of res judicata is consis-
19. Mo. R.P. 2-506(a) provides: 
Except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute, a plaintiff may 
dismiss an action without leave of court (l) by filing a notice of dismissal 
at any time before the adverse party files an answer or motion for sum-
mary judgment or (2) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all 
parties who have appeared in the action. 
20. Mo. R.P. 2-325(a) provides: 
Any party may elect a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury 
by filing a demand therefor in writing either as a separate paper or sepa-
rately titled at the conclusion of a pleading and immediately preceding 
any required certificate of service. 
21. MPC, Inc. v. Kenny, 279 Md. 29, 32, 367 A.2d 486, 488 (1977). 
22. Alvey v. Alvey, 225 Md. 386, 171 A.2d 92 (1961). 
23. /d. at 390, 171 A.2d at 94. 
24. Frontier Van Lines v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 274 Md. 621, 336 A.2d 778 
(1975). 
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tent with the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (Restatement), which 
provides: 
When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extin-
guishes the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the rules of merger or 
bar . . . the claim extinguished includes all rights of the 
plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all 
or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transac-
tions, out of which the action arose.25 
To the extent the rule expressed in Alvey requires that the court 
must have jurisdiction of the claim not asserted for the bar to apply, it 
may be argued that, under former practice, a claim at law would not 
have been barred by a plaintiff's failure to assert it with a related claim 
in a prior equity action. While such a view is consistent with the Re-
statement, 26 no such protection from res judicata has ever existed in 
Maryland.27 
It also appears that Maryland is moving towards requiring consoli-
dation of factually related claims against multiple defendants. Apply-
ing res judicata to claims against defendants who were not parties to an 
earlier action because of the factual relationship of such claims to the 
action carries the doctrine beyond the Restatement view. The first in-
dication of this tendency appeared in MPC, Inc. v. Kenny.28 In that 
case the plaintiffs sued the defendant for contribution as a joint 
tortfeasor. The defendant had pushed his cousin through a glass door 
causing her personal injury. The plaintiffs were a builder and a sup-
plier who had installed and supplied the glass door. They had been 
sued in an earlier action by the defendant's cousin for negligence and 
had settled with the plaintiff, permitting entry of a consent judgment. 
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 24(1) (1982). 
26. /d. § 26, comment c. 
27. In Sterling v. Local438, 207 Md. 132, l 13 A.2d 389 (1955), the plaintiff, a former 
business agent of a union, sued the defendant union to have it enjoined from 
setting aside an election that the plaintiff had won. The court found the election 
to be invalid and held for the defendant. In a later suit, the plaintiff sought dam-
ages for the consequences of the later election in which he was replaced. Con-
cluding that the elements of the prior equity action were the same as in the present 
action at law, the court held that the equity suit was conclusive as a direct estoppel 
of the action at law. In essence, this holding required the plaintiff to assert both 
legal and equitable claims in the first action, or lose the claim not asserted. As-
serting the legal claim in the equity suit, however, would have deprived the plain-
tiff of trial by jury of that claim. Presumably, the plaintiff would have been 
barred in his action for damages even if he had been successful in his suit for 
injunctive relief. 
Sterling should have been decided on the basis of collateral estoppel, with the 
legal and equitable claims treated as separate claims. Collateral estoppel would 
have prevented relitigation of the validity of the plaintiff's election in the suit on a 
different cause of action. See MPC, Inc. v. Kenny, 279 Md. 29, 35, 367 A.2d 486, 
490 (1977). The court in Sterling indicated that collateral estoppel was applicable 
on that basis. 207 Md. at 144, 113 A.2d at 394. 
28. 279 Md. 29, 367 A.2d 486 (1977). 
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The defendant in the suit for contribution was not a party to the earlier 
suit by his cousin. He contended that the plaintiffs were barred from 
proceeding against him because they had not made him a third party 
defendant in the first suit. 
The court, in rejecting res judicata as a bar of the plaintiffs' claim, 
decided that the evidentiary facts supporting the case of the personal 
injury plaintiff in the earlier suit and the case of the plaintiffs for contri-
bution in the latter suit were different. The case against the defendant 
would center on the accident while the case against the plaintiffs in the 
prior personal injury suit centered on installation of the door. The 
court did not preclude the possibility of barring a later action because 
of an earlier failure to assert a third party claim. 
This logic was recently applied by the court of special appeals in 
Harbin v. H.E. W.S., Inc. 29 In Harbin, the plaintiff sought damages for 
illegal eviction and wrongful interference with possession and enjoy-
ment of property. Harbin previously sued Safeway for injunctive relief 
and damages with respect to the same property. Safeway impleaded 
two of the defendants in the second action as third party defendants, 
and Harbin did not assert claims against the third party defendants in 
the earlier action. 
After conclusion of the first action, Harbin sued the two former 
third party defendants and another defendant. The trial court granted 
summary judgments for the former third party defendants on the basis 
of Maryland Rule 315(d)(3),30 and granted a directed verdict to the 
third defendant. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that 
the trial court should have dismissed the claim against the third de-
fendant on the basis of res judicata, holding squarely that "even a non-
party to a previous action may assert res judicata where the cause of 
action is the same."31 Finding that the cause of action was the same as 
to the third defendant, the court held that Harbin was barred by his 
failure to assert his claim in the first action even though the bar of Rule 
315(d)(3) would not apply to a nonparty. The court stated in a footnote 
that: "Rule 315(d)(3) and the doctrine of res judicata share the com-
mon goal of putting an end to litigation by requiring litigants to bring 
all their claims in a single action."32 
It appears from decisions such as Alvey and Harbin that any at-
tempt to avoid difficulties concerning the scope of trial by jury by 
avoiding consolidation of claims arising out of the same facts, even 
against different defendants, is fraught with peril for plaintiffs. The lack 
29. 56 Md. App. 72, 466 A.2d 879 (1983). 
30. Md. R.P. 315(d)(3) (1977) provided: 
The plaintiff may not assert against the third party in a separate action, 
instituted after the third party is impleaded, any claim which arises out 
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of his claim 
against the defendant in the pending action. 
31. Harbin v. H.E.W.S., Inc., 56 Md. App. 72, 81, 466 A.2d 879, 884 (1983). 
32. Id. at 80, 466 A.2d at 883-84. 
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of a compulsory counterclaim rule in the revised rules ostensibly elimi-
nates one of the most difficult problems confronted by the federal 
courts after merger: the requirement that a defendant assert a legal 
counterclaim in an equitable action. As indicated infra, before the 
merger of law and equity in the federal courts, the right to trial by jury 
would have been lost as to any legal counterclaim asserted in an equity 
action.33 
It is not entirely clear that Maryland's counterclaim policy will 
provide much protection in this respect, however, because the courts 
have construed res judicata broadly concerning claims which may be 
asserted by defendants. In Felger v. Nichols, 34 the plaintiff sued his for-
mer lawyer for professional malpractice. The plaintiff previously had 
been sued by his lawyer for a legal fee, and defended himself on the 
grounds of inadequate legal services and excessive fees. The skill, fi-
delity, and diligence of the lawyer were at issue in both suits. The 
Felger court quoted from the holding in Lebrun v. Marcey that a judg-
ment is res judicata "not only as to every matter which was offered to 
sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible 
matter which might have been offered for that purpose."35 The court 
held that either res judicata or collateral estoppel precluded relitigation 
of the attorney's skill in a malpractice action. 
Singer v. Steven Kokes, Inc. 36 is a similar decision. The plaintiffs 
in Singer sued the builder of their house for negligence and breach of 
warranty in construction. The construction company had previously 
sued the plaintiffs to foreclose a mechanic's lien. The plaintiffs in the 
later action claimed and were awarded a credit against the lien because 
of a substantial number of construction defects.37 Shortly after conclu-
sion of the first suit, the plaintiffs brought an action alleging 141 addi-
tional defects. 
The construction company moved for summary judgment on the 
basis of res judicata. The court granted the summary judgment, and 
held that "[o)ne aspect of direct estoppel is that a party must raise all 
defenses he has to a cause of action and once that action is concluded 
he cannot use a defensive matter as a basis for relief in a subsequent 
action between the parties."38 Recognizing the apparent incongruity of 
such a notion in light of Maryland's lack of a compulsory counterclaim 
rule, the court held that if a defensive matter constituted a counter-
claim, it was not barred simply by the failure to assert it: 
If a matter is not in the nature of a defense but constitutes a 
counterclaim, the general rule is that the party is not required 
33. See infra note 68. 
34. 35 Md. App. 182, 370 A.2d 141 (1977). 
35. Lebrun v. Marcey, 199 Md. 223, 227, 86 A.2d 512, 514 (1952) (emphasis added). 
36. 39 Md. App. 180, 384 A.2d 463 (1978). 
37. Singer v. Steven Kokes, Inc., 39 Md. App. 180, 183, 384 A.2d 463, 465 (1978). 
38. /d at 182, 384 A.2d at 465. 
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to assert the claim unless the subject matter is such an integral 
part of the issue being litigated that a judgment would neces-
sarily negate the existence of facts essential to its 
maintenance. 39 
The application of res judicata to the plaintiffs in Singer is not 
particularly troubling. By asserting a claim for credit in the first action 
the plaintiffs were, in essence, asserting a counterclaim. They should 
have been required to claim relief based upon all discoverable defects 
in the first action. The holding that defensive matter must be asserted 
by a defendant or lost as a basis for relief is disconcerting in light of 
Felger and Lebrun. If a defendant is permitted to hold back only a 
counterclaim which does not raise defensive matter then he would gen-
erally be permitted to hold back only a counterclaim which would be 
permissive under the Federal Rules. If a counterclaim arises out of the 
same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim it is quite likely 
that it involves matter which constitutes a defense to the plaintiff's 
claim and, hence, must be asserted. Thus, res judicata creates in Mary-
land what is essentially a compulsory counterclaim under the Federal 
Rules. 
This brief discussion of the joinder rules and the expanding policy 
of res judicata in Maryland indicates that parties will not be able to 
avoid increased consolidation of related legal and equitable claims in 
the same action. While some states have developed doctrines of waiver 
of the right to trial by jury when a legal claim is combined with an 
equitable claim,40 such a rule would be harsh in Maryland where join-
der of related claims by plaintiffs and defendants is becoming increas-
ingly less discretionary. 
III. THE EFFECTS OF MERGER OF LAW AND EQUITY ON 
TRIAL BY JURY: THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 
In 1938, with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, the federal system merged the law and equity sides of the district 
courts into a unified procedural system.41 The federal rules grant par-
39. /d. at 182-83, 384 A.2d at 465. 
40. SeeDiMenna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 220 N.Y. 391, 115 N.E. 993 (1917); see also 
PA. R. Crv. P. l509(c) (in an equitable action, existence of an adequate remedy at 
law as a basis for transfer to law side must be raised in a preliminary objection or 
it is waived as a defense). 
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 2 provides: ''There shall be one form of action to be known as 
'civil action.' " The original version of the Rules Enabling Act provided the basis 
for this merger: 
The [United States Supreme] [C]ourt may at any time unite the general 
rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those in actions at law so as 
to secure one form of civil action and procedure for both: Provided, how-
ever, that in such union of rules the right of trial by jury as at common 
law and declared by the seventh amendment to the Constitution shall be 
preserved to the parties inviolate . . . . 
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ties the unfettered right to combine legal and equitable claims and is-
sues in the same action.42 The Rules Enabling Act specified that the 
right to trial by jury was to be preserved in the face of such merger.43 
The experience of the federal courts in accommodating the historic 
right to trial by jury in a merged system of jurisprudence provides sub-
stantial guidance to the Maryland judiciary because the federal civil 
jury trial right, like Maryland's, is viewed in concert with the historic 
scope of equity. The scope of equity in Maryland is largely the same as 
it was in the federal courts before the merger of law and equity. Fur-
thermore, the jury trial issues faced in Maryland under the revised 
rules will be much the same as those faced by the federal courts. 
Merger in the federal courts, as under the revised rules in Maryland, 
presented unprecedented possibilities for the assertion of traditionally 
legal claims and issues before tribunals possessing equitable powers. 
There is limited support in Maryland jurisprudence for the vigorous 
jury trial policy ultimately adopted by the federal courts, but the ques-
tions faced today by the Maryland judiciary are nearly identical to 
those confronted by the federal courts since 1938. 
A. Pre-Merger Law, Equity, and Trial by Jury in the Federal Courts 
In the federal courts, as in Maryland,44 the separation of law and 
equity courts was the principal procedural safeguard preventing chan-
cery from eroding the right to trial by jury. The seventh amendment 
preserves the right to trial by jury which existed at common law,45 sub-
ject to restrictions which were applicable in 1791, the year the amend-
ment was adopted.46 As the United States Supreme Court held in 
Shields v. Thomas: 
This provision, correctly interpreted, cannot be made to em-
brace the established exclusive jurisdiction of courts of equity, 
nor that which they exercise concurrent with courts of law; 
but should be understood as limited to rights and remedies 
peculiarly legal in their nature, and such as it was proper to 
assert in courts of law, and by the appropriate modes and pro-
Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072 (1982)). 
42. FED. R. CJv. P. 18(b). Before its amendment in 1966, the rule provided: 
The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting forth a counterclaim 
may join either as independent or as alternate claims as many claims 
either legal or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing 
party .... 
The current Rule 18(b) is substantially the same in this respect. 
43. Rules Enabling Act ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(1982)). 
44. See infra text accompanying notes 183-218. 
45. In Maryland, the jury trial right is preserved by Mo. DECL. OF RTs. art. 23. 
46. See Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935) (reservation on 
motion for directed verdict); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) (remittitur). 
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ceedings of courts of law.47 
Equitable claims or issues may have arisen and resulted in removal of a 
legal claim from the law side,48 but as long as the claim remained on 
the law side, there was a right to trial by jury. 
From the earliest days of the federal judiciary there were other 
protections of trial by jury from the encroachment of equity. The first 
Judiciary Act provided "[t]hat suits in equity shall not be sustained in 
either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, ade-
quate, and complete relief may be had at law."49 If the claim was legal 
in character and the legal remedy was adequate, the claim could not be 
maintained in a court of equity.50 When the Supreme Court adopted 
rules of practice in equity cases, it provided for transfer to the law side 
of actions erroneously initiated in equity.51 
An early analysis of the restriction of equitable jurisdiction in the 
federal courts is contained in Insurance Co. v. Bailey. 52 The plaintiff, a 
life insurance company, refused to pay the proceeds of life insurance 
policies on the basis of alleged fraudulent misrepresentations in the ap-
plication. The company sued in equity to prevent assignment of the 
policies and to have them cancelled. The Court referred to the Judici-
ary Act and noted that whenever a court of law is able to proceed to 
judgment which "affords a plain, adequate and complete remedy ... 
the plaintiff must in general proceed at law, because the defendant, 
under such circumstances, has a right to trial by jury."53 Since the in-
sured had died, the Court determined that the insurance company, as a 
possible defendant in a later action at law on the policy, should be left 
to the assertion of a legal defense to a "purely legal demand."54 In 
discussing instances in which equity might supplant an action at law, 
and hence trial by jury, the Court set forth a scope of equitable jurisdic-
tion which is quite similar to that of Maryland. 55 The Supreme Court 
47. Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 253, 262 (1856). 
48. Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235 (1922). 
49. Judiciary Act ch. 20, § 16, l Stat. 82 (1789), repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 
646, 62 Stat. 869. 
50. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917); Fleit-
man v. Welsbach, 240 U.S. 27 (1916); Cates v. Allen, 149 U.S. 451 (1893); Scott v. 
Neely, 140 U.S. 106 (1891). In United Copper and Fleitman the solicitude for trial 
by jury thwarted the plaintiff from bringing suit at all. Both actions were share-
holder derivative actions which, at that time, were cognizable only in equity. Cj 
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (right to jury trial extends to stockholder's 
derivative suit with respect to those issues as to which the corporation would have 
been entitled to a jury trial had it brought suit). 
51. R. PRAC. EQ. 22, 226 U.S. 654 (1912). 
52. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 616 (1871). 
53. Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 616, 621 (1871). 
54. /d. at 622-23. 
55. The Court held that equity will intervene to "restrain irreparable mischief, or to 
suppress oppressive and interminable litigation or to prevent a multiplicity of suits 
.... " Equity will also act "to rescind written instruments in cases where they 
have been procured by false representations or by the fraudulent suppression of 
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reaffirmed this limitation on equitable jurisdiction in a similar factual 
context. 56 
When legal relief was not as suitable or complete as equitable re-
lief, equity could intervene, even when the substantive issues involved 
were traditionally cognizable at law. In Holland v. Chal/en,57 a plaintiff 
brought an action to quiet title to real estate pursuant to a Nebraska 
statute which expanded the class of plaintiffs able to sue in equity. The 
Court assumed that the defense was lack of equitable jurisdiction be-
cause the plaintiff's title had not been adjudged at law and because the 
plaintiff was not in possession of the real property. The Supreme Court 
noted that since the defendants were not in possession, an action at law 
would provide an inadequate remedy. The Court held: 
It is not an objection to the jurisdiction of equity that legal 
questions are presented for consideration which might also 
arise in a court of law. If the controversy be one in which a 
court of equity only can afford the relief prayed for, its juris-
diction is unaffected by the character of the questions 
involved. 58 
If the remedy in equity was in any way more suitable than the legal 
remedy, equitable jurisdiction attached to the controversy. 59 
Once equitable jurisdiction attached, equity was able to resolve all 
aspects of the controversy, whether such matters were already before 
the chancellor or whether it was necessary to enjoin the prosecution of 
other suits.60 The operation of this principle, sometimes referred to as 
"equitable cleanup," may be seen in American Life Insurance Co. v. 
Stewart,61 an action similar to Insurance Co. v. Bailey.62 In Stewart, the 
life insurance company brought two suits in equity to cancel two insur-
ance policies on the grounds of fraud in their procurement. The de-
fendant beneficiaries moved to dismiss the bill for want of equity, and 
sued on the law side to recover on the policies. The parties stipulated 
that the equity case would be tried first, and the equity court ordered 
cancellation. The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's dismis-
the truth," and "to enjoin such instruments where they operate as a cloud upon 
the title of the opposite party .... " 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 621-22. As to the scope 
of equitable jurisdiction based on an inadequate remedy at law in Maryland, see 
infra notes 245-81 and accompanying text. 
56. Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935). 
57. 110 u.s. 15 (1884). 
58. Holland v. Challen, 110 U.S. 15, 25 (1884). 
59. See Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 12 (1898). 
60. In Camp v. Boyd, 229 U.S. 530 (1913), the Court upheld equitable jurisdiction to 
enjoin an action in ejectment. The ejectment action involved three lots, and the 
plaintiff in equity, defendant in ejectment, had legal title, hence a good defense at 
law, to only one lot. The need to resort to equity as to two of the lots permitted 
the court of equity to adjudicate the rights of the parties with respect to all three 
lots. See Greene v. Louisville & I. R.R., 244 U.S. 499, 520 (1917). 
61. 300 u.s. 203 (1937). 
62. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 616 (1871). 
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sal, which was based on the fact that the insurance company had an 
adequate remedy at law.63 
At the time of the commencement of its equity action, the defend-
ant in Stewart, unlike the defendant in Bailey, had no adequate defense 
at law. Under the policy terms in Stewart, requiring the insurance 
company to wait to assert its defense in an action at law would permit 
the beneficiaries to wait until the policy had become incontestable. 64 
The Court also considered the possibility that the beneficiaries might 
not be present if the insurance company were required to wait to assert 
its defense to the policy.65 
Significantly, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the 
equity suits should have been dismissed once the beneficiaries sued at 
law. The Court held that: "the settled rule is that equitable jurisdiction 
existing at the filing of a bill is not destroyed because an adequate legal 
remedy may have become available thereafter."66 The Court observed 
that the chancellor, in his discretion, could have held the equity suit in 
abeyance while the action at law proceeded. In this case, however, the 
beneficiaries had stipulated that possibility away. 
This discretion to retain an entire controversy in equity, even 
when the remedy at law became adequate, gave the chancellor the 
power to determine whether trial by jury would be accorded to any part 
of the controversy. A party could lose the right to trial by jury by as-
serting a legal claim in a suit for equitable relief,67 or by asserting a 
legal counterclaim in an equitable suit.68 
The Law and Equity Act of 191569 permitted adjudication of equi-
63. American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937), reversing80 F.2d 600 (lOth 
Cir. 1935), on reh'g, 85 F.2d 791 (lOth Cir. 1936). 
64. /d. at 212. 
65. /d. at 213-14. 
66. /d. at 215. 
67. Frederick v. Surloff, 4 F.2d 589 (D.C. Pa. 1924). 
68. American Mills Co. v. American Sur., 260 U.S. 360 (1922). In American Mills, the 
Supreme Court held that R. PRAc. EQ. 30, which made certain counterclaims 
compulsory, did not apply to legal claims. By asserting a claim at law in the 
plaintiff's suit in equity, the defendant was held to have waived any argument that 
the court lacked jurisdiction. It was later held that the plaint!ffmight demand a 
jury trial of such a claim. Clifton v. Tomb, 21 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1927). 
69. Act of March 3, 1915, ch. 90, 38 Stat. 956, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 
646, 62 Stat. 996 provides: 
[I]n all actions at law equitable defenses may be interposed by answer, 
plea, or replication without the necessity of filing a bill on the equity side 
of the court. The defendant shall have the same rights in such case as if 
he had filed a bill embodying the defense of seeking the relief prayed for 
in such answer or plea. Equitable relief respecting the subject matter of 
the suit may thus be obtained by answer or plea. In case affirmative 
relief is prayed in such answer or plea, the plaintiff shall file a replica-
tion. Review of the judgment or decree entered in such case shall be 
regulated by rule of court. Whether such review be sought by writ of 
error or by appeal the appellate court shall have full power to render 
such judgment upon the records as law and justice shall require. 
/d. § 274(b). 
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table defenses in actions at law in the federal courts. This primitive 
form of merger made the separation of law and equity less cumber-
some. Under prior practice it was necessary for a defendant asserting 
an equitable defense to file a bill in equity in order to have the law 
action enjoined during the adjudication of the equitable defense.70 As 
a result of the 1915 Act, the law court was able to try the equitable 
defense without transferring the case to equity. It was clear, however, 
that the law court tried such defense as a suit in equity, without a 
jury.71 If any legal issue remained after resolution of the equitable de-
fense, it could be tried by a jury;72 but whether such issue was tried by 
jury or was "cleaned up" by the chancellor was decided by the chancel-
lor.73 Reposition in the chancellor of discretion concerning the availa-
bility of trial by jury in controversies involving legal and equitable 
issues was regarded as consistent with the seventh amendment because 
equity possessed such discretion at the time the seventh amendment 
was adopted.74 The right to trial by jury was protected since the sum-
mary procedure was not considered appropriate unless, under prior 
practice, the inadequacy of the remedy at law would have justified the 
interposition of equity.75 
B. Jury Trial and the Scope of Equity After Merger 
Merger of law and equity into one civil action removed what had 
been the most stalwart protection of the right to trial by jury. Plaintiffs 
were required to combine related legal and equitable claims in the 
same action or suffer preclusion by res judicata of claims not asserted.76 
A compulsory counterclaim policy required a defendant seeking dam-
ages to counterclaim in a related equitable action.77 In both cases, the 
rules required a party to assert a legal claim in a proceeding in which 
there was a basis for equitable relief. The rules, of course, permitted 
other forms of combination of legal and equitable issues, such as the 
joinder by a plaintiff of legal and equitable claims against different de-
70. Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 243 (1922). 
71. Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935). This procedure is not 
entirely unlike former Md. R.P. 342(d)(l) (1977) which permitted assertion of eq-
uitable defenses in actions at law by special plea. This rule does not grant courts 
of law in Maryland the power to administer relief which is purely equitable, such 
as cancellation or reformation of contracts. See Conner v. Groh, 90 Md. 674, 45 
A. 1024 (1900). 
72. Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 242 (1922). 
73. Id at 244. 
74. Id at 243. 
75. Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 384 (1935). 
76. See Hennepin Paper Co. v. Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co., 153 F.2d 822 (7th 
Cir. 1946). 
77. FED. R. C1v. P. l3(a); see also Lisle Mills v. Arkay Infants Wear, 90 F. Supp. 676 
(E.D.N.Y. 1950) (jury trial right preserved as to counterclaim). 
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fendants, 78 permissive counterclaims by defendants/9 cross-claims,80 
and third party claims_BI Merger oflaw and equity confronted the fed-
eral courts with a choice: restrict the chancellor's discretion with respect 
to the order and mode of trial of actions in which legal and equitable 
claims were combined, or suffer a substantial, but probably unin-
tended, erosion of the right to trial by jury. In Beacon Theatres v. West-
over82 and its progeny, the Supreme Court ultimately took decisive 
action to protect the right to trial by jury. As shown infra, however, the 
Beacon opinion may be read as distorting the historic concept of the 
right to trial by jury and the scope of equity in ways which would find 
little sanction in Maryland jurisprudence. Thus, Maryland lawyers 
may find the greatest guidance regarding the effect of merger on trial 
by jury in the federal cases decided after merger and before Beacon. 
A few decisions in that period held that it was necessary to restrict 
the discretion of the chancellor in order to protect the right to trial by 
jury. In Bruckman v. Hollzer, 83 the plaintiff sought damages, an ac-
counting, and various forms of injunctive relief for copyright infringe-
ment. The trial court submitted the action for damages to the jury and 
simultaneously tried the equitable claims to the extent practicable. The 
defendant contended that the plaintiff, by combining claims for legal 
and equitable relief in the same suit, had waived his right to trial by 
jury.84 The court, however, saw a duty to preserve the right to trial by 
jury in the face of consolidation of legal and equitable issues provided 
by the rules. In Bruckman, the trial court protected the right by con-
forming its own findings to those of the jury with respect to issues com-
mon to the legal and equitable claims. 
In Leimer v. Woods, 85 a suit by the Federal Administrator of Price 
Controls against a landlord under the Emergency Price Control Act of 
1942,86 the plaintiff sought an injunction, a restitutionary order, and a 
judgment for damages in favor of the United States. The court con-
cluded that the damages relief sought was independent of the injunc-
tive and restitutionary relief, and thus the defendant was entitled to a 
78. FED. R. Crv. P. 20. 
79. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(b). 
80. FED. R. C1v. P. 13(g). 
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 14. 
82. 359 u.s. 500 (1959). 
83. 152 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1946). 
84. Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1946). The defendant relied on 
the opinion of Judge Cardozo in DiMenna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 220 N.Y. 391, 
115 N.E. 993 (1917), which held: "[t]he rule is fundamental that where a plaintiff 
seeks legal and equitable relief in respect of the same wrong, his right to trial by 
jury is lost." Id. at 396, 115 N.E. at 994. 
85. 196 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1952). 
86. Acts of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, tit. II,§ 205, 56 Stat. 33; Act of June 30, 1944, ch. 325, 
tit. I,§ 108(a), (b), (d), (e), 58 Stat. 640; Act of July 25, 1946, ch. 671, §§ 12, 13, 60 
Stat. 676, 677; Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 361, tit. I,§ 101,61 Stat. 619 (formerly 50 
U.S.C. App. § 925) (terminated June 30, 1947 pursuant to former 50 U.S.C. App. 
§ 901). 
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jury trial. The court presciently noted that long range protection of the 
right to jury trial required a sympathetic judicial attitude. Where the 
legal and equitable claims involved coordinate issues, the legal issues 
should be tried first.87 To the court, it was 
inexorably clear that any such union of equitable and legal 
claims in a complaint, under Rule 18(a), should not nakedly 
be employed as, or unconcernedly be permitted to become, an 
instrument for curbing or prejudicing the substantive and fun-
damental right of jury trial, as that nght otherwise would exist 
in relation to a separate legal cause of action which has been 
joined in the complaint.88 
In Elkins v. Nobe/, 89 the inclusion of a claim to set aside a fraudu-
lent conveyance in a suit for damages did not deprive the defendant of 
his jury trial right. The trial court decided to empanel a jury and then 
to take whatever additional evidence was necessary with respect to the 
fraudulent conveyance issue. 
In these cases, priority was clearly accorded the jury adjudication 
in order to prevent prior equitable findings from becoming the law of 
the case.90 These decisions before Beacon Theatres 91 do not reflect a 
constitutionally-mandated contraction of the scope of equity, but rather 
the sensitivity of a trial judge possessed of equitable powers to the right 
of trial by jury. Similar sensitivity with respect to the scope of equity 
may be found in decisions of the Court of Appeals of Maryland.92 
Several lower court decisions in the post-merger, pre-Beacon Thea-
tres period protected the right to jury trial in actions involving both 
legal and equitable claims by looking past the conflicting claims for 
relief and characterizing the actions as essentially legal. In such cases, 
a right to trial by jury was accorded primarily because the subject mat-
ter was such that a plaintiff would be entitled to trial by jury if only 
damages were claimed. This approach overlooked the well-established 
principle that equity was competent to entertain questions which could 
also be adjudicated in a court of law.93 
In Ransom v. Staso Milling Co.,94 the plaintiff brought an action 
for an injunction of a nuisance and for damages. Though claims for 
legal and equitable relief were combined, the district court refused to 
strike the jury demand and reasoned that 
87. Leimer v. Woods, 196 F.2d 828, 834 (8th Cir. 1952). 
88. Id. at 833. 
89. 1 F.R.D. 357 (E.D.N.Y. 1940). 
90. See Bruckman, 152 F.2d at 732. 
91. 359 u.s. 500 (1959). 
92. See infra notes 189-202 and accompanying text. 
93. See Holland v. Challen, 110 U.S. 15, 25 (1884). Equitable jurisdiction over an 
otherwise legal subject matter has been called concurrent jurisdiction in Mary-
land. See Berman v. Leckner, 188 Md. 321, 327, 52 A.2d 464, 466 (1946). 
94. 2 F.R.D. 128 (D. Vt. 1941). 
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where the gist of the action is for money damages, which at 
common law would fall within a well recognized form of ac-
tion, such as an action of tort for damage to property, or per-
son, the case is for the jury if demand for jury is made, even 
though there has been added an incidental prayer for equita-
ble relief.95 
Characterizing the equitable relief as merely incidental may pre-
serve the jury trial right, but it obviously involves a subjective form of 
analysis.96 In General Motors Corp. v. California Research Corp.,97 the 
plaintiff sought a declaration of the invalidity of the defendant's patent 
and injunctive relief against infringement suits. The defendant counter-
claimed only for damages for infringement. The court noted that the 
defendant would have had a right to trial by jury if it had brought its 
claim as a plaintiff. The court held that the basic issues of infringement 
and validity of the patent were legal, and that they should be tried by a 
jury.9s 
To reach this decision, the court was forced to distinguish two pat-
ent infringement cases in which a jury had been denied in a manner 
which called into question the viability of the "basic issue" approach. 
The two decisions were Bellavance v. Plastic-Craft Novelty Co. 99 and 
Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp. 100 
The General Motors court distinguished Bellevance on the basis 
that the plaintiff therein had sought an injunction and damages. 101 It 
distinguished Beaunit on the basis that neither party had sought dam-
ages. 102 Although the defendant in Beaunit had not sought damages, 
he had, in response to the plaintiff's claim for extensive injunctive re-
lief, counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the patent was 
valid and infringed. 103 In both cases, the same "basic issue" as in Gen-
eral Motors had been raised. In General Motors, the court's holding 
protected trial by jury for a basic legal issue only when raised by the 
defendant in a claim for damages. 
In Ring v. Spina, 104 the Second Circuit made a strong attempt to 
reconcile the right to trial by jury of legal issues with the liberal joinder 
provisions of the Federal Rules. In Ring, the plaintiff sought damages 
95. Id. at 131. 
96. Md. R.P. BF40 (1977) permitted a plaintiff to seek injunctive relief in an action at 
law without compromising the right to trial by jury. Beane v. McMullen, 265 Md. 
585, 291 A.2d 37 (1972). 
97. 9 F.R.D. 565 (D. Del. 1949). 
98. Id. at 567. 
99. 30 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1939). 
100. 124 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1942). 
101. General Motors Corp. v. California Research Corp., 9 F.R.D. 565, 567-68 (D. 
Del. 1949). 
102. Id. 
103. Beaunit, 124 F.2d 562. 
104. 166 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1948). 
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and injunctive relief under the Sherman Act. 105 The court rejected the 
defendant's contention that the plaintiff had waived trial by jury by 
seeking both legal and equitable relief and held that 
the basic nature of the claim for damages for violation of the 
Anti-Trust Act to this complaint is, we think, quite clear. 
Such a claim, it is well settled, is triable by jury on timely 
demand of a party. 106 
A series of cases resorted to the basic issue test to prevent insur-
ance companies from depriving insureds of trial by jury in actions for 
declaratory judgment to establish nonliability. 107 The results in these 
"inverted" suits represented an unwillingness by the courts to treat de-
claratory judgment actions as inherently equitable, 108 rather than any 
desire to restrict the traditional scope of equity in favor oftrial by jury. 
This unwillingness was later vindicated by the Supreme Court. 109 
With the possible exception of cases involving land titles and de-
claratory judgments, 110 the basic legal issue analysis has little support 
in Maryland. Experience in states with merged systems which have 
adopted this mode of analysis to determine the availability of trial by 
jury indicates that trial judges are permitted discretion similar to that 
exercised in equity before merger. 111 
Many decisions in the post-merger, pre-Beacon Theatres period 
did not prevent trial courts, in their discretion, from denying a jury trial 
of traditionally le§al issues in suits in which legal and equitable claims 
were combined. 11 Thus, a plaintiff who sued an insurance company 
on an annuity contract and combined alternative claims for damages 
and rescission and restitution was held to have waived trial by jury by 
invoking equity. 113 Trial by jury was also denied in suits by bank-
ruptcy trustees who sought not only money judgments but also the set-
ting aside of fraudulent conveyances. 114 When legal and equitable 
claims were combined, the trial court determined not only the order of 
105. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1-2629 (1982). 
106. Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546, 550 (2d Cir. 1948). 
107. See Johnson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 238 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1956); Dickinson 
v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 147 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1945); 
Pacific lndem. Co. v. McDonald, 107 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1939). 
108. Johnson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 238 F.2d 322, 324-25 (8th Cir. 1956); Dickin-
son v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 147 F.2d 396, 397-98 (9th 
Cir. 1945); Pacific lndem. Co. v. McDonald, 107 F.2d 446, 446 (8th Cir. 1939). 
109. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959). This is also true in 
Maryland. See Himes v. Day, 254 Md. 197, 206, 254 A.2d 181, 186 (1969). 
110. See infra notes 233-37 and accompanying text. 
111. See infra notes 371-75. 
112. Note, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term; V Federal Procedure, 73 HARv. L. REv. 
188-89 (1959). 
113. Fitzpatrick v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 1 F.R.D. 713 (D.N.J. 1941). 
114. Conn v. Kohlemann, 2 F.R.D. 514 (E.D. Pa. 1942); Williams v. Collier, 32 F. 
Supp. 321 (E.D. Pa. 1940). 
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the trial, but also whether trial by jury was permitted. 115 The Supreme 
Court did nothing to discourage such an approach. 116 
During this period the standards for exercising judicial discretion 
with regard to the mode of trial were undefined. Most cases after 
merger and before Beacon Theatres which considered the scope of eq-
uity with respect to the trial by jury did not recognize the threat to jury 
trial inherent in merger. For the most part, the strong equitable 
cleanup policy existing at the time of merger continued. Hence, there 
was undoubted erosion of the jury trial right by equitable encroach-
ment. This process was abruptly checked in Beacon Theatres and sub-
sequent decisions. 
C The Pre-Eminence of Trial by Jury after Beacon Theatres 
In Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 117 the Supreme Court for the first 
time confronted the threat posed to the right to trial by jury by a 
merged system. Beacon Theatres dealt with the situation which posed 
the most egregious threat to trial by jury-the assertion of a compul-
sory "legal" counterclaim by a defendant in a suit in which the plaintiff 
sought equitable relief. The plaintiff, a movie theater operator, had 
contracted with film distributors for the exclusive right to show first-run 
films. The defendant owned a drive-in theater located eleven miles 
away from the plaintiff, and it notified the plaintiff that it considered 
contracts granting these exclusive rights to be an overt violation of the 
antitrust laws. The plaintiff alleged that this notification, as well as 
threats of treble damage suits against the plaintiff and its distributors, 
gave rise to duress and coercion, depriving the plaintiff of a valuable 
property right. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that its 
agreements were not in violation of the antitrust laws and an injunction 
to prevent the defendant from initiating any action under the antitrust 
laws against the plaintiff and its distributors until final resolution of the 
pending litigation. The defendant, seeking treble damages, counter-
claimed under the antitrust laws and demanded a trial by jury. 118 
The outcome of both the claim and the counterclaim depended 
upon the reasonableness of the exclusive rights granted to the plaintiff 
by the distributors which, in part, depended upon the existence of com-
petition between the parties. The district court viewed the issues of the 
complaint as "essentially equitable," and ordered that these issues be 
tried by the court prior to jury determination of the validity of the 
counterclaimed charges of antitrust violations. 119 The Ninth Circuit 
115. Institutional Drug Distrib., Inc. v. Yankwich, 249 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1957); 
Tamimura v. United States, 195 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1952); Orenstein v. United 
States, 191 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1951). 
116. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946). 
117. 359 u.s. 500 (1959). 
118. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 503 (1959). 
119. Id. 
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Court of Appeals noted that trial of the plaintiff's claim, because it 
contained issues common to the defendant's claims, would operate 
either by way of res judicata or collateral estoppel so as to preclude 
both parties with respect to issues in the subsequent trial of the treble 
damage claim. 120 It was this prior resolution in equity of issues that a 
jury would necessarily consider in adjudicating the legal claim which 
would render meaningless the jury trial right. Yet this practice was 
perfectly consistent with pre-merger practice. 121 
The Supreme Court rejected the notion that resort by the plaintiff 
to the Declaratory Judgment Act122 created such equitable jurisdic-
tion. 123 The Court, however, viewed the complaint as "alleging the 
kind of harassment by a multiplicity of lawsuits which would tradition-
ally have justified equity to take jurisdiction and settle the case." 124 
The Court determined that the defendant was entitled to a trial by jury 
on the issues of the antitrust counterclaim for damages, and that he 
could not be denied this right by a prior determination of the plaintiff's 
claim. 125 Prior equitable adjudication of issues common to legal claims 
in actions with mixed legal and equitable claims was to be justified 
only under the new test of inadequacy of the remedy at law set forth in 
Beacon Theatres. 
The concept of inadequacy of the remedy at law is, of course, a 
traditional prerequisite to equitable jurisdiction.126 The Court held 
that this concept now had to be viewed in light of the post-merger abil-
ity of the federal courts to administer both legal and equitable relief 
and the availability of the Declaratory Judgment Act. 127 Although eq-
120. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 359 
U.S. 500 (1959). One might argue that according a collateral estoppel effect to 
findings would be incongruous in that, absent a determination under FED. R. C1v. 
P. 54(b), a judgment as to only part of a case should not be regarded as final, a 
requirement for issue preclusion. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTS§ lOOA (4th 
ed. 1983). In accepting the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit that prior equitable 
adjudication of factual issues common to the legal counterclaim would preclude 
relitigation of such issues, the Court tacitly adopted the pragmatic approach of the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS. In some instances the Restatement 
permits factual findings which have not become the subject of a final appealable 
JUdgment to be conclusive. It notes: "In particular circumstances the wisest 
course is to regard the prior decision of [an] issue as final for the purpose of issue 
preclusion without awaiting the end judgment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS§ 13, comment g (1982). Whether or not the application of issue pre-
clusion to these circumstances is logically tidy, the Supreme Court has unques-
tionably regarded it as applicable. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 
322, 335 (1979); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 334 (1966). 
121. Beacon, 359 U.S. at 517 (Stewart, J ., dissenting). See also American Life Ins. Co. 
v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937). 
122. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1982). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 57. 
123. Beacon, 359 U.S. at 504-05. 
124. /d. at 506 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied). 
125. /d. at 504. 
126. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text. 
127. Beacon, 359 U.S. at 506-10. 
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uity might have enjoined rrosecution of an action at law by the defend-
ant prior to merger, 12 such equitable interposition was now 
unnecessary. The plaintiff now was able to get a declaration of its legal 
position, and the defendant was essentially compelled to assert his anti-
trust counterclaim in the plaintiff's action. As there were no longer any 
circumstances which required equity to intervene, equity should not be 
allowed to preclude the issues in the claim triable by the jury. The 
flexibility of remedies made available to trial judges by merger, includ-
ing the joinder provisions of the Federal Rules and the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, substantially curtailed the scope of equity129 and per-
mitted trial by jury in cases in which it would formerly have been pre-
cluded by equitable intervention. 
Perceiving a need to protect the right to jury trial, the Court justi-
fied the subordination or curtailment of equity on the basis that there is 
no constitutional protection for trial by the court. 130 The Court cited 
Scott v. Neeij 31 for the proposition that the right to trial by jury cannot 
"be impaired by any blending with a claim, properly cognizable at law, 
of a demand for equitable relief in aid of the legal action or during its 
pendency." 132 From "[t]his longstanding principle of equity," the 
Court concluded that: 
only under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances 
which in view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules 
we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of legal 
issues be lost through prior determination of equitable 
claims.t33 
The conclusion reached by the Court in Beacon Theatres, however, 
was much broader than that justified by the equitable principle set 
forth in Scott. Scott involved a simple action for debt brought in a 
federal equity court, pursuant to a Mississippi statute which granted 
state chancery courts equitable jurisdiction to entertain actions by non-
judgment creditors to set aside fraudulent conveyances. 134 The plain-
tiff's suit was thus an attempt to effectuate a state statutory grant of 
equitable jurisdiction in a federal court. The Supreme Court found 
federal equity jurisdiction lacking: 
In the case before us the debt due the complainants was in no 
respect different from any other debt upon contract; it was the 
suoject of a legal action only, in which the defendants were 
entitled to a jury trial in the Federal courts. Uniting with a 
demand for Its payment, under the statute of Mississippi, a 
128. Id. at 507. 
129. Id. at 516-18 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
130. Id. at 510. 
131. 140 u.s. 106 (1891). 
132. Id. at 110. 
133. Beacon, 359 U.S. at 510-ll (footnote omitted). 
134. Miss. CoDE§ 1843 (1880) (current version at Miss. CoDE ANN.§ 11-5-75 (1972)). 
1984) Merger of Law & Equity 
proceeding to set aside alleged fraudulent conveyances of the 
defendants, did not take that right from them, or in any re-
spect impair it. 135 
23 
The Court also referred to Section 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 136 
which precluded equitable jurisdiction where there was an adequate 
remedy at law. The Court's position was consistent with the equitable 
principle that "[i]n the absence of a statute, a simple contract creditor 
cannot, in general maintain a creditor's bill" without first obtaining a 
judgment at law. 137 The Scott Court did not hold that a jury trial could 
not be pre-empted by equitable adjudication when grounds for equita-
ble intervention were present. Thus, Scott does not support the notion 
that, after merger, equity must be contracted to protect the right to trial 
by jury. Such a contraction expands the right to trial by jury. As noted 
infra, many states which have merged law and equity have not simi-
larly restricted equitable power. 138 While the Court in Beacon Theatres 
may have misread Scott, it recognized that, after merger, the choice 
either to curtail equitable discretion or to curtail the right to trial by 
jury had to be made. Because jury trial is a constitutional right, the 
Court chose to curtail equitable discretion. The comment by the dis-
senters in Beacon Theatres that "[i]t is, of course, a matter of no great 
moment in what order the issues between the parties in the present liti-
gation are tried ... " 139 is a head-in-the-sand approach to the effect of 
merger on jury trial. 
Perhaps Beacon Theatres is the simplest application of the 
Supreme Court's protective attitude toward trial by jury. The case in-
volved two discrete claims, one of which, the antitrust claim, was tria-
ble by jury. The ·Supreme Court was not required to determine 
whether and to what extent a jury would be required in the trial of a 
particular claim with mixed legal and equitable aspects. The Supreme 
Court's next major decision in this area, Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 140 
dealt with such a problem and extended the right to trial by jury in a 
more subtle context, in part, at least, on the basis of an even grosser 
distortion of Scott. 
In Dairy Queen, the plaintiffs, owners of the trademark "DAIRY 
QUEEN," had made a franchise agreement with the defendant for use 
of its trademark. The plaintiffs were to receive most of their payments 
under the contract from fifty percent of the gross receipts of the defend-
ant. Several years later the plaintiffs notified the defendant that the 
135. Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, I 10 (I89I). 
136. Judiciary Act ch. 20, § I6, I Stat. 82 (I789) repealed by Act of June 25, I948, ch. 
646, 62 Stat. 869. 
137. 2 J. POMEROY, JR., A TREATISE ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES § 882 (I905). 
138. See infta note 295. 
139. Beacon, 359 U.S. at 5I4. 
I40. 369 u.s. 469 (1962). 
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defendant had breached the contract. The defendant, however, contin-
ued to use the trademark. 
The plaintiffs sued, alleging a material breach in the contract and 
a default in payments under the contract. The plaintiffs alleged that 
failure to cure the breach constituted a cancellation of the contract and 
that the defendant's continued use of the trademark after the cancella-
tion constituted trademark infringement. The plaintiffs contended that 
they lacked an adequate remedy at law. They sought temporary and 
permanent injunctions to restrain the defendant from future use or 
dealing in the franchise and trademark, an accounting to determine the 
exact amount of money owed by the defendant, and a judgment for 
that amount. They also sought an injunction pending the accounting to 
prevent the defendant from collecting money from Dairy Queen stores 
in the territory. 141 The defendant demanded a jury trial. The district 
court granted the plaintiffs' motion to strike the jury demand on the 
alternative grounds that the action was purely equitable and that 
whatever legal issues were raised were incidental to the equitable is-
sues.142 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied the defendant's 
request for a writ of mandamus to vacate this order. 
Dairy Queen differed from Beacon Theatres in that neither party in 
Dairy Queen ostensibly asserted a discrete claim to which the right to 
trial by jury attached. The plaintiffs asserted claims for injunctive re-
lief and an accounting, and the defendant did not counterclaim. Never-
theless, the defendant contended that "insofar as the complaint 
requests a money judgment it presents a claim which is unquestionably 
legal." 143 The Supreme Court agreed that the action, viewed either as 
an action for breach of contract or for trademark infringement, would 
be "subject to cognizance by a court of law."144 Although the plaintiffs 
contended that their complaint was cast in terms of an accounting 
rather than an action for debt or damages, the Court held that "the 
constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be made to depend upon the 
choice of words used in the pleadings." 145 
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that equitable jurisdic-
tion was established by its demand for an accounting. It held that in an 
action cognizable at law, the plaintiff seeking equitable jurisdiction of 
legal claims must be able to show that the accounts between the parties 
are of such a complicated nature that a jury, even with the help of 
a master, 146 cannot satisfactorily resolve them. 147 The Court noted 
141. Id. at 475. 
142. McCullough v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 686, 687-88 (1961), rev'd sub nom. 
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). 
143. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 476. 
144. Id. at 477. 
145. Id. at 477-78. 
146. See FED. R. C1v. P. 53(b) (in actions tried by jury, a master may be appointed 
when issues are complicated). 
147. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 478. 
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that an accounting would rarely serve as a basis for equitable 
jurisdiction.148 
The Court noted common issues between the claim for injunctive 
relief and the legal claim for a monetary judgment, and followed Bea-
con Theatres by holding that only under the most imperative circum-
stances could trial of the legal issues be lost through prior adjudication 
of the equitable claims. 149 T~ Court again relied on Scott, citing it for 
the proposition that a court of equity could not take jurisdiction of a 
claim cognizable only at law when it is united in the same pleading 
with a claim for equitable relief. 150 
In this respect, however, Scott must be viewed in its factual con-
text. Under established equitable principles, the contract claim in Scott 
was cognizable only at law, because it had not been reduced to judg-
ment and was combined with a claim to set aside a fraudulent convey-
ance, ordinarily a post-judgment equitable remedy. It is one thing to 
posit that joinder of a claim for post-judgment relief cannot transform 
a legal claim into an equitable one; it is, in view of the historic scope of 
equity, quite another to say that joinder of a claim for an injunction 
with a legal claim does not justify equity in assuming jurisdiction over 
the whole case. 151 Again, truncation of the historic scope of equity was 
justified by the Court on the basis of the expanded powers of the dis-
trict courts following merger. 
To the extent that .Dairy Queen prevented avoidance of trial by 
jury by blatant mischaracterization of actions for debt as actions for 
accounting, it was a sensible result. The extent to which .Dairy Queen 
sifted out legal issues for prior trial by jury when, ostensibly, nothing 
but equitable relief was demanded, was novel,1 52 Nevertheless, the pol-
icy of .Dairy Queen, if somewhat historically anomalous, is clear: legal 
issues, not just discrete legal claims, must be tried first to a jury if the 
collateral estoppel effect of prior equitable adjudication will otherwise 
preclude the right to trial by jury. 
This process was carried a major step further in Ross v. Bern-
148. Id. In In ReUnited States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 424 (9th Cir. 1979), the 
court noted that accounting was a narrow and little used ground for establishing 
equitable jurisdiction. Accounting has not been construed so narrowly as a basis 
for equitable jurisdiction in Maryland. See infra notes 266-74 and accompanying 
text. 
149. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 472-73. 
150. Id. at 471-72. 
151. The Court held that the trial court could, consistent with the right to trial by jury, 
grant temporary injunctive relief pending final adjudication on the merits. Dairy 
Queen, 369 U.S. at 479, n.20. 
152. Although Justice Story had held in Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 
(1830) that suits at common law for purposes of the seventh amendment were not 
limited to actions involving the common law forms but rather "suits in which legal 
rights were to be ascertained and determined ... " (emphasis added), federal 
equity jurisdiction clearly extended to actions involving "legal" issues where there 
was an inadequate remedy at law. Holland v. Challen, 110 U.S. 15 (1884). 
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hard, 153 a shareholders' derivative suit. The Ross plaintiffs sued for 
damages, alleging that defendants were guilty of gross abuse of trust, 
willful misconduct, and gross negligence, and demanded a trial by jury. 
The district court held that only the issue of whether the plaintiff had 
standing to speak for the corporation had to be tried by the court. On 
an interlocutory appeal the Second Circuit reversed, holding that a 
shareholders' derivative action is entirely equitable, and that no part of 
it should be tried by a jury. 154 
From an historical perspective, the view of the Second Circuit with 
respect to the inapplicability of trial by jury in derivative actions was 
correct. 155 That court recognized the refusal at common law "to permit 
stockholders to call corporate managers to account in actions at 
law." 156 Equity had filled this void by permitting the development of 
the derivative action. The Supreme Court reversed. The majority 
noted that the derivative suit has two stages: 1) the equitable matter of 
standing of the plaintiff to represent the shareholders; and 2) the under-
lying legal claim asserted on behalf of the corporation. The Court held 
that the federal rules permitted the district court to entertain both 
claims. 157 The Court stated: 
It is no longer tenable for a district court, administering both 
law and equity in the same action, to deny legal remedies to a 
corporation, merely because the corporation's spokesmen are 
its shareholders rather than its directors. 158 
By contracting the scope of equity, the Court again focused on the 
nature of the issues rather than on historical procedural limitations. In 
determining the applicability vel non of trial by jury, the Court held 
"that the right to jury trial attaches to those issues in derivative actions 
as to which the corporation, if it had been suing in its own right, would 
have been entitled to a trial by jury." 159 Mandating a jury as to a legal 
corporate claim created a right that had not existed prior to merger. In 
dissent, Justice Stewart chided, perhaps legitimately, that the Court re-
lied on an "ill-defined combination of the Seventh Amendment and the 
Federal Rules ... to do what each was expressly intended not to do, 
namely to enlarge the right to a jury trial in civil actions brought in the 
courts of the United States." 160 
The Court stated in a footnote that whether an issue is legal is 
determined by pre-merger custom, by the remedy sought, and by the 
153. 396 u.s. 531 (1970). 
154. 403 F.2d 909, 912 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). 
155. See United Copper Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917); F1eit-
man v. Welsbach, 240 U.S. 27 (1916). 
156. Ross, 396 U.S. at 534. 
157. /d. at 539. 
158. /d. at 540. 
159. /d. at 532-33. 
160. /d. at 543 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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practical abilities and limitations of juries. 161 The consideration of the 
third factor, the practical abilities of juries, introduced the notion that 
trial by jury might be denied in otherwise legal actions because the 
issues were too complex for a jury. 162 
As to what types of legal issues the right to jury trial attaches in a 
hybrid claim, the most significant guidance provided by the Supreme 
Court came in Curtis v. Loether. 163 This was a suit for damages and 
injunctive relief under the fair housing provisions of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968.164 The defendant demanded a trial by jury. The trial court 
denied the demand; the Seventh Circuit reversed. 165 The plaintiff con-
tended that the seventh amendment did not apply to new causes of 
action created by congressional enactment. 166 The Supreme Court held 
that the suit was an action to enforce legal rights within the meaning of 
the seventh amendment: 
A damages action under the statute sounds basically in tort -
the statute merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the 
courts to compensate a plaintiff for the mjury caused by the 
defendant's wrongful breach . . . . [T]his cause of action is 
analogous to a number of tort actions recognized at common 
law. More important, the relief sought here- actual and pu-
nitive damages - is the traditional form of relief offered in 
the courts of law. 167 
In determining whether issues are triable by the jury by looking to the 
nature ofthe right and the remedy at common law, Curtis blunted criti-
cism by Justice Stewart in Ross that post-Beacon Theatres decisions 
would swallow up equity: 
An equitable suit for an injunction, for instance, often in-
volves issues of fact which, if damages had been sought, 
would have been triable to a jury. Does this mean that m a 
suit asking only for injunctive relief these factual issues must 
be tried to the JUry, with the judge left to decide only whether, 
given the jury's findings, an injunction is the appropriate 
161. /d. at 538 n.lO. 
162. A few federal districts have stricken jury demands because of the complexity of 
the issues. See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Ma-
chines, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (antitrust); Bernstein v. Universal Pic-
tures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (antitrust); Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. 
International Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (trademark and pat-
ent infringement); In re Boise Cascade Securities Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. 
Wash. 1976) (securities). But see In reUnited States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 
431 (9th Cir. 1979) (the court refused to read such a complexity exception into the 
seventh amendment). 
163. 415 u.s. 189 (1974). 
164. 42 u.s.c. § 3612 (1982). 
165. Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1972), ajf'd sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 
415 u.s. 189 (1974). 
166. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193. 
167. /d. at 196 (footnote omitted). 
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remedy? 168 
Since Curtis, the lower federal courts have analyzed the remedy 
sought as well as the nature of the action in order to determine the 
applicability of the right to trial by jury. 169 There is no right to trial by 
jury if only equitable relief, such as injunction, 170 rescission, 171 restitu-
tion, 172 cancellation, 173 or foreclosure 174 is sought. 
Under current federal practice, courts analyze the nature of the 
action and the remedy sought to determine the applicability of the right 
to trial by jury. Historically equitable procedures, such as class ac-
tions175 and actions involving interpleader, 176 intervention, 177 and con-
tribution178 preliminary to the merits may be equitable, but the 
underlying issues and the relief sought are determinative of the jury 
trial issue at later stages of the lawsuit. Because there is no right to jury 
trial of claims against the United States, the Federal Tort Claims Act 179 
presents a difficult question concerning that right when the United 
States is joined as a defendant with others. 180 Some courts consider the 
jury verdict as to other defendants as advisory regarding issues of fact 
relevant to the liability of the United States. 181 This practice has not 
been unanimously accepted. 182 
Analysis of the federal experience with merger indicates that 
Maryland's revised rules will present mixed legal and equitable claims 
in situations which have not heretofore been encountered. For the 
most part, the ultimate federal response in such situations has been to 
expand the scope of the jury trial right. Although this expansion has 
not been reflexive or without thought, a merged system does not re-
168. Ross, 396 U.S. at 549-50 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
169. Thus, in Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981), the court 
held that the right to trial by jury attached to an action for injunction and mini-
mum statutory damages for copyright infringement brought under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 504(c) (1976) because the right was analogous to tortious interference with a 
property right, and the remedy was analogous to an action for debt. ld at 120-21. 
In Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 934 
(1978), the court used similar reasoning to find a trial by jury right with respect to 
damage claims under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1982). 
170. See Lulling v. Barnaby's Family Inns, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 720 (E.D. Wis. 1980). 
171. See Skippy, Inc. v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 674 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 
u.s. 969 (1982). 
172. See S.E.C. v. Asset Management Corp., 456 F. Supp. 998 (S.D. Ind. 1978). 
173. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oubre, 93 F.R.D. 622 (M.D. La. 1982). 
174. See Gefen v. United States, 400 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1968); Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 
F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1961). 
175. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2307 (1971). 
176. See Pan Am. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960). 
177. See 5 J. MoORE, J. LUCAS & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 38.38(3] 
(2d ed. 1982). 
178. See In re N-500L cases, 691 F.2d 15 (lst Cir. 1982). 
179. 28 u.s.c. §§ l346(b), 2671 (1982). 
180. See Barron v. United States, 654 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1981). 
181. See Poston v. United States, 262 F. Supp. 22 (D. Hawaii 1966). 
182. See Wright v. United States, 80 F.R.D. 478 (D. Mont. 1978). 
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quire the expansion of the jury trial right merely because the Constitu-
tion preserves such a right. Merger may instead result in the expansion 
of the scope of equity, as has been the tendency throughout Maryland 
legal history. 
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EQUITY AND THE 
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN MARYLAND 
A. The Right to Trial by Jury 
The division of law and equity acted as a guarantor of the right to 
trial by jury. In Maryland, this division never really served as an abso-
lute protection. There has been limited power for a court of law to 
entertain equitable defenses, and there was considerable power in 
courts of equity to entertain strictly legal claims and grant monetary 
relief. 183 Prior to merger, however, there were limitations on the extent 
to which the law and equity courts could entertain claims within each 
other's jurisdiction. A merged system places legal claims and issues in 
tribunals capable of exercising equitable jurisdiction and equitable 
power. 
There appears to be little Maryland authority compelling the 
courts to adopt doctrines comparable to those adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Beacon Theatres, .Dairy Queen and their progeny to preserve 
the right to trial by jury as it existed at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution. If there is no such authority, then the question arises 
whether Maryland trial judges must order proceedings involving both 
legal and equitable claims so as to prevent loss of the jury trial right. If 
trial judges do not respect traditional limitations on the scope of equita-
ble powers and instead deem themselves to have the power to exercise 
untrammeled jurisdiction as chancellors over all hitherto legal claims, 
the adoption of the revised rules will result in considerable contraction 
of the right to trial by jury. 
The issues decided in Beacon Theatres and .Dairy Queen have not 
been squarely confronted by Maryland's appellate courts. 184 Neverthe-
less, some Maryland decisions indicate an intention to prevent undue 
encroachment by chancery on jurisdiction of courts of law and the right 
to trial by jury. 
In an early decision, Richardson v. Stillinger, 185 the court of ap-
peals demonstrated a keen awareness of the potential effect of the ex-
183. As discussed earlier, some consolidation of legal and equitable issues was permit-
ted in federal courts by statute in the Law and Equity Act of 1915, Act of March 3, 
1915, ch. 90, 38 Stat. 956, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 996. 
See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. 
184. A decision of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, Smith v. Edwards, 46 
Md. App. 452,418 A.2d 1227 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 292 Md. 60,437 A.2d 
221 ( 1981 ), explicitly rejected the holding of Dairy Queen, that the right to trial by 
jury could not be avoided by resort to equity. 
185. 25 Md. 326, 12 G. & J. 477 (1842). 
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pansion of equity jurisdiction on the right to trial by jury. The plaintiff 
therein sued in chancery to enforce a vendor's lien because of the de-
fendant's default in payment of a note. The court reversed the trial 
court's judgment for the plaintiff on the basis that the plaintiff had an 
adequate remedy at law, an action on the note, and therefore had no 
need to resort to equity. 
Recognizing the difficulty of determining when equity jurisdiction 
is appropriate, 186 the court asserted that actions at law were the supe-
rior method of trial "of most of the controversies between man and 
man." 187 The court also lauded the Federal Judiciary Act's limitation 
on equitable jurisdiction, 188 based on a desire to protect the right to 
trial by jury rather than a need to fastidiously keep the spheres of judi-
cial administration separate and distinct. This desire is demonstrated 
by Maryland's approval of several Virginia decisions which protected 
the right to trial by jury by limiting the scope of equitable jurisdiction 
to situations where the legal remedy was inadequate. 189 One of the 
early Virginia decisions, Turpin v. Thomas, decried "the natural and 
progressive tendency of the jurisdiction of the chancery to encroach 
upon that of the common law courts . . . and thus . . . to lose the 
advantage of jury trial." 190 In 1842, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
explicitly expressed its agreement with Turpin 191 in a decision that can-
not be regarded as a construction of the current civil jury trial right, 
which did not appear in the Maryland Constitution until 1851. 192 
In Johnson & Higgins v. Simpson, 193 the court of appeals had an 
opportunity to consider the problem that later arose in Beacon Theatres 
and Dairy Queen. The plaintiff filed an equitable action for an ac-
counting against the administratrix of an estate, who had asserted a 
legal action against the equity plaintiff to recover a claim of the estate. 
The equity plaintiff also sought to enjoin the action at law. 194 The eq-
uity plaintiff asserted that the accounts were too complex for the 
186. ld. 
187. Id. at 479-80. 
188. See supra note 50. The Federal Judiciary Act precluded equitable jurisdiction 
where there was an adequate remedy at law. 
189. Richardson, 25 Md. at 329, 12 G. & J. at 480. 
190. 4 Va. 377, 380, 2 Hen. & M. 139, 146 (1808); see also Alderson v. Biggars, 4 Va. 
952, 4 Hen. & M. 470 (1809). 
191. Richardson, 25 Md. at 329, 12 G. & J. at 480. 
192. Art. III of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution of 1776 
provided: 
That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law of 
England, and the trial by jury, according to the course of that law .... 
See 3 F. THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAWS 
1492-1508, 1686-87 (1909). This right to jury trial provision was regarded by the 
framers of the 1851 Constitution as subject to restriction by the Legislature. ld. 
193. 165 Md. 83, 166 A. 617 (1933). 
194. The executor's claim was based on services rendered by the deceased to the plain-
tiff in equity. The plaintiff in equity alleged that the deceased had juggled its 
books. Johnson, id. at 88, 166 A. at 619. 
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jury. 195 The defendant argued that her claim could be asserted only at 
law, where the Consitution entitled her to a trial by jury. 196 
Unfortunately, the court of appeals did not decide whether as-
sumption of equitable jurisdiction over what was essentially a defense 
to a legal action would unconstitutionally infringe the equity defend-
ant's right to trial by jury. The court held that "the suit having been 
begun at law, it should there remain .... " 197 Interestingly, the court 
foreshadowed Justice Black's Beacon Theatres analysis of the collateral 
estoppel problem created by separate legal and equitable adjudications 
of the same factual situation by assertinft the untenable assumption that 
both determinations would be proper. 98 Although the Johnson deci-
sion protected the right to trial by jury by keeping the subject matter of 
the equity defendant's legal claim out of the equity court, its holding 
should perhaps be regarded as a statement that equity should not have 
exercised jurisdiction in this isolated instance. 
Allender v. Ghinger99 contains the strongest endorsement of the 
civil jury trial in Maryland jurisprudence. In Allender, the plaintiff was 
appointed to liquidate a bank. He sued the bank's shareholders in eq-
uity to collect the par value of the shareholders' stock. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that resort to equity was not justified to 
avoid multiplicity because, although each shareholder was individually 
liable, new joinder rules eliminated the necessity of separate suits and 
hence rendered the remedy at law adequate.200 The court stated that 
equitable jurisdiction was improper because the defendants would be 
subjected to a forum in which they would be deprived of a trial by 
jury.2°1 Nevertheless, the Allender opinion strongly suggests that the 
respective spheres of law and equity may be altered in such a way as to 
limit the right to trial by jury far more than do the federal courts. After 
citing Mr. Justice Story as to the importance of trial by jury to the 
American people,202 the Allender court cited with approval the old and 
little noted case of Capron v. De Vries,203 which indicates the flexible 
nature of Maryland's right to trial by jury.204 
In Capron, an equity court gave a deficiency judgment against a 
defendant who failed to pay the price bid for property at auction. Pur-
suant to a court order, the property was sold, and the purchase price 
195. /d. The issue of the complexity of the accounts is similar to that raised in Dairy 
Queen. See supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text. The court in Johnson did 
not explicitly resolve the issue as to whether the accounts were sufficiently com-
plex to give equity jurisdiction. 
196. Johnson, 165 Md. at 89, 166 A. at 619. 
197. /d. at 90, 166 A. at 619. 
198. /d. at 89, 166 A. at 619. 
199. 170 Md. 156, 183 A. 610 (1936). 
200. /d. at 164-65, 183 A. at 614. 
201. /d. at 167-68, 183 A. at 615-16. 
202. /d. at 167, 183 A. 616 (citing Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830)). 
203. 83 Md. 220, 34 A. 251 (1896). 
204. Johnson, 165 Md. at 167, 183 A. at 616. 
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was less than that due from the defendant. The defendant argued that 
the equity court's granting judgment for the deficiency violated her 
constitutional right to trial by jury. The court rejected her contention 
and held: 
It can hardly be established that the legislature has not the 
power to enlarge the jurisdiction of equity. The system of eq-
uity jurisprudence has been of steady growth ever since its 
origin; sometimes by the effect of JUdicial decisions, and 
sometimes by statute law. It is difficult to see a reason why 
the legislature could not give it the jurisdiction to pass a de-
cree for the payment of a sum of money which the court finds 
to be due from one suitor to another in a proceeding pending 
before it. 205 
Thus, either the legislature or an appellate court may contract the scope 
of the right to trial by jury by expanding the scope of equity.206 Paying 
heed to Capron, Allender upheld the right to jury trial on the basis that 
no statute or judicial decision had broadened the scope of equity with 
respect to litigation of the subject matter involved. Thus, the jury trial 
right was not upheld simply on the basis that the right itself precluded 
resort to equity. 
Allender becomes less a bulwark of the right to trial by jury when 
it is compared with a later related case, Fooks Executors v. Ghinger.207 
Fooks involved a claim in equity by the same receiver on the same 
basis as Allender. A decree had been entered and had become en-
rolled.208 Since the court of appeals had ruled in Allender that equity 
lacked jurisdiction over such a suit, the appellant in Fooks asserted that 
the decree was void. The court indicated that it regarded the original 
claim by the receiver as legal,209 and that the legislature could not fix 
the scope of equity to violate the constitutional right to trial by jury.210 
205. Capron, 83 Md. at 224, 34 A. at 252. 
206. Of course, the power of the legislature in this respect is not entirely unrestricted. 
In McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889), the court held that the legis-
lature could not deprive suitors of the right to trial by jury with respect to legal 
rights by conferring the right to determine legal rights on courts of equity. /d. at 
492, 17 A. at 387. The case, however, involved only the issue of title to land, and 
the plaintiff did not invoke any of the well-established bases for resort to equity 
when essentially legal rights are at issue. /d. 
207. 172 Md. 612, 192 A. 782 (1937). 
208. The court noted that a bill of review ordinarily must be filed within the time 
permitted for appeal. Fooks, 112 Md. at 617, 192 A. at 784. See Mo. R.P. 625 
(1977). The bill was filed in 1936 by the defendant's executor; the decree sought 
to be reopened had been entered in 1934. Fooks, 172 Md. at 616-17, 192 A. at 784. 
209. Fooks, 112 Md. at 623, 192 A. at 787. 
210. /d. at 625, 192 A. at 788. The court of appeals correctly perceived the intent of the 
framers of Maryland's constitutional right to trial by jury. It was placed in the 
Constitution in 185 1 to protect the jury trial right from encroachment by the legis-
lature, as indicated by the Proceedings of the Maryland Constitutional Conven-
tion of 185 l. 
Prior to 185 l, the Declaration of Rights provided for trial by jury "subject 
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Nevertheless, the court saw the boundary between when a chancellor 
may and may not entertain suits involving legal rights as so hazy that 
any decree in an action inappropriately entertained should be voidable 
rather than void. As the court noted: 
The limits of the respective jurisdictions of those two sides of 
the same court are fixed by the ordinary common-law distinc-
tion between courts oflaw and courts of chancery. Those lim-
its are in many instances so vague and shadowy that if the 
validity of the decree of a circuit court in its capacity as a 
court of chancery were to depend in every case upon the fact 
that according to the ordinary practice of the court the power 
to enter the particular decree was not within its equity juris-
diction, although within its general jurisdiction, its JUdgments 
and decrees would lack finality and certainty, rights depend-
ing upon them must necessarily be illusory and uncertain, and 
litigation endless. 211 
The court in Fooks simply recognized that the right to trial by jury 
protected by the United States Constitution is one which existed at the 
time of the adoption of the Maryland Constitution.212 That right at-
tached to a spectrum of actions at law which, in certain instances, 
might have been entertained in equity. Preservation of the right to trial 
by jury, as opposed to extension of the right, in the face of any proce-
dural reforms requires attentiveness to the situations in which the right 
has been limited by accepted equitable encroachments. 
The respect of the court of appeals for the right to trial by jury in 
the face of its oft-stated respect for established equitable encroach-
ments on legal actions is demonstrated in Impala Platinum Ltd v. Im-
pala Sales, U.S.A., Inc. 213 In that case, the plaintiff brought an action 
at law against two defendants for payment of the price of goods sold 
and delivered. One of the defendants counterclaimed, prayinf. for an 
accounting, an equitable remedy, as well as punitive damages,2 4 which 
nevertheless to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by the Legislature of this 
State .... " Mo. CoNST. art. 3 (1776) (current version at Mo. CoNST. art. 5). 
Part of the discussion pertaining to the addition in 1851 of the ancestor of the 
current civil jury trial provision reads as follows: 
Mr. CONSTABLE added that the Legislature had the express right to 
repeal the whole of this article, and they had constantly exercised the 
power to modify it. He had little fear of any inroad upon trial by jury; 
but he should prefer to have it in the Constitution rather than to have it 
left to the Legislature. 
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTION, 1850-1851, 676 
(1851). 
The decision in Capron v. DeVries obviously indicates that the 1851 provi-
sion has not been construed to preclude contraction of the right to trial by the 
Legislature. Capron, 83 Md. at 224, 34 A. at 252 (1896). 
211. Fooks, 172 Md. at 625-26, 192 A. at 788. 
212. /d. 
213. 283 Md. 296, 389 A.2d 887 (1978). 
214. /d. at 299, 389 A.2d at 890. 
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are not recoverable in equity.215 The defendant's counterclaim was 
based in part upon the existence of a confidential relationship among 
the parties. Such a relationshi~ has traditionally provided justification 
for the interposition of equity. 16 
After a jury verdict for the defendant on the counterclaim, the 
plaintiff, who had sued at law initially, argued on appeal that the suit 
was not triable to a jury because the defendant had injected equitable 
claims and issues into the case. There is ample support in Maryland 
for the proposition that once equitable jurisdiction attaches, a court of 
law has no further role to play.217 When the plaintiff objected to trial 
by jury in the trial court, however, the defendant was granted leave to 
strike from the counterclaim all relief prayed other than damages. As 
to the defendant's reliance on a fiduciary relationship, the court viewed 
it as akin to equitable estoppel, which is cognizable at law and in eq-
uity.218 Clearly, the court disregarded established equitable notions 
which might have permitted the trial court to dispense with the jury. 
Decisions such as Impala Platinum and Allender recognize the abil-
ity of chancery, in appropriate cases, to narrow the scope of law. They 
also offer an important message to trial judges grappling with the un-
precedented consolidation of legal and equitable claims which the re-
vised rules permit: the Maryland judiciary has often guarded the right 
to trial by jury against such equitable encroachment. 
B. Established Equitable Encroachments Upon the Jurisdiction of 
Courts of Law 
The right to trial by jury has been best protected by a generally 
assiduous effort by the Maryland judiciary to maintain the separation 
of legal and equitable jurisdiction and to keep legal and equitable 
claims in the appropriate sides of the courts. The Maryland Rules have 
allowed limited consolidation of legal and equitable issues. Defendants 
at law have been permitted to assert equitable defenses219 and separate 
trials of legal issues have been permitted in equitable actions.220 There 
215. See Superior Constr. Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. I, 102 A.2d 739 (1954). 
216. See infra notes 245-65 and accompanying text. 
217. See infra notes 245-54 and accompanying text. 
218. Md. R.P. 342(d) (1977) permitted special pleas on equitable grounds in actions at 
law. 
219. Md. R.P. 342(d) (1977). This rule did not permit a law court to grant equitable 
relief such as rescission of a contract. See Conner v. Groh, Doub & Co., 90 Md. 
674, 45 A. 1024 (1900). It did enable a defendant to defensively assert matters that 
might entitle him to relief in equity. See Jameson v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 130 Md. 
75,99 A. 994 (1917); Williams v. Peters, 72 Md. 584,20 A. 175 (1890). Allowing 
such defenses sometimes eliminated the need for a subsequent equitable proceed-
ing, and, indeed, the availability of such a procedure may narrow the scope of 
equity by making the remedy at law adequate. Mountain Lake Park Ass'n v. 
Shartzer, 83 Md. 10, 34 A. 536 (1896). 
220. Md. R.P. 502 (1977). This device was not limited solely to trial by the court of 
equitable issues in actions at law. It has also been used to resolve legal issues in 
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was even some authority for a chancellor to refer factual issues in eq-
uity for trial by jury, although the practice fell into disuse and was 
eventually abolished by former Maryland Rule 517.221 Strangely 
enough, consolidation of legal and equitable claims has not been en-
tirely unknown. 222 
Professor Brown has very ably described the scope of equity in 
Maryland as predicated on two bases: (1) substantive rights which are 
regarded as of equitable origin, and (2) cases in which rights of legal 
origin exist but in which the legal remedy is "inadequate, incomplete or 
uncertain. "223 
1. Substantive Equitable and Legal Classification of Actions 
Where "substantive" equitable rights are involved, the applicabil-
ity of the right to trial by jury may be resolved by a look at Maryland 
legal history. In some instances, the legislature or the court of appeals 
has simplified the in~uiry by classifying certain actions as equitable by 
statute or court rule.2 4 Such power is apparently not without limits.225 
Sometimes, then, the applicability of the right to trial by jury may be 
determined by a court's analysis of the action's historical pedigree.226 
actions in equity. E.g., Irvine v. Montgomery County, 239 Md. 113, 210 A.2d 359 
(1965) (municipal immunity); Beach v. Mueller, 32 Md. App. 219, 359 A.2d 232 
(1976) (dictum) (res judicata). Use of the procedure is entirely discretionary with 
the trial court. A. S. Abell Co. v. Skeen, 265 Md. 53, 288 A.2d 596 (1972). 
221. Md. R.P. 517 (1977) provided: 
The practice heretofore existing of transferring issues of fact arising in 
an action in equity to a court of law for an advisory verdict by a jury is 
hereby abolished. All such issues shall be determined in the equity court 
in accordance with the existing equity practice, without a jury. 
This policy is carried forward in Mo. R.P. 2-5ll(d). 
222. See Surrey Inn v. Jennings, 215 Md. 446, 138 A.2d 658 (1958) (single opinion by 
trial court in related law and equity cases); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md. 
App. 190, 469 A.2d 867 (1984); H.A. Knott Ltd. v. Poppleton Place Assoc., No. 
83224045/L9593 (Cir. Ct. Bait. City filed Aug. 12, 1983); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. 
Poppleton Place Assoc., No. 83209052 (Cir. Ct. Bait. City filed July 28, 1983) 
(consolidated with H.A. Knott Ltd. v. Poppleton Place Assoc. by order of court of 
Dec. 13, 1983). But see Creamer v. Helferstay, 294 Md. 107, 448 A.2d 332 (1982) 
(disapproving of such consolidation, at least to the extent it would involve a court 
of law administering equitable relief). 
223. Brown, supra note l, at 428; Baltimore Sugar Ref. Co. v. Campbell & Zell Co., 83 
Md. 36, 53, 34 A. 369, 371 (1896). 
224. E.g., Mo. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 5 (1981) (alimony); Md. R.P. W72b (1977) (mort-
gage foreclosure). 
225. Compare McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889) (discussed supra note 
206) with Pemall v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974) (legislative determination 
that statutory eviction proceeding should be tried without a jury unconstitutional). 
226. See McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889). The federal courts have a 
similar process. In Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974), the Supreme 
Court declined to accept a legislative determination that statutory eviction could 
be tried without a jury. In Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966), the Court 
allowed a related legal claim to be cleaned up by equity, in part because of the 
historic characterization of bankruptcy proceedings as equitable. In Curtis v. 
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), the Supreme Court characterized a civil rights ac-
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There is support in Maryland for such an analysis of historic cate-
gorization of actions. Discovery was once almost exclusively the prov-
ince of equity.227 At a very early stage, Maryland adopted discovery 
provisions in actions at law.228 The court of appeals has consistently 
held that the creation of an adequate discovery remedy at law has not 
ousted equity jurisdiction over bills of discovery.229 Nevertheless, the 
court has also held that discovery alone will not support equitable ju-
risdiction; there must be some other basis on which equity may exercise 
jurisdiction.230 
Of course, the classification of actions as legal is a substantive as 
well as an historical inquiry.231 It does not appear that the Maryland 
courts would extend the right to trial by jury to actions which did not 
exist at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.232 Maryland deci-
sions have expressed a very clear preference for adjudicating actions 
tion for damages as legal, in part because of the close analogy to a common law 
action in tort. 
227. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.1 (2d ed. 1977). 
228. For instance, 1801 Md. Laws ch. 74, § 6 provided: 
The said courts shall have power, in the trial of actions at law, on motion 
made at the first court after the appearance court, supported by affidavit, 
that the same is not intended for delay, and due notice thereof being 
given, to require the parties to produce copies, certified by a justice of 
the peace, of all such parts of all books or writings in their possession or 
power as contain evidence pertinent to the issue, or to answer any bill for 
discovery only which may be filed by the second court after the appear-
ance court, in cases and under circumstances where they might be com-
pelled to produce the said original books or writing, or answer such bill 
of discovery by the ordinary rules or proceeding in chancery; and if a 
plaintiff shall fail to comply with any such order to produce such books 
or writings, or answer such bill of discovery, it shall be lawful for the 
said courts, on motion, to give the like judgment for the defendant as in 
cases of nonsuit; and if a defendant shall fail to comply with such order 
to produce books or writings, or to answer any bill for discovery only, it 
shall be lawful for the said courts, on motion as aforesaid, to give judg-
ment against him, her, or them, by default; provided, that any plaintiff or 
defendant may, in compliance with any rule for producing extracts of 
such books or papers, bring into court the original books or papers. 
229. See Spangler v. Dan A. Sprosty Bag Co., 183 Md. 166,36 A.2d 685 (1944); Zalis v. 
Orman, 175 Md. 100, 199 A. 877 (1938); Union Passenger Ry. v. Mayor and City 
Council of Baltimore, 71 Md. 238, 17 A. 933 ( 1889). In Union Passenger Ry., the 
court held that, even when the legislature gives jurisdiction to law courts of mat-
ters traditionally heard in equity, equity is not ousted. Union Passenger Ry., 71 
Md. at 241, 17 A. at 934 (citing Barnes v. Crain, 33 Md. 311, 315, 8 Gill391, 398 
(Md. 1849)). Such a holding would not inappropriately restrict the right to trial 
by jury because law jurisdiction over such matters did not exist at the time the 
Constitution was adopted. 
230. See Johnson v. Bugle Coat, Apron & Linen Serv., 191 Md. 268, 60 A.2d 686 
(1948); Becker v. Frederick W. Lipps Co., 131 Md. 301, 101 A. 783 (1917). 
231. Actions at law to which a right to trial by jury would attach are comprehensively 
described in 1 PoE'S PLEADING AND PRACTICE§§ 71-275A (H. Sachs, Jr. 6th ed. 
1970). 
232. See Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 320, 389 
A.2d 887, 901 (1978). 
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with respect to land titles in courts of law. The preference that this 
substantive area be adjudicated at law is so strong that it diminishes 
remedial considerations that otherwise might confer equitable 
jurisdiction. 
This may be seen in Finglass v. George Franke Sons Co.,233 in 
which the plaintiff sought to enjoin an adjoining landowner from clos-
ing off an alley. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismis-
sal of the bill because of a lack of equitable jurisdiction, and stated 
that: "[u]nder the settled practice in this state, the dispute of title 
should be litigated at law."234 Although the plaintiff adverted to the 
need for drainage through the alley in support of its claim for equitable 
relief, the court held that "[t]here was no evidence that whatever drain-
age might pass through was now obstructed in any way, and there was 
no appearance of necessity for immediate equitable interference."235 
The court also indicated that subsequent equity proceedings would be 
unnecessary because the law court could grant an injunction at law as 
an ancillary remedy.236 Absent extraordinary circumstances/37 actions 
involving title to land usually have been heard on the law side with a 
right to a trial by jury. 
2. Equitable Classification Based on Procedural Considerations 
Although equity may supplant jurisdiction of courts of law if there 
is any basis for equitable relief, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
attempted to limit the applicability of equitable relief to specific cir-
cumstances. Maryland appellate decisions in this area are not always 
easily reconcilable because of the role the facts of each case play in 
equity jurisprudence. The notion that equity will not act if there is an 
adequate remedy at law was established very early in Maryland.238 
In Bachman v. Lembach, 239 the plaintiff sought in equity to recover 
the contents of a safe deposit box from the joint custodian. The defend-
ant contended that equitable jurisdiction was lacking because the legal 
233. 172 Md. 135, 190 A. 752 (1937). 
234. Id at 136, 190 A. at 752. 
235. Id at 137, 190 A. at 753. 
236. See Diener v. Wheatley, 191 Md. 690, 62 A.2d 783 (1948); Schultz v. Kaplan, 189 
Md. 402, 56 A.2d 17 (1947); Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 24 A.2d 795 (1942); 
Mountain Lake Park Ass'n v. Shartzer, 83 Md. 10, 34 A. 536 (1896). But see War-
ing v. National Sav. & Trust Co., 138 Md. 367, 114 A. 57 (1921) (equity coun 
could declare deed invalid as ancillary remedy in suit for enforcement of lien 
created by deed of trust). 
237. In Smith v. Shiebeck, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to compel the defend-
ants to remove a fence from what the plaintiffs contended was a public road. 
Although the coun enunciated the general rule discussed above, it allowed the 
plaintiffs to proceed in equity because they had no other convenient means of 
access to their farm. Smith, 180 Md. at 415, 417, 24 A.2d at 798, 799. 
238. See Richardson v. Stillinger, 25 Md. 326, 12 G. & J. 477 (1842); Waters v. How-
ard, 1 Md. Ch. 80 (1847). 
239. 192 Md. 35, 63 A.2d 641 (1949). 
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remedies of replevin, trover, and money had and received were ade-
quate. The court agreed, holding that the chattels sought did not have 
unique value. The plaintiff claimed that equity was necessary to pre-
vent a multiplicity of actions because more than one person might pur-
loin the contents of the box. The court responded that the avoidance of 
multiplicity of actions is not an independent ground of equitable juris-
diction. 240 The court held that the issue of multiplicity had to be con-
sidered in light of the recently enacted joinder rules which would have 
permitted the plaintiff to join his claims against more than one defend-
ant241 and which narrowed the scope of equity: "In considering 
whether discretion should be exercised to avoid a multiplicity of suits, 
we cannot disregard the fact that the issue here could be decided in a 
single action at law."242 Bachman and the discovery cases243 suggest 
that the "inadequate remedy at law" requirement for equitable juris-
diction retains dynamism in Maryland similar to that accorded the par-
allel federal notion in Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen. 244 
If the established right to trial by jury is to be preserved in the face 
of unprecedented litigation of legal claims by tribunals possessing eq-
uity powers, judges must recognize that equity may assume jurisdiction 
over legal claims only in cases in which the legal remedy is deemed to 
be inadequate. This may be seen in several specific areas where equity 
has intervened to adjudicate what substantively may be regarded as 
legal rights. 
a. Confidential Relationships 
Equity has frequently intervened to alleviate the consequences of 
fraud or the abuse of a confidential relationship. Fraud has been re-
garded as particularly within the competence ofequity,245 although law 
courts have the authority to try issues offraud.246 Equity has interposed 
itself in the context of relationships ranging from employer/em-
ployee247 and agent/principal,248 to those in the context of the adminis-
240. Bachman, 192 Md. at 41, 63 A.2d at 643. Multiplicity certainly is a significant 
factor concerning the existence vel non of equitable jurisdiction. See infra notes 
276-78 and accompanying text. 
241. 192 Md. at 42, 63 A.2d at 644 (citing GRPP, III, 2(a), (d)) (current versions at Mo. 
R.P. 2-303(c), 2-212(a)). 
242. Bachman, 192 Md. at 43, 63 A.2d at 644. 
243. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
244. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
245. See Nagel v. Todd, 185 Md. 512,45 A.2d 326 (1946); Spangler v. Dan A. Sprosty 
Bag Co., 183 Md. 166,36 A.2d 685 (1944); Chase v. Gray, 134 Md. 619, 107 A. 537 
(1919). 
246. See Anderson v. Watson, 141 Md. 217, 232, 118 A. 569, 574 (1922); National Park 
Bank v. Lanahan, 60 Md. 477 (1883). 
247. See Spangler v. Dan A. Sprosty Bag Co., 183 Md. 166, 36 A.2d 685 (1944); An-
derson v. Watson, 141 Md. 217, 118 A. 569 (1922). 
248. See Dormay v. Doric Co., 221 Md. 145, 156 A.2d 632 (1959); Baltimore Sugar 
Ref. Co. v. Campbell & Zell Co., 83 Md. 56, 34 A. 369 (1896); see also Finch v. 
Hughes Aircraft, 57 Md. App. 190, 469 A.2d 867 (1984) (joint venturers). 
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tration of estates249 and property of minors. 25° For the most part, 
equitable intervention in such instances is not based on the essential 
nature of the rights asserted in actions based on such relationships. 
Rather, it is based on the ability of equity to provide remedies unavail-
able at law, such as injunction, the imposition of a constructive trust, 
cancellation, rescission of a contract, or accounting. Frequently, the 
inadequacy of the legal remedy arises from a vulnerability of one of the 
parties to the relationship. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has not permitted invocation 
of fraud in a purported confidential relationship to sidestep courts of 
law in all cases. This is demonstrated in Johnson v. Bugle Coat, Apron 
& Linen Serv .. 251 In that case, the defendant agreed to sell linen and 
other restaurant supplies to the plaintiff. The defendant was required 
to keep records on the amount of goods delivered and to issue state-
ments each month to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that one of his 
employees and two of the defendant's employees had engaged in a 
scheme to shortchange the plaintiff and that the defendant had refused 
to make a true account of the linens actually delivered. The plaintiff's 
bill sought discovery, monetary relief, and general relief. 
The court questioned whether a relationship existed between the 
parties that would make equitable jurisdiction appropriate: "The rela-
tion of laundry and customer, or bailor and bailee, unlike that of 
guardian and ward, attorney and client, or principal and agent, is not 
usually a confidential relation, but in a particular case it conceivably 
may be."252 The court's view of the relationship of the parties in John-
son indicates the flexibility of equitable jurisdiction. It is obvious that 
more than overreaching in a buyer-seller relationship must be alleged 
to confer equitable jurisdiction. The court in Johnson continued: "The 
butcher, the baker and the candle-stick [maker] do not occupy a fiduci-
ary relation toward every customer who is too busy or too careless 
(whichever way he may properly be characterized) to count his 
change."253 Because the alleged scheme was perpetrated by employees 
of both parties, the court was unconvinced that the susceptibility of the 
plaintiff vis a vis the defendant justified equitable interference. 
Further, even assuming the existence of a confidential relationship, 
the court saw no inadequacy of the remedy available at law. The only 
equitable relief sought was discovery. The court held that, where there 
is no other ground of equitable jurisdiction asserted, a bill of discovery 
249. See Turk v. Grossman, 176 Md. 644, 6 A.2d 639 (1939); Boland v. Ash, 145 Md. 
465, 125 A. 801 (1924). 
250. See Barnes v. Crain, 33 Md. 311, 8 Gill 391 (1849). 
251. 191 Md. 268, 60 A.2d 686 ( 1948). 
252. Johnson, 191 Md. at 276, 60 A.2d at 689. 
253. Id In Anderson v. Watson, 141 Md. 217, 118 A. 569 (1922), the court stated that 
such relationships "embrace both technical fiduciary relations, and those informal 
relations which exist wherever one man trusts in and relies on another." Id at 
234, 118 A. at 575. 
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has been superseded by an adequate, complete, and sufficient remedy 
at law.254 Thus, the refusal to exercise equitable jurisdiction in Johnson 
was upheld based on the lack of obvious unfair advantage in the rela-
tionship of the parties and the lack of any apparent need for a pecu-
liarly equitable remedy. 
The demonstration of either, however, may form the basis of equi-
table jurisdiction. In Wagner v. Shank,255 a demonstration of gross in-
justice against the plaintiff by justices of the peace at the behest of the 
defendant conferred equity jurisdiction. The defendant had fraudu-
lently obtained hundreds of virtually ex parte judgments, including one 
against the plaintiff, from two justices of the peace in Frederick 
County. After the plaintiff learned of the defendant's baseless claims, 
he was falsely informed by one of the justices of the peace that the 
action would be dismissed. He therefore did not assert his defense at 
law. Judgment was later entered, and the plaintiff filed in equity to 
enjoin execution of the judgment. The court agreed with the defend-
ant's contention that a party generally cannot rely upon equity to pro-
tect him from an action at law when he could have asserted his 
defenses at law. The court held, however, that: 
[t]his rule in terms recognizes the doctrine, which is equally 
well settled, that where a party is not in fault by failing to use 
reasonable diligence, and is prevented from defending the ac-
tion at law, by fraud or acc1dent, or the acts of the opposite 
party, equity will lend its aid and give relief . . . .256 
In Wagner, both oppressive fraud and the need for an injunction, an 
equitable remedy, supported equitable interference with an action at 
law. The court admitted, however, that the general rule is that equity 
should not interfere with legal actions. 
In Spangler v. Dan A. Sprosty Bag Co.,257 the decedent's executor, 
his wife, and the corporation he controlled sued a corporate employee 
who allegedly diverted funds from the corporation. The plaintiffs 
sought an accounting, an injunction, and a constructive trust as to 
property allegedly purchased with diverted funds. According to the 
court, when there was a need to trace such allegedly purloined funds, 
and when the plaintiffs' claim to property was not based on legal ti-
tle,258 declaration of a constructive trust might be necessary because of 
the inadequacy of the remedy at law. Likewise, equity might intervene 
when the contract was between parties who bear a relationship to each 
other which may be conducive to unfair advantage; the remedy at law 
may be completely inadequate, even considering the ability to defend 
254. Johnson, 191 Md. at 278, 60 A.2d at 690. 
255. 59 Md. 313 (1883). 
256. /d. at 318. 
257. 183 Md. 166, 36 A.2d 685 (1944). 
258. See Turk v. Grossman, 176 Md. 644, 668, 6 A.2d 639, 651 ( 1939). 
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on equitable grounds. Only equity may cancel or reform a contract259 
and enforce it as reformed by decreeing payment of the plaintiff's 
loss.260 
Two instances in which equity has supplanted legal actions in con-
tract demonstrate the inquiry the Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
used in this area. In Conner v. Groh,261 the plaintiff sought to cancel a 
contract to purchase a hardware store based on allegedly fraudulent 
representations of the seller about the volume of business. Although the 
court of appeals conceded that law and equity had concurrent jurisdic-
tion over questions of fraud and misrepresentation, it noted that law 
lacked the power to reform a contract procured by fraud. It held that 
in permitting a defendant to make a plea on equitable grounds in an 
action at law, the legislature did not intend to provide law courts with 
the power of cancellation or reformation of contracts. 262 The court 
stated that since the instrument involved was under seal, all questions 
of evidence and pleading before a law court must be determined by 
reference to the contract "as presented to the Court . ... "263 
In Baltimore Sugar Refining Co. v. Campbell & Ze/1 Co.,264 the 
plaintiff had purchased boilers from the defendant under two separate 
contracts. The plaintiff sought in equity to declare the latter contract 
null and void, to compel the defendant to restore monies paid by the 
plaintiff, and to enjoin the defendant from prosecuting any suit at law 
with respect to the latter contract. Although the plaintiff sought two 
remedies which were not available at law, the court, in upholding the 
appropriateness of equitable jurisdiction, emphasized the relationship 
between the parties. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had 
bribed the plaintiff's purchasing agent, upon whom the plaintiff was 
dependent for selection of the boilers. The court commented: 
in a case where fraud is superadded and practiced by agents 
of the innocent principal, and a fraudulent design secretly ac-
complished by the other principal through the corrupt instru-
mentality of unprincipled agents, there ought to be, we think, 
but small doubt as to the Court which should take cognizance 
of it.26s 
The plaintiff sought rescission and the return of monies paid under 
both contracts because of the underlying fraud. The latter contract was 
the subject of an action at law in another court. Defense of such action 
259. See Baltimore Sugar Ref. Co. v. Campbell & Zell Co., 83 Md. 36, 56, 34 A. 369, 
372 (1896). 
260. See Maryland Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Kimmell, 89 Md. 437, 441, 43 A. 764, 765-66 
(1899). 
261. 90 Md. 674, 45 A. 1024 (1900). 
262. Id. at 683, 45 A. at 1026. 
263. Id. (Emphasis in original). 
264. 83 Md. 36, 34 A. 369 (1896). 
265. Id. at 55, 34 A. at 372. 
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would provide no remedy as to the earlier contract, which had been 
fully performed by the plaintiff. 
b. Accounting 
The equitable action of accounting appears to have been a remedy 
most frequently permitted in Maryland in actions involving confiden-
tial relationships. 266 Equitable interposition has usually been based on 
the need for information of one of the parties to such a relationship 
rather than the complexity of the issues for resolution by a jury. 267 Re-
gardless of the increasing ability of an action at law to adjudicate com-
plex issues, the court of appeals has held that an accounting will 
generally be appropriate when the rights of a party to some sort of joint 
enterprise or confidential relationship "can be determined only by ref-
erence to accounts or information kept in possession of [the other 
party]. "268 
In Silver Hz!/ Sand & Gravel Co. v. Carozza/69 the plaintiff gave 
the defendant a license to mine sand and gravel on its land. The de-
fendant agreed to keep records and issue statements of accounts to the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action for discovery and accounting 
against the defendant. The court of appeals treated the relationship of 
the parties as a fiduciary relationship rather than as that of buyer and 
seller. The court emphasized that the defendant had expressly under-
taken to keep all records and to make monthly accountings. 270 This 
undertaking obviously meant that the plaintiff lacked the information 
to determine whether it had received appropriate payment for all the 
sand and gravel mined by the defendant. Further, the court high-
lighted the indefinite duration of the parties' agreement, which raised 
the possibility of a multiplicity of actions, as a basis for assuming equi-
266. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court held in Dairy 
Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) that in order to justify an accounting, a party 
must show that the accounts are of such a "complicated nature" that only a court 
of equity may satisfactorily unravel them. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 478. 
267. In view of the availability of the aid of a master for the jury under FED. R. C1v. P. 
53(b), the Supreme Court suggested that resort to accounting would rarely be ap-
propriate. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 478. As long ago as 1922, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland suggested much the same thing about the complexity of 
accounts as a justification for resort to accounting: 
under the decisions of this court "great complication" and "difficulty in 
the way of adequate remedy at law," when used in connection with an. 
accounting in equity, may be taken to mean such an action as a court of 
law, with the aid of all the legal machinery at its command, is unable to 
solve so as to do substantial justice between the parties. 
Anderson v. Watson, 141 Md. 217,234, 118 A. 569,575 (1922). See a/so Johnson 
& Higgins v. Simpson, 165 Md. 83, 116 A. 617 (1933). But see Turk v. Grossman, 
176 Md. 644, 6 A.2d 639 (1939). 
268. Goldsborough v. County Trust Co., 180 Md. 59, 61, 22 A.2d 920, 921 (1941). See 
Legum v. Campbell, 149 Md. 148, 131 A. 147 (1925). 
269. 184 Md. 226, 40 A.2d 311 (1944). 
270. /d. at 230, 40 A.2d at 312. 
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table jurisdiction.271 
Contrasting Silver Hill with the decision in Becker v. Frederick W 
Lipps Co.,212 which was distinguished by the court in Silver Hill, is in-
structive with respect to exercise of equitable discretion in accounting. 
In Becker, the plaintiff alleged that it had agreed to purchase the de-
fendant's entire output of empty barrels for one year and that the de-
fendant had failed to deliver as promised. Although the plaintiff 
asserted in its bill that it had no means of ascertaining the number of 
barrels produced by the defendant during the period of the contract, 
the court held that such information could be made available to the 
plaintiff in an action at law.273 Also, as the contract period had ex-
pired, there was no possibility, as there would be in Silver Hill, of a 
multiplicity of actions. 
It is apparent that the most important factor for a court of equity 
to assess in determining whether an accounting is appropriate is 
whether the accounts upon which the plaintiff's right depends are con-
trolled by the opposite party. If they are, it appears an accounting will 
be awarded.274 
c. Multiplicity of Actions 
The ability of equity to alleviate multiplicity is, of course, based on 
its ability to act in personam. Unlike law courts, equity courts may en-
join individuals before them from proceeding with other litigation. 
Whether equity acts to enjoin parties from proceeding in another pend-
ing suit or acts to preempt another suit, it may afford complete relief.275 
The exercise of this form of equitable jurisdiction may be seen in two 
cases involving significant public issues, County Commissioners v. 
Mayor & City Council of Frederick 216 and Wells v. Price. 211 In County 
Commissioners, Frederick City officials brought an action in equity 
against Frederick County to recover the city's share of a tax on bonds 
which had been illegally collected by the county. The court of appeals 
concluded that leaving the city to its remedy at law would require it to 
sue the individuals from whom the county had collected the tax and 
who, in tum, would institute actions against the county. The court held 
that equity could "require the county to account directly with the city, 
which is ultimately entitled to the money.'ms 
In Wells, the State's Attorney for Baltimore City sued the warden 
271. Id. 
272. 131 Md. 301, 101 A. 783 (1917). 
273. Id. at 307, 101 A. at 784-85. 
274. Boland v. Ash, 145 Md. 465, 125 A. 801 (1924). See Goldsborough v. County 
Trust Co., 180 Md. 59, 22 A.2d 920 (1941). 
275. See McKeever v. Washington Heights Realty Corp., 183 Md. 216, 37 A.2d 305 
(1944); Gibula v. Sause, 173 Md. 87, 194 A.2d 597 (1937). 
276. 88 Md. 654, 42 A. 218 (1898). 
277. 183 Md. 443, 37 A.2d 888 (1944). 
278. 88 Md. at 664, 42 A. at 222. 
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of the Baltimore City jail in equity to prevent him from releasing pris-
oners in conformity with statewide law rather than in accordance with 
the more restrictive local law. Although it indicated that the issues in 
the suit might be resolved in a multitude of habeas corpus proceedings, 
the court of appeals held that equity could act to prevent such a multi-
plicity of litigation. The court also noted the public interest may justify 
equitable intervention. 279 
Given the ability of the circuit courts under the revised rules to 
entertain both legal and equitable claims, it is likely that multiplicity 
will be rendered obsolete as an independent basis of equitable 
jurisdiction. 
The cases predicating equitable jurisdiction on the inadequacy of 
remedies at law demonstrate a sensitivity to the preservation of the dis-
tinction between law and equity. If the right to trial by jury is to be 
preserved under the new pleading regime, trial judges should restrict 
adjudication of legal claims in equity to those situations existing under 
prior practice. Maryland decisions have long indicated that the chan-
cellor has considerable discretion in determining when he may act in 
equity.280 Law and equity have been separated "not b~ a line, but by a 
borderland under the dominion of the Chancellor." 81 It is unlikely 
that the procedural reform is intended to encroach upon this discretion, 
but exercise of equity should be tempered by an awareness of the po-
tential effects of unprecedented consolidation of legal claims and issues 
on the right to trial by jury. 
V. ALTERNATIVES FOR MARYLAND TRIAL COURTS IN 
ACTIONS UNDER THE REVISED RULES 
The discussion of the preceding section indicates how Maryland's 
courts have dealt with jury trial rights in lawsuits involving both legal 
and equitable elements. As stated earlier,282 Maryland's rules by and 
large guaranteed the right to jury trial in actions filed on the law side of 
the circuit courts283 and denied the right when a claim was filed on the 
equity side.284 It was as if one entered Maryland's courts of general 
jurisdiction285 through two doors, one marked "law," the other "eq-
279. 183 Md. at 451, 37 A.2d at 872 (1944). 
280. See Hilleary v. Crow, l H. & J. 337 (1804). 
281. Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh 
Amendment, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 43, 107 (1980). 
282. See supra text accompanying note 183. 
283. Md. R.P. 343 (1977). 
284. After the abolition of advisory juries in equity, see Md. R.P. 517 ( 1977), the court 
of appeals held that there was absolutely no provision for use of a jury to resolve 
questions of fact in a court of equity. Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales 
(U.S.A.), 283 Md. 296, 389 A.2d 887 (1978); Village Books, Inc. v. State's Attor-
ney, 263 Md. 76, 282 A.2d 126 (1971), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 930 (1974). 
285. Ruddy v. First N at'l Bank, 48 Md. App. 681, 683, 429 A.2d 550, 551, aff'd, 291 
Md. 275, 434 A.2d 581 (1981). There are, of course, exceptions to the circuit 
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uity," and once inside, the jury trial question was resolved on the basis 
of which door one had used for entry. 
The revised rules attempt to eliminate the procedural distinction 
between law and equity286 and to secure the right to jury trial on "any 
issue triable of right by a jury."287 Supplanting the "nature of the ac-
tion" test with an issue oriented test does not eliminate the significance 
of initial characterization, because many factual issues are neither "le-
gal" nor "equitable" in the abstract, but may be characterized only in 
terms of the context in which they arise. 288 It is fair to say that a factual 
issue is "legal" only if, in some sense, its determination would be mate-
rial to the grant of the kind of relief law courts historically are author-
ized to grant. In this sense, whether a contract was made would be a 
"legal" issue in an action for damages for breach, but not "legal" in an 
action to enforce the contract by way of injunction or specific perform-
ance, since these remedies historically were available only in equity.289 
Except in easy cases like the preceding, for a variety of reasons, 
characterization of issues as "legal" or "equitable" in a merged system 
is extremely difficult. First and foremost, the historic division between 
law and equity is itself frequently obscure.290 Second, many of the his-
toric procedural bases for assertion of equitable jurisdiction over what 
appear to be claims for essentially legal relief have diminished over 
time291 and, after merger, could be viewed as having been entirely 
eliminated.292 Finally, a host of actions and remedies unknown in the 
court's jurisdiction. See generally C. BROWN, INTRODUCTION TO MARYLAND 
CIVIL LITIGATION 5-14 (1982). 
286. Mo. R.P. 2-301. 
287. Mo. R.P. 2-325(a). 
288. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 8.11, at 387-88 (2d ed. 1977), 
where the authors, after conceding that mutual mistake is virtually always an eq-
uitable issue and that negligent driving is a legal one, point out that many issues 
are not inherently equitable or legal but instead are "like chameleons which take 
their color from surrounding circumstances." 
289. Id. at 372, 376. 
290. See generally id. at 17-18, 351-59. The overlap between law and equity in the 
eighteenth century led Blackstone to note that while bills in equity always indi-
cated the inadequacy of legal remedies, 
he who should from thence conclude that no case is judged of in equity 
where there might have been relief at law, and at the same time casts his 
eye on the extent and variety of the cases in our equity reports, must 
think the law a dead letter indeed. 
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *434. 
291. For example, only in equity could a party be competent to testify, multiple parties 
and claims be easily joined, and discovery be had. Reforms, some going back to 
the nineteenth century, have long since eliminated equity's monopoly over party 
testimony, liberal joinder, and discovery. 
292. The basic justification for extension of equity jurisdiction into legal matters rarely 
had much to do with antipathy to jury trial. Rather, the goal was usually to alle-
viate hardships and inefficiencies the trial system engendered. See Levin, Equita-
ble Cleanup and The Jury: A Suggested Orientation, l 00 U. PA. L. REv. 320 ( 1951 ). 
Once the necessity for the invention of cleanup has been eliminated by merger, 
much of the justification for an expanded equity jurisdiction disappears. 
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eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries virtually defy rigid historic 
categorization. 293 
In many cases, law courts have not been able to adjudicate equita-
ble issues because of their inability to administer equitable relief.294 
When equity courts adjudicated legal claims, they generally did so 
without the aid of a jury. If tradition is to be followed regardless of the 
changed picture created by merger, any combination of legal and equi-
table claims would permit a trial court to adjudicate the entire case 
without a jury. The Supreme Court has prevented this in the federal 
courts through the doctrine in Beacon Theatres and .Dairy Queen. 
Many states, however, with merger rules similar to Rule 2 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, rules which preserve jury trial similar to 
Federal Rule 38, and constitutional jury trial provisions have rejected 
the Beacon position.295 The Maryland judiciary must now decide 
293. This would include administrative actions, statutory claims, and special remedies 
like those in declaratory judgment acts. For federal cases holding such claims not 
legal, see, e.g., Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966) (plenary claims in bank-
ruptcy held inherently equitable); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 
U.S. l (1937) (administrative determination of back pay and reinstatement not 
legal); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913) (statutory suits to cancel naturali-
zation certificate not triable to a jury). For cases holding such claims subject to 
jury trial, see, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974) (statutory sum-
mary eviction); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (Fair Housing Act damages 
action). For discussion of the declaratory judgment remedy, see Beacon Theatres, 
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
294. See Creamer v. Helferstay, 294 Md. 107, 448 A.2d 332 (1982). See also infra note 
360. But see Md. R.P. BF40 (1977). 
295. See Federal Lumber Co. v. Wheeler, 643 P.2d 31 (Colo. 1981 ); LaFrance v. La-
France, 127 Conn. 149, 14 A.2d 739 (1940); Summers v. Martin, 77 Idaho 469, 295 
P.2d 265 (1956); Hill v. Jessup, 139 Ind. App. 467, 220 N.E.2d 662 (1966); Hind-
man v. Shepard, 205 Kan. 207, 468 P.2d 103 (1970), appeal dismissed, cert. denied 
sub nom. Morse v. Hindman, 401 U.S. 928 (1971); Rognrud v. Zubert, 282 Minn. 
430, 165 N.W.2d 244 (1969); Linville v. Wilson, 628 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. App. 1982); 
Sanguinetti v. Strecker, 94 Nev. 200, 577 P.2d 404 (1978); Miles v. N.J. Motors, 
Inc., 44 Ohio App. 2d 351, 338 N.E.2d 184 (1975); Rowell v. Kaplan, 103 R.I. 60, 
235 A.2d 91 (1967); Skoglund v. Staab, 312 N.W.2d 29 (S.D. 1981); Ranta v. Ger-
man, 11 Wash. App. 104, 459 P.2d 961 (1969); Davidek v. Wyoming Inv. Co., 77 
Wyo. 141, 308 P.2d 941 (1957); CoLO. CaNsT. art. II, § 23; CoNN. CaNST. art. 1, 
§ 19; IDAHO CaNsT. art. 1, § 7; IND. CaNsT. art. 1, § 20; KAN. CaNST. Bill of 
Rights§ 5; MINN. CaNST. art. 1, § 4; Mo. CaNST. art. I, § 22(a); NEv. CaNST. art. 
I,§ 3; OHIO CaNsT. art. I,§ 5; R.I. CaNST. art. 1, § 15; S.D. CaNST. art. 1, § 21; 
WYo. CaNsT. art. I,§ 9; CoLO. R. C1v. P. 2, 38; CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN§§ 52-91, 
52-97 (West. Cum. Supp. 1984); IDAHO R. C1v. P. 2, 38; IND. (TRIAL) R. 60-202, 
60-238; MINN. R. Civ. P. 2, 38.01; Mo. R. C1v. P. 42.01, 69.01; NEv. R. C1v. P. 2, 
38; OHIO R. Civ. P. 2, 38; R.I. R. Clv. P. 2, 38; S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN §§ 15-6-2, 
15-6-38 (1967); WASH. SuPER. CT. Civ. R. 2, 38; WYO. R. C1v. P. 2, 38. A few 
states have adopted a rule similar to that of Beacon Theatres. See Poston v. Gad-
dis, 335 So. 2d 165 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 335 So. 2d 169 (Ala. 1976); Shope 
v. Sims, 658 P.2d 1336 (Alaska 1983); Cheek v. McGowan Elec. Supply Co., 404 
So. 2d 834 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Harada v. Bums, 50 Haw. 528, 445 P.2d 376 
(1968); Evans Fin. Corp. v. Strosser, 99 N.M. 788, 664 P.2d 986 (1983); Landers v. 
Goetz, 264 N.W.2d 459 (N.D. 1978); Int'l Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Trac-
tor & Implement Co., 626 A.2d 418 (Utah 1981); Merchants Bank v. Thibodeau, 
143 Vt. 132, 465 A.2d 258 (1983). 
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whether - or to what extent - to restrict the power of the chancellor 
to decide a whole case without a jury any time there is any basis for 
equitable relief. As seen above, the federal system expanded the right 
to trial by jury in order to preserve it. As examples discussed below will 
demonstrate, not all states have made that choice. As discussed above, 
there is some support in Maryland precedents for either choice. 
The remainder of this article will consider various problems likely 
to be encountered with the right to trial by jury after merger. Consider-
ation will first be given to the problem of characterization of "issues" in 
a merged system which appears to make the right to trial by jury tum 
on the nature of the issue at stake. This will be followed by a discussion 
of multi-claim lawsuits containing both legal and equitable elements. 
A. Characterization of Issues as Legal or Equitable 
Since the right to jury trial is secured for any "issue triable of right 
by a jury,"296 it is instructive to consider how one might go about char-
acterizing issues. Frequently, recurring examples of such problems 
arise in claims for declaratory judgment, in actions affecting title to 
land, and in actions posing fraud issues. 
1. Declaratory Judgment Actions 
The modem declaratory judgment action was unknown at com-
mon law.297 Maryland cases have indicated that law and equity en-
joyed concurrent jurisdiction to grant the remedy.298 Here, as 
elsewhere, courts have had to determine whether the remedy was 
sought as a substitute for a remedy traditionally available only in an 
action at law or bill in equity. The decision whether to honor a jury 
trial demand hinges upon this prior determination.299 
Precisely how the determination is made varies. Opinions of sev-
eral federal courts of appeals, after Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. West-
over,300 are instructive of the federal view. These cases hold that a 
declaratory judgment will be characterized as legal if, but only if, it 
appears from the facts that legal type relief would be possible at the 
296. Mo. R.P. 2-325(a). 
297. See E. BoRCHARD, DECLARATORY JuDGMENTS 399 (2d ed. 1941). There were, of 
course, always equitable actions which were primarily declaratory, e.g., the bill in 
equity to cancel a written instrument, to remove a cloud in title, to impress a trust 
on legal title, or to render a divorce. This fact, together with the fact that both 
kinds of claims require the exercise of discretion, has led many students of the law 
to consider declaratory relief essentially equitable; but the courts have steadfastly 
refused to so hold. 
298. Himes v. Day, 254 Md. 197, 254 A.2d 181 (1969); Shultz v. Kaplan, 189 Md. 402, 
56 A.2d 17 (1947). 
299. See Note, Right to Trial by Jury in Declaratory Judgment Actions, 3 CoNN. L. REv. 
564 ( 1971) (listing the various kinds of actions in which the issue had to be 
determined). 
300. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 114-33 and 
accompanying text. 
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time of the lawsuit. Thus, in a school desegregation case, the inclusion 
of a request for a declaratory remedy does not authorize a jury triaP01 
Similarly, in a suit for a declaratory judgment construing an oil and gas 
lease, followed by a counterclaim for possession of the property on ac-
count of breach of the lease constituting termination, the court treated 
the action as a reverse equitable bill for cancellation, not as a reverse 
claim for ejectment. Because the lease itself provided no automatic pro-
visions for termination, the defendant had no immediate right to pos-
session until the court cancelled the lease. Therefore, no jury trial was 
authorized.302 Also, in a suit for a declaratory judgment that plaintiff 
was entitled to produce and market its product because defendant's 
patent was invalid or did not cover plaintiff's product, the court charac-
terized the claim as equitable because no act of infringement had oc-
curred, and hence, legal damages or accounting would be 
unavailable.303 
On the other hand, where the legal remedy is deemed present and 
adequate, such defensive use of the declaratory judgment act will be 
characterized as legal. In James v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co./04 the 
insurer sought a declaration that the liability policy was invalid be-
cause its reinstatement had been procured by a fraudulent predating of 
the application for renewal. The court stated that the question was 
whether the action was in truth an inverted suit at law on the policy, 
and that the court would characterize the action as legal if defense to 
such a legal action would provide an adequate defense for the insurer. 
Since the claim for liability was pending and would be brought to trial 
within a year, and proof regarding fraud was largely documentary and 
there was little risk of crucial evidence disappearing over time, the 
court overruled arguments that delay of the presentation of the in-
surer's defense of fraud until the claim on the policy could be finally 
litigated would be prejudicial. The court therefore held that the in-
surer's remedy at law would be adequate.305 Furthermore, if on•: ofthe 
issues set out for resolution in the declaratory judgment action i:; inher-
entllc legal, as for instance, slander of title in a patent infrin ~ement 
suit 06 or mental incapacity of a party to the contract in a declnatory 
action for rescission of an insurance contract, 307 the court will g1 ant the 
right to jury trial. 
There is language in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover 30~ which 
suggests that courts must go much further in order to protect 1 rial by 
301. Robinson v. Brown, 320 F.2d 503 (6th Cir. 1963). 
302. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Bokum Corp., 453 F.2d 1067, 1071-72 (lOth Cir. 1972). 
303. Shubin v. United States Dist. Court, 313 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1963). 
304. 349 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
305. Id. at 232. 
306. Inland Steel Products v. MPH Mfg. Corp., 25 F.R.D. 238 (N.D. Ill. 1959). 
307. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hardwick, 118 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Tenn. 
1953). 
308. 359 u.s. 500 (1959). 
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jury. Beacon'S holding- that factual issues common to the claim and 
counterclaim regarding the reasonableness of the operator's practices 
should be triable of right to a jury- is itself not radicaP09 But two of 
the Court's rationales were radical. First, the Court found that the de-
claratory judgment act provided a legal remedy which "necessarily af-
fects the scope of equity."310 Second, it suggested that the fact that the 
jury trial right is constitutional warrants a requirement that judicial 
discretion, "wherever possible, be exercised to preserve jury trial."311 
Few decisions since Beacon have followed either of these lines of 
thought. In Alabama, the courts have held that where the underlying 
facts indicate that a legal remedy may become available to one of the 
parties, jury trial as of right is available;312 but these courts have de-
clined to extend the right to cases where the only conceivable alterna-
tive relief would be equitable.313 In Florida, the supreme court has 
indicated that doubtful questions regarding the distinction between law 
and equity should be resolved in favor of jury trial because of the fun-
damental guaranty of the state constitution;314 but this court has de-
clined to characterize all declaratory judgment actions as inherently 
legal.315 
A few courts are more restrictive than are the federal courts. In 
Lazarus v. Village of Northbrook,3 16 the Supreme Court of Illinois was 
309. Arguably the district court's characterization of the declaratory judgment action 
as essentially equitable was erroneous; it just as easily might have been character-
ized as an effort to cut off the antitrust claimant's right to jury trial by winning a 
race to court. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 8.10, at 385 (2d 
ed. 1977). The decision went further, of course, by eliminating the trial judge's 
discretion to try the equitable issues first when such trial might conclusively estab-
lish an issue of fact on a common legal claim presented by the lawsuit. Beacon 
Theatres, 359 U.S. at 508 (overruling American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 
203, 215 (1937)). 
310. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 509. As James and Hazard have pointed out, the 
logic of this part of Beacon would make all declaratory judgment actions triable 
by jury. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PRoCEDURE § 8.10, at 385-86 (2d ed. 
1977). 
311. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510. The democratic value choice implicit in this 
kind of argument may well have caused the Court's subsequent "legal" character-
ization of the accounting claim in Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962), 
discussed supra at notes 134-45 and accompanying text. It may also have led the 
Court to abandon the historical characterization of shareholders' derivative suits 
as triable exclusively in equity in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (discussed 
supra at notes 146-54 and accompanying text). 
312. See Sherer v. Burton, 393 So. 2d 991, 991-92 (Ala. 1981). But cf. Shubin v. United 
States Dist. Court, 313 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1963) (where the federal court declined 
to treat as legal a future claim as to which no damages had been inflicted or 
suffered). 
313. See, e.g., Burnham v. City of Mobile, 277 Ala. 659, 174 So. 2d 301 (1965). 
314. Hollywood, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 321 So. 2d 65, 71 (Fla. 1975). 
315. See id. at 73. In Hollywood, the court characterized as legal the tax assessor's bill 
for declaratory and equitable relief against alternative claimants to land. The 
court explained that the suit sounded in ejectment because it would likely lead to 
ouster of a party in possession of property. Id. at 71-72. 
316. 31 Ill. 2d 146, 199 N.E.2d 797 (1964). 
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confronted with an action for declaration of invalidity of a zoning ordi-
nance as applied to plaintiff's property. The complaint contained a 
prayer for injunctive relief but indicated that it was filed at law. The 
defendant asked for a jury trial. The court stated that, when a declara-
tion alone is sought, 
the right to trial by jury must be determined by an examina-
tion of the disputed issues and an appraisal of their predomi-
nant characteristics as indicating the approeriateness of legal 
or equitable relief. But when, as is ordmanly the case, relief 
in addition to the naked declaration of rights is sought, the 
nature of that relief determines the right to a trial by jury.317 
The court therefore denied jury trial. Ohio's courts show a marked 
willingness to subordinate parallel claims for legal relief to those for 
equitable relief and thus to deny jury trial rights as to all claims.318 
Ohio refuses to treat defensive actions for declaratory relief of non-
liability of an insurance policy as legal unless that claimant has re-
duced his claim to judgment and is actively seeking payment.319 Both 
the Illinois and Ohio approaches risk the loss of jury rights in many 
actions which, but for the statute, the right would probably be 
available. 
Maryland case law regarding the declaratory judgment, while 
scant, appears to follow the federal cases. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has construed the Declaratory Judgment Act as vesting in 
the circuit courts the power to render a substituted noncoercive remedy 
for what might have been available at law or in equity;320 the circuit 
court must look to the underlying circumstances to ascertain whether, 
prior to the act, legal relief would have sufficed or, alternatively, 
whether special factors would warrant the intervention of equity.321 
When a plaintiff sought to involve an earlier declaratory judgment act 
which deprived parties of the right to jury trial, the court of appeals 
refused him the right because he had an adequate remedy at law, and 
suggested that to do otherwise would conflict with the constitutional 
right to jury triaP22 
317. /d. at 148, 199 N.E.2d at 799. 
318. See, e.g., Miles v. N.J. Motors, Inc., 44 Ohio App. 2d 351, 338 N.E.2d 784 (1975) 
(court discharged debtors from a series of cognovit notes and subordinated debt-
ors' requests for declaratory relief to their claim for injunctive relief to compel 
defendant to comply with debtors' rights and sell repossessed vehicles at public 
sales). 
319. See, e.g., Republic Indem. Co. v. Durell, 105 Ohio App. 153, 151 N.E.2d 687 
(1957). 
320. Himes v. Day, 254 Md. 197, 206, 254 A.2d 181, 186 (1969). 
321. /d. at 207, 254 Md. at 186 (action is substitute for action for breach of contract, 
and thus legal). See Schultz v. Kaplan, 189 Md. 402, 408, 56 A.2d 17, 19-20 
(1947) (action is in the nature of ejectment, and hence legal). 
322. McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889). 
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2. Title to Land 
As a general matter, Maryland case law has tended to characterize 
claims of title as legal. In Diener v. Wheatley, 323 the court of appeals 
reaffirmed the rule that disputed issues of land title must be tried at law 
before injunctive or other equitable relief could issue from a court of 
equity. In McCoy v. Johnson, 324 the court of appeals denied the plain-
tiff a right to sue in equity to remove a cloud on title where the defend-
ant had record title but the plaintiff was in possession and could 
vindicate his claim through defense to an action at law for ejectment. 
In so doing, the court restricted the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1888, 
which provided an apparent statutory basis for pursuing this kind of 
claim in equity, and stated that because title presents questions of legal 
rights, the statute was "broader perhaps than the legislature intended 
... for it is clear [that] ... the Constitution guarantees to suitors the 
right of trial by jury, and this right the Legislature cannot abridge or 
take away."325 
On the other hand, in Maryland it seems settled that, generally, 
one who has title and is in possession must proceed in equity to vindi-
cate his title. The McCoy case conceded as much. Ejectment would 
not avail where the defendant had not dispossessed plaintiff,326 and 
trespass would not lie where damages would be insubstantial.327 The 
same result would follow if the defendant's beclouding acts would give 
him no present claim of right but might provide one in the future under 
an implied grant or adverse use, 328 or if no present right to possession is 
at stake, as in the case of an action to construe a future lease.329 Fi-
nally, under bifurcated procedures, equity would entertain an action 
for injunctive relief to remove an obstruction where no reasonable 
claim of adverse title could be asserted,330 but otherwise equity de-
ferred to law, where jury trial rights might be secured, to determine 
issues of title. 331 
In Fin glass v. George Franke Sons Co. 332 and Smith v. Shiebeck, 333 
the court of appeals was confronted with claims for equitable relief to 
enjoin obstructions to the plaintiffs' use of property. In each case, the 
defendant asserted a colorable legal right to enforce the obstruction. In 
Finglass, the court of appeals refused to uphold equitable jurisdiction, 
323. 191 Md. 690, 62 A.2d 783 (1948). 
324. 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889). 
325. fd at 492-93, 17 A. at 387. 
326. Rosenthal v. Donnelly, 126 Md. 147, 94 A. 1030 (1915). 
327. Homewood Realty Corp. v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 160 Md. 457, 154 A. 58 
(1931). 
328. ld 
329. Cf Shultz v. Kaplan, 189 Md. 402, 56 A.2d 17 (1947). 
330. Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 418, 24 A.2d 795, 799-800 (1942). 
331. ld; Diener v. Wheatley, 191 Md. 690, 62 A.2d 783 (1948). 
332. 172 Md. 135, 190 A. 752 (1937). 
333. 180 Md. 412, 24 A.2d 795 (1942). 
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and noted that law could render complete relief by issuing an injunc-
tion ancillary to its judgment regarding title.334 Five years later, in 
Smith, the same court upheld equity jurisdiction under similar facts. 335 
The apparent distinction between the two cases was that in Finglass 
there was no need for immediate action because the use in question, 
drainage, was not presently obstructed,336 while in Smith, the defend-
ant's fence constituted a present obstruction to the plaintiff's right of 
access to the property, and thus, immediate intervention of equity was 
warranted. 337 
Arguably, the distinction drawn between Finglass and Smith is too 
narrow. In Cooper v. Williams, 338 under facts identical to those in 
Smith, the Illinois Court of Appeals declined to deprive the defendant 
of his right to jury trial on the issue of title.339 In a merged system, the 
right to jury trial should tum on whether one of the parties is seeking, 
at least in part, legal relief, and not on a judicial characterization of 
what relief would be considered "primary" and in what court the relief 
would have been sought in a bifurcated system of courts. 
This method of analyzing the question of how to characterize ac-
tions may limit other Maryland precedents aside from Smith. In War-
ing v. National Savings Trust Co.,340 a bank sought to enforce a lien 
and to declare void the defendant's tax sale deed because the defend-
ant, as the mortgagor, had failed to pay the tax arrearages on the prop-
erty and because of irregularities in the tax sale. The court held that 
since the primary goal of the suit was to enforce the lien, the action 
properly lay in equity; therefore, the court could issue as subsidiary 
relief the necessary declaratory judgment.341 In Waring, since both 
parties stipulated to all the facts and thus left no issues of fact upon 
which reasonable jurors could differ, the decision to deny a jury trial 
was proper. In merged proceedings, however, it would be improper to 
deny the right to jury trial on the ground that the legal relief sought is 
subsidiary to that sought in equity. The justification for equitable 
cleanup is the convenience and necessity of avoiding a multiplicity of 
actions; because merger eliminates the possibility of multiplicity, the 
justification disappears. 342 
Another case which illustrates a proper limitation of the right to 
jury trial is Gibula v. Sause. 343 In that case, the parties mutually agreed 
334. Finglass, 172 Md. at 137, 190 A. at 753. 
335. Smith, 180 Md. 412, 24 A.2d 795 (1942). 
336. Smith, 172 Md. at 136-37, 190 A. at 752-53. 
337. Smith, 180 Md. at 422-23, 24 A.2d at 801. 
338. 60 Ill. App. 3d 634, 376 N.E.2d 1104 (1978). 
339. Id 
340. 138 Md. 367, 114 A. 57 (1921). 
341. Id at 379-80, 114 A. at 61-62. 
342. See Levin, Equitable Cleanup and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 100 U. PA. L. 
REv. 320, 339 (1951). 
343. 173 Md. 87, 194 A. 826 (1937). 
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to abandon a contract for the sale of realty, with the plaintiff-purchaser 
surrendering possession to the defendant-seller and the defendant-
seller taking possession. The plaintiff sued to get his money back. Al-
though noting that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law to sue 
for money had and received, the court allowed the action to lie in eq-
uity because the plaintiff's action was based on a prayer for rescission 
of the contract. 344 The court of appeals then authorized the court sit-
ting in equity to award the payback order.345 The jury trial issues were 
not significant since there was little dispute as to the facts of the case. 
The Gibula court's justification of equitable cleanup should be tem-
pered by recognition that there were no disputed factual questions, nor 
was there a jury demand involved therein. 
3. Rescission and Restitution based upon Fraud 
In Maryland, it has long been the law that only a court of equity 
could reform or rescind a contract,346 and that once equity granted such 
relief, it could award additional relief. 347 In a reformation action, it is 
not clear precisely why juries could not hear parol evidence as to the 
intended agreement and then enforce the contract as intended. In can-
cellation actions, it is even less clear why juries should be unable to 
hear claims of fraud, since juries are authorized to consider such mat-
ters when awarding affirmative damages for deceit.348 Rescission is es-
sentially a defensive doctrine employed to void a contract or deed in 
order to prevent its enforcement at law.349 Although cases speak of re-
scission as affirmative in nature, it is essentially a declaratory remedy 
defining the status of the parties.350 While adhering to the position that 
a defendant at law may not be precluded from asserting grounds for 
344. /d. at 93-94, 194 A. at 828-29. 
345. /d. at 94-95, 194 A. at 828-29. 
346. See Creamer v. Helferstay, 294 Md. 107, 448 A.2d 332 (1982); Connor v. Groh, 90 
Md. 674, 45 A. 1024 (1900); Ridgley v. Beatty, 222 Md. 76, 159 A.2d 651 (1960). 
347. Gibula v. Sause, 173 Md. 87, 194 A. 826 (1937) (rescission); Aetna Indemnity of 
Baltimore, S.P.E. & C. Ry. Co., 112 Md. 389, 76 A. 251 (1910) (reformation); 
Maryland Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Kimmell, 89 Md. 437, 43 A. 764 (1899) (reforma-
tion); Baltimore Sugar Ref. Co. v. Campbell & Zell Co., 83 Md. 36, 34 A. 369 
(1896) (rescission). 
348. See Appel v. Hupfield, 198 Md. 374, 84 A.2d 94 (1951); Loyola Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Trenchcraft, Inc., 17 Md. App. 646, 303 A.2d 432 (1973). 
349. See Cook, Equitable Defenses, 32 YALE L.J. 645, 649-50 (1923). The justifications 
for intervention of equity have included the prematurity of the law action, the 
ability of the client to delay it for tactical reasons, and the desirability of avoiding 
a multiplicity of legal actions. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 
367-68 (2d ed. 1976) and authorities cited therein. 
350. In Baltimore Sugar Ref. Co. v. Campbell & Zell Co., 83 Md. 36, 34 A. 369 (1896), 
the plaintiff purchased faulty equipment on the basis of false representations of 
the defendant and of the plaintiff's engineers whom the defendant had bribed. 
The court of appeals held that equity could award damages ancillary to a decree 
cancelling the contract. In response to defendant's argument that the remedy at 
law was fully adequate, the court stated that the legal remedy was incomplete 
because only equity could finally annul the agreement. This is not self evident. 
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rescission in equity,351 Maryland courts have wavered as to whether 
these defenses are also fully available in an action at law,352 and have 
left unclear whether such defenses should be tried to a jury or to a 
judge if they are available at law.353 
Merger may have a limited influence on this problem. Where le-
gal relief is sought, fraud as a basis for reformation or rescission may 
be triable to the court or to a jury. The traditional justifications for 
refusing jury trial in an action for rescission based on fraud is that eq-
uity did not have juries, and that fraud was an inappropriate issue for 
jury determination.354 This rationale is severely undermined in a court 
using united procedures. Indeed, an action for rescission could be 
characterized as an effort to obtain a declaratory judgment of the unen-
forceability of a contract, an inverted action at law. 
Maryland's courts may well adhere to history by characterizing is-
sues of fraud and mistake when used for purposes of reformation or 
rescission as essentially equitable. Even if Maryland's courts take this 
stance, the equitable cleanup which has historically swept away the 
right to jury trial on subsequent issues relating to legal type relief 
would not necessarily be applied.355 The essential justification for eq-
uitable cleanup lay in the cost, delay and inconvenience of a separate 
For a later, equally mystifying decision, see Stirup v. Warfield, 104 Md. 530, 65 A. 
346 (1906). 
351. See Ridgley v. Beatty, 222 Md. 76, !59 A.2d 651 (1960); Connor v. Groh, 90 Md. 
674, 45 A. 1024 (1900). 
352. Fraud appears to be available as a defense at law. See Stiegler v. Eureka Life Ins. 
Co., 146 Md. 629, 127 A. 397 (1925); McGrath v. Peterson, 127 Md. 412,96 A. 551 
(1916). But see Ridgley v. Beatty, 222 Md. 76, !59 A.2d 651 (1960) (casting doubt 
on the proposition that fraud is available as a defense at law as well as on the issue 
of whether mutual mistake of fact is a defense which may be asserted at law). 
The court of appeals has recently held that mutual mistake may not be asserted as 
a defense at law. Annapolis Mall Ltd. Partnership v. Yogurt Tree, Inc., 299 Md. 
244, 473 A.2d 32 (1984). 
353. In Stiegler v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 146 Md. 629, 127 A. 397 (1925), the court of 
appeals suggested that, in cases of fraud, an insurance company could alterna-
tively file a bill in equity to cancel a policy, or raise the fraud issue defensively in 
an action on the policy. Id. at 639-41, 127 A.2d at 401-02. The court indicated in 
dictum that if fraud were asserted defensively in the law action, the issue would be 
triable of right to a jury. I d. at 639, 127 A.2d at 400. Without addressing the jury 
trial issue, other cases have strongly suggested that fraud is a legal issue when 
raised defensively in an action at law. See McGrath v. Peterson, 127 Md. 412, 96 
A. 551 (1916); George v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'! Bank, 155 Md. 693, 142 A. 
590 (1928). Compare George and McGrath with Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'! 
Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 242 (1972). 
354. Frequently, other jurisdictions have refused to allow equitable defenses to acting 
on written instruments to be raised before juries out of fear that they might be too 
quick to upset the security of transactions these instruments were designed to fos-
ter. See Coleman v. Coleman, 208 S.C. 103, 37 S.E.2d 305 (1946); McCormick, 
The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L. 
J. 365 (1982). The holding of Connor v. Groh, 90 Md. 674,45 A. 1024 (1900), that 
reformation and cancellation are not equitable defenses which must be raised in a 
law action, may be based on such fears. 
355. See supra note ·347. 
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action at law in a bifurcated legal system. 356 Merger eliminates this 
justification, and thus the right to jury trial should be available in sub-
sequent proceedings leading to legal type relief. 
This is not to say that fraud might never be triable entirely in eq-
uity. Where determination of the fraud issue would lead to purely e~­
uitable relief, there is no need to consider ordering a jury triaP 7 
Where equitable relief is sought and its determination might foreclose 
the granting of legal relief, however, the judge should decline to order 
trial of the equitable issues to the court first,358 lest he eviscerate the 
right to jury triaP59 
B. Actions Containing Separate Claims for Legal and Equitable 
Relief Involving Common Issues 
1. Simultaneous Claims by a Plaintiff for Legal and Equitable 
Relief Involving Common Issues 
The prior Maryland Rules of Procedure did not generally sanction 
the combination, cumulatively or in the alternative, oflegal and equita-
ble claims. Former Rule BF40, however, permitted a plaintiff to join 
an ancillary claim for injunction to a claim for legal relief.360 That rule 
356. See Levin, Equitable Cleanup and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, I 00 U. P A. L. 
REV. 320 (1951). 
357. This would be true whether the object of the suit were to obtain truly affirmative 
equitable relief, such as an injunction, the setting aside of judgments procured by 
fraud, or the establishment of a constructive trust to trace stolen property, or 
whether it was merely to obtain rescission. An interesting example of the latter 
type can be found in Powell v. Kaplan, 103 R.I. 60, 235 A.2d 91 (1967). In Powell, 
plaintiff had obtained a loan in consideration of his conveyance of a half-interest 
in the property to the defendant's wife. When she declined to convey the property 
back, the plaintiff sued for rescission and damages for usuary. The court declined 
to honor a jury trial demand after it concluded that plaintiff's failure to allege any 
payments of principal or interest failed to afford any right to legal relief. 
358. See Cheek v. McCowan Elec. Supply Co., 404 So. 2d 834 (Fla. App. 1981); Land-
ers v. Goetz, 264 N.W.2d 459 (N.D. 1978); Warner v. Kittle, 280 S.E.2d 276 (W. 
Va. 1981). 
359. For examples of cases in which this occurred, see Hiatt v. Yergin, 152 Ind. App. 
496, 284 N.E.2d 834 (1972); Hill v. Jessup, 139 Ind. App. 467, 220 N.E.2d 662 
(1966); Farwell v. Neal, 40 Mich. App. 351, 198 N.W.2d 801 (1972); Johnson v. 
Johnson, 272 Minn. 284, 137 N.W.2d 840 (1965); Linville V. Wilson, 628 S.W.2d 
422 (Mo. App. 1982); Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445, 317 A.2d 68 (1974); 
Miles v. N.J. Motors, Inc., 44 Ohio App. 2d 351, 338 N.E.2d 184 (1975); Ranta v. 
German, I Wash. App. 104, 459 P.2d 961 (1969). 
360. Md. R.P. BF40 (1977) provides: 
In an action at law a party either in his original pleading or at any time 
after the commencement of the action (whether before or after judg-
ment) may claim, in addition to any other demand which may be en-
forced in such action, that a writ of mandamus or injunction, or both, be 
issued. 
This rule derives from previous statutes enforced in such cases as Superior Constr. 
Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. I, 102 A.2d 739 (1954) and Dundalk Holding Co. v. Easter, 
215 Md. 549, 137 A.2d 667 (1958). The rule does not authorize trial courts to issue 
non-injunctive equitable relief, such as the imposition of a trust, Zimmerman v. 
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has been construed to require the claim for legal relief to be tried first 
and the chancellor to follow the factual findings of the jury, thus avoid-
ing bifurcated proceedings.361 Rule BF40 was used to provide injunc-
tions as well as dama§es in actions involving continuing trespasses, 362 
wrongful discharge, 36 and disparagement of business and property 
rights.364 It is not clear whether this rule may have permitted a plaintiff 
to claim relatively minor legal relief with a more involved and burden-
some "ancillary" claim for equitable relief and have the jury findings 
on the legal claim control the outcome of the equitable claim. The 
more established notion, as discussed supra, is that equity may decide 
all claims, even legal claims, if there is any basis for equitable 
adjudication. 365 
Rule BF40 provided a model for regulating the order of trial of 
suits in which the plaintiff combines legal and equitable claims. It 
treats such situations in a manner very similar to Beacon Theatres be-
cause the rule requires that the jury claim be tried first and that the jury 
adjudication control facts common to the equity claim. Application of 
the policy in Rule BF40 to forms of equitable relief such as rescission 
and specific performance, or requiring a trial judgt: in all cases where 
legal and equitable ciaims are combined to try the legal claim first 
would entail a substantial restriction of the scope of equity in 
Maryland. 
Other jurisdictions have handled the problem of the order of legal 
and equitable claims joined by a plaintiff in different ways. Some states 
have taken a position similar to Beacon Theatres that, in certain in-
Garfinkel, 144 Md. 394, 124 A. 919 (1924), although it arguably would suffice to 
authorize specific performance in an action at law. Cf., Grant v. Katson, 261 Md. 
112, 274 A.2d 88 (1971) (in an action at law, court ordered injunctive relief to 
protect the plaintiff's property from flooding). 
361. Beane v. McMullen, 265 Md. 585, 291 A.2d 37 (1972); Beane v. Prince George's 
County, 20 Md. App. 383, 315 A.2d 777 (1974). 
362. See, e.g., Grant v. Katson, 261 Md. 112,274 A.2d 88 (1971); Dundalk Holding Co. 
v. Easter, 215 Md. 549, 137 A.2d 667 (1958). 
363. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Wm. Schuderberg-T.J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88 
(1958). 
364. See, e.g., Warren House Co. v. Handwerger, 240 Md. 177, 213 A.2d 574 (1965). 
365. Surrey Inn, Inc. v. Jennings, 215 Md. 446, 138 A.2d 658 (1958) (the plaintiff's 
request for equitable relief where he has no colorable right to it cannot serve as a 
basis for equity jurisdiction). If for some reason equity would not first intervene, 
as where there is yet insufficient evidence of irreparable harm or where title is in 
question, Finglass v. George Franke Sons, Co., 172 Md. 135, 190 A. 752 (1937), a 
plaintiff would be compelled to sue at law, thus assuring the possibility of jury 
trial for legal issues while eliminating the need for bifurcated proceedings. More-
over, where equity could not provide some of the relief requested, if., Superior 
Constr. Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. I, 104 A.2d 581 (1954) (equity will not afford puni-
tive damages), it may be that the plaintiff can proceed in equity only at the risk of 
being forced to have elected to surrender his claim to legal relief. See 3 PoE's 
PLEADING AND PRACTICE 334 B (6th ed. H. Sachs 1975). Whether a law court 
might have refused to entertain a claim for equitable relief which significantly 
dwarfs a legal claim is unclear. 
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stances, the right to trial by jury must be preserved through the order of 
trial of the claims. 366 The view of Beacon Theatres, however, has been 
rejected by many state courts which have considered the issue. Some 
simply have held that any plaintiff who joins legal and equitable claims 
thereby waives his right to have a jury decide the issues necessary to 
equitable relief.367 Since a plaintiff in Maryland may be compelled by 
the rule against splitting causes of action to join transactionally related 
claims, 368 such a waiver policy would be harsh. 
More numerous are cases which deny jury trial on the basis of 
traditional principles of equitable cleanup. These courts hold that once 
equity has properly taken jurisdiction of a case, it may, at its discretion, 
decide legal issues without a jury. This is true not only among those 
few jurisdictions retaining a separation of law and equity,369 but also 
among those in which some degree of merger has been accom-
plished.370 Like some federal courts prior to Beacon Theatres, a sub-
stantial number of state courts have conditioned loss of the jury trial 
right on a judicial determination that the action as a whole is regarded 
366. See, e.g., Pacific Western Oil Co. v. Bern Oil Co., 13 Colo. 60, 87 P.2d 1045 (1939) 
(error to deny defendants' jury trial demand in action to enjoin defendants from 
removing oil from plaintiff's land and for damages for oil already removed); 
Miller v. Carnation Co., 33 Colo. App. 62, 516 P.2d 661 (1973) (p1aintiffentitled 
to jury trial on common issues in action for injunction and compensatory and 
punitive damages for nuisance); Landers v. Goetz, 264 N.W.2d 459, 462 (N.D. 
1978) (plaintiff entitled to jury trial when seeking decree quieting title against one 
defendant and damages against others for false representations). 
After the merger of law and equity in 1973, Massachusetts took a similar 
view. MASS. R. Clv. P. 38, Reporters Notes (1973). Vermont has also adopted this 
view in dicta. Merchants Bank v. Thibodeau, 143 Vt. 132, 465 A.2d 258 (1983). 
In First National Bank of Commerce v. Baker, 142 Ga. App. 870, 237 S.E.2d 233 
(1977), the Georgia court held that statutory right to trial by jury must be pro-
tected in an action to foreclose a security interest in a mobile home and combined 
with a writ for possession of the mobile home. Nevada may permit the same result 
although the issue of sequence of the claims appears discretionary. Sanquinetti v. 
Strecker, 94 Nev. 200, 577 P.2d 404 (1978) (trial judge upheld in ordering jury 
trial on issue of whether plaintiff should get damages, and then ordering cancella-
tion of the deeds in question). 
367. A New York statute suggests that there is no waiver of jury trial rights on legal 
claims joined with equitable ones that do not arise out of the same transaction. 
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW§ 4102 (McKinney 1963). The New York courts apparently 
believe, however, that a plaintiff who joins transactionally related claims, such as 
a claim for specific performance and damages, thereby waives his right to jury 
trial on any issues in the case. See L.C.J. Realty Corp. v. Back, 37 A.D.2d 840, 
326 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1971) (dictum). Since lawyers are likely to be strongly moti-
vated to join multiple claims only when they are transactionally related, the rule 
has the effect of mandating waiver in virtually all such cases. See also P A. R. Civ. 
P. l509(c). 
368. See supra Part I. 
369. See, e.g., Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Park Oil, Inc., 385 A.2d 147 (Del. Ch. 1978) 
(action for debt, to set aside a fraudulent conveyance and to pierce a corporate 
veil). 
370. See, e.g., Linville v. Wilson, 628 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (action for in-
junction against trespass and for actual and punitive damages). 
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as "essentially e~uitable" or that the legal issues are "incidental" to the 
equitable issues. 71 Defining the term "incidental" can be difficult. A 
few courts define it narrowly, protecting jury trial when the legal and 
equitable remedies sought are cumulative and denying jury trial only 
when the legal remedy sought is in the altemative.372 Occasionally a 
legal claim will be regarded as incidental when it is dwarfed by the 
equitable relief sought.373 Other jurisdictions leave substantial leeway 
to the plaintiff or the trial judge to characterize the action as essentially 
legal or essentially equitable.374 Too often, the way this discretion is 
371. See, e.g., LaFrance v. LaFrance, 127 Conn. 149, 14 A.2d 739 (1940) (claims for 
injunction against business interference and $1500 damages characterized as fun-
damentally equitable); Summers v. Martin, 77 Idaho 469, 295 P.2d 265 (1956) 
(action to rescind a contract for exchanging land and damages characterized as 
equitable because primary and ultimate relief sought was rescission and restora-
tion of property); Hiatt v. Yergin, 152 Ind. App. 497,284 N.E.2d 834 (1972) (claim 
for $500,000 damages held incidental to demands for specific performance of con-
tract to sell stock, accounting, and injunction against payment of wages); Miles v. 
N.J. Motors, Inc., 44 Ohio App. 2d 351, 338 N.E.2d 784 (1975) (consumer class 
action for injunctive relief to compel sale of autos and declaratory judgment dis-
charging plaintiff's obligation on cognovit notes held primarily equitable because 
legal claims subordinate). 
372. In Miller v. Carnation Co., 33 Colo. App. 62, 516 P.2d 661 (1973), a nuisance 
claim for injunction and compensatory and punitive damages was held essentially 
legal because the damages were sought as a cumulative rather than as an alterna-
tive remedy. See Kaitz v. Dist. Court, 650 P.2d 553 (Colo. 1982). 
373. Although the Connecticut statute which merges law and equity provides that 
"whenever there is any variance between the rules of equity and ... of the com-
mon law ... the rules of equity shall prevail .... " CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 52-1 (West Cum. Supp. 1982), the Connecticut courts have characterized as es-
sentially equitable only those actions in which damages are sought in the alterna-
tive or as a supplement to equitable relief. See Berry v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & 
Trust Co., 125 Conn. 615, 7 A.2d 847 (1939). The Berry court indicated that an 
action seeking specific performance or damages in lieu thereof or an action for 
accounting, reconveyance of property and damages would be essentially equita-
ble. An action for damages for trespass and for an injunction against its continu-
ance, an action to set aside an insurance policy award and for damages for loss 
under the policy and an action for damages and to set aside a conveyance as 
fraudulent would not be essentially equitable. In Dick v. Dick, 167 Conn. 210, 
355 A.2d 110 (1974), the court held that an action to set aside a conveyance, to 
establish a constructive trust and for specific performance and damages was essen-
tially equitable. In LaFrance v. LaFrance, 127 Conn. 149, 14 A.2d 739 (1940), the 
plaintiff alleged violation by the defendant of an injunction issued in a prior ac-
tion and sought an injunction of interference with his business and damages. The 
court denied the defendant's jury demand because, although $1,500 in damages 
had been claimed, it was clear that "the fundamental purpose of the action was 
against the continuance of the defendant's conduct in conspiring to avoid the 
court's restraining order." ld. at 153, 14 A.2d at 741. 
374. See, e.g., Ledford v. Wheeler, 620 P.2d 903 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979) (decision 
whether to allow seller bifurcated trial to protect jury trial right to damages claim 
was discretionary, and trial court did not err in refusing bifurcation where para-
mount issue was rescission); Skoglund v. Staab, 89 S.D. 470, 312 N.W.2d 29 
(1981) (plaintiff's claim for damages dependent upon outcome of his claim for 
specific performance; decision of trial judge denying jury trial upheld as discre-
tionary); Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P.2d 126 (1966) 
(trial judge's decision to characterize contract action seeking accounting and in-
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exercised reveals a strong judicial bias against trial by jury.375 In many 
instances, a legal claim is regarded as incidental because the decision 
with respect to it is dependent upon the resolution of an equitable 
claim which requires affirmative relief. 
The boundaries of the court's classification of an issue as "inciden-
tal" are elusive, and appellate courts do not appear inclined to disturb 
the discretion of trial judges as to whether to permit trial by jury. 
Under such a regime, the hostility of some trial judges to jury trials 
may be cause for concern. In Lakeman v. La France, 376 for instance, 
the plaintiff sued a physician for malpractice and sought to circumvent 
the statute of limitations by showing knowing concealment of the in-
jury by the physician. The court held that since the plaintiff was seek-
ing affirmative equitable relief- estoppel of the doctor from asserting 
limitations - the plaintiff had no right to trial by jury on the issue of 
fraud. The court did not reach the question of whether the plaintiff 
could have a jury trial on the malpractice issues, but cases like Ledford 
v. Wheeler 37 suggest a negative answer. 
Thus, in determining the degree of protection it will extend to the 
right to trial by jury in an action in which the plaintiff has combined 
legal and equitable claims for relief, the Maryland judiciary has essen-
tially three choices. It may protect the right to trial by jury by ordering 
trial of the jury case first when the order of trial may make a difference. 
Second, it may treat joinder oflegal and equitable claims as a waiver of 
the right to trial by jury. Finally, the Maryland judiciary may protect 
or dispense with the right to trial by jury in its discretion depending 
upon whether it characterizes the action as essentially equitable or es-
sentially legal. If the factual bases for the legal and equitable claims 
are not closely related, of course, the trial court may order separate 
trials in any order without consequence to the jury trial right of any 
party. 
The selection of any of these approaches should be made in light 
of four important principles. The first principle is Maryland's constitu-
tion preserves the right to trial by jury as it existed at the time of the 
adoption of the constitution vis a vis the scope of equity.378 Second, the 
junction as equitable will not be interfered with unless there is patent error or 
abuse of discretion); Coleman v. Highland Lumber, Inc., 46 Wash. 2d 549, 283 
P.2d 123 (1955). 
375. See, e.g., Anderson v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 112, 227 P.2d 351 (1951) (action for 
possession and rents, as well as to quiet title against other defendants, held to be 
primarily equitable); Hiatt v. Yergin, 152 Ind. App. 497, 284 N.E.2d 834 (1972) 
(claim for $500,000 in damages held incidental to claims for specific performance, 
accounting and injunction); Town of Hampton v. Palmer, 99 N.H. 143, 106 A.2d 
397 (1954) (action for entry against possessory defendant and to quiet title held 
essentially equitable); Miles v. N.J. Motors, Inc., 44 Ohio App. 2d 351,338 N.E.2d 
784 (1975). 
376. 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959). 
377. See supra note 374. 
378. See supra notes 185-99 and accompanying text. 
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scope of equity has historically been measured with due respect to the 
importance of the right to trial by jury. 379 Third, the scope of equity is 
necessarily limited by the principle that equity will not intervene where 
the remedy at law is full, expeditious and adequate.38° Finally, it has 
been recognized that the scope of equity in Maryland may be expanded 
by statute or judicial decision.381 As a matter of common sense, the 
Maryland judiciary should consider the efficacy of separate treatment 
of legal issues and the impact on judicial economy of expanding the 
right to trial by jury by applying it in situations in which equity would 
traditionally have cleaned up. There is no reason why Maryland must 
expand the right to trial by jury in the wake of merger at a time when 
its suitability for the pressures of modern litigation has been called into 
question.382 On the other hand, it would be reasonable to re-examine 
the appropriateness of resort to equity and equitable cleanup in light of 
the post-merger remedial powers of Maryland's trial courts.383 
With these factors in mind, it would be useful to consider how trial 
of claims might be ordered in actions in which various legal and equi-
table claims are asserted. 
a. Suits to Enjoin Inteiference with a Business Relationship and for 
Damages 
In Warren House Co. v. Handwerger, 384 the plaintiff, a corporation 
which operated a motor inn and shopping arcade, filed a bill in equity 
seeking to enjoin seven individuals from uttering false and malicious 
statements about its business. The plaintiff alleged that such statements 
were made with the intent to injure, but it did not allege the existence 
of a conspiracy or other concerted effort among the individual defend-
ants to injure the plaintiff's business. The court of appeals upheld the 
trial court's decision to sustain the defendants' demurrer on the basis 
that no wrong such as conspiracy, coercion or intimidation was 
sought.385 
Assume, however, that a plaintiff alleges a fact situation similar to 
Warren House, but also alleges the presence of a conspiracy and seeks 
an injunction and damages. The fact situation bears some resemblance 
to Beacon Theatres. The existence of a conspiracy would be a common 
379. Allender v. Ghinger, 170 Md. 156, 183 A. 610 (1936). 
380. Superior Constr. Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. I, 104 A.2d 581 (1954); Bachman v. 
Lambach, 192 Md. 35,63 A.2d 641 (1949); Johnson v. Bugle Coat, Apron & Linen 
Serv., 191 Md. 268, 60 A.2d 686 (1948). 
381. Capron v. DeVries, 83 Md. 220, 34 A. 251 (1896). 
382. See supra note 154 and cases cited therein. 
383. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); see supra notes 122-24 
and accompanying text. This factor has also been regarded as relevant with re-
spect to the scope of equity in Maryland. Bachman v. Lembach, 192 Md. 35, 63 
A.2d 641 (1949). 
384. 240 Md. 177, 213 A.2d 574 (1965). 
385. Jd at 179, 213 A.2d at 575. 
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element to the claims for injunction and damages, and the federal pol-
icy would require that the action for damages be tried first. A federal 
trial court would not be prevented, however, pending trial by jury of 
the damages claim, from granting preliminary injunctive relief. 386 A 
state court which accords a right to trial by jury in mixed actions only if 
the action is essentially legal might well regard the claim for injunctive 
relief as predominant and deny a right to trial by jury.387 
The Maryland judiciary has demonstrated a high regard for trial 
by jury, and Maryland courts have historically limited equitable inter-
vention to situations in which the legal remedy is inadequate. There-
fore, if a party demands a jury trial under the revised rules, the trial 
court should try the damages claim first. Although the injunctive relief 
might not be regarded as ancillary, trial of the legal claim first is consis-
tent with the spirit of former Rule BF40. The trial court could then 
enter final injunctive relief in a manner consistent with the factual find-
ings of the jury. A Maryland trial court might also enter an interlocu-
tory injunction to· alleviate the effects which the delay of a trial by jury 
might occasion.388 Assuming that equity will preclude trial by jury 
only where there is some inadequacy of the remedy at law, it seems 
highly unlikely, given the ability of trial courts to grant provisional re-
lief, that a claim for injunction that is joined with a legal claim should 
ever be tried first. This is particularly true if punitive damages are 
sought. If the plaintiff prevailed with respect to the injunctive relief, a 
second trial would be necessary since equity may not award punitive 
damages.389 This reasoning is also applicable to situations in which the 
plaintiff seeks damages and an injunction for nuisance or for continu-
ing trespass. In such cases, a result similar to that in Beacon Theatres is 
obtained under established Maryland principles. 
b. Suits Joining Claims for Spec[jic Performance and .Damages 
The ability of a court of equity to decree specific performance is a 
significant remedial advantage over a court of law. This remedy is 
largely limited to contracts involving land390 and unique chattels.391 If 
a claim for damages is joined with one for specific performance, the 
damages are generally sought in the alternative or for the recoupment 
of incidental losses for wrongful detention. In either event, states gen-
erally hold that there would be no right to trial by jury. 392 Since the 
right to damages would involve issues common to entitlement for spe-
cific performance, the analysis under Beacon Theatres and its progeny 
386. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a). 
387. See LaFrance v. LaFrance, 127 Conn. 149, 14 A.2d 739 (1940). 
388. See Md. R.P. BB70c (1977). 
389. Superior Constr. Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. 1, 102 A.2d 739 (1954). 
390. Popplein v. Foley, 61 Md. 382 (1884). 
391. Berman v. Leckner, 188 Md. 321, 52 A.2d 464 (1947). 
392. See supra notes 372, 373. 
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would require that the damages claim be tried first. Where the equita-
ble grounds for specific performance are strong, such a result would be 
ridiculous. In such a case, the plaintiff would only want substantial 
damages if specific performance were denied; the value to the plaintiff 
of incidental damages for wrongful detention would be dwarfed by the 
value of performance. A jury could not efficaciously adjudicate a claim 
for specific performance because such an adjudication involves consid-
eration of factors uniquely within the province of the chancellor.393 
Maryland has regarded cases of specific performance as justifying 
the interposition of equity. Once equitable jurisdiction attached, the 
chancellor was permitted to award damages if specific performance was 
denied. 394 Under the revised rules, if the court denies specific perform-
ance despite finding a breach of contract, it should not be compelled to 
hold a separate jury trial as to damages. The need for specific perform-
ance provides equitable jurisdiction, and nothing under the revised 
rules cures the inadequacy of the damages remedy. In this instance, the 
merger of law and equity should provide no limitation on the ability of 
equity to "clean up" the claim for damages. 
One caveat to this approach seems appropriate. The plaintiff 
should be required early in the proceeding to demonstrate strong 
grounds for believing that the specific performance remedy will issue 
and that whatever damages are awarded will likely be incidental. Dis-
cretion to order jury trial of common issues should be freely exercised 
when either of these conditions cannot be met. Analysis of the jury 
trial issue posed by joinder of a claim for specific relief for return of 
unique chattels395 and a claim for damages for conversion of chattels 
which are not unique illustrates the point. The facts surrounding the 
acquisition of the chattels by the defendant might well be common to 
both claims. In the federal courts, the claim for conversion should be 
tried first. A simple claim for return of chattels might not involve sig-
nificant discretionary considerations. In such a case, the legal relief 
would not be alternative, and deference for trial by jury would require 
the trial judge to submit the claim for damages to the jury. The jury's 
findings as to the conversion claim would bind the judge as to that issue 
but not as to whether the specific items must be recovered. 
c. Suits Joining IJivorce Related Claims with Actions at Law 
A question arises as to how a trial court should order the trial of a 
suit in which the plaintiff joins a claim for a limited divorce on the 
393. See Linthicum v. Washington, B. & A. Elec. R.R. Co., 124 Md. 263, 92 A. 917 
(1915) (court denied specific performance on the basis that the injury to the de-
fendant would be greater than the benefit to the plaintiff). 
394. /d. 
395. Berman v. Leckner, 188 Md. 321, 52 A.2d 464 (1947), involved a suit by an ad-
ministrator d.b.n. of an estate to recover personal property. The unique property 
involved was a painting alleged to be worth $300,000, and various heirlooms. 
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basis of cruelty of treatment or excessively vicious conduct396 with a 
claim for damages for assault and battery. Joinder of such claims in 
the same suit would be novel. In an action for divorce and child cus-
tody, it has been held that an equity court lacked jurisdiction to order 
child support to which the parties had not agreed, and that such sup-
port would have to be sought in an action in assumpsit at law.397 
It may strongly be contended that permitting claims not strictly 
related to divorce, property distribution and child custody to be in-
cluded in suits involving domestic relations is unsound judicial admin-
istration. It may be preferable to confine claims related to domestic 
relations to separate court divisions, as is done in the Family Division 
of the District of Columbia Superior Court.398 The mixture of claims 
triable by jury to historically equitable domestic relations actions399 
may inject inappropriate elements of delay and interference with equi-
table discretion. It must be noted that the Maryland legislature has 
endowed chancery with jurisdiction over matters pertaining to ali-
mony,400 divorce401 and disposition of marital property.402 It is doubt-
ful that the legislature specifically intended to preclude the right to trial 
by jury as to such matters because it is unlikely that the legislature 
considered that these claims might have been combined with claims 
triable by jury. Nevertheless, it has been established in Maryland that 
the legislature may fix the scope of equity in such a way as to narrow 
the scope of trial by jury.403 
In the action combining a claim for divorce based upon cruelty 
and a claim for damages for assault and battery, the same conduct may 
well be the basis for both claims. If such is the case, the rule of Beacon 
Theatres would require that the assault and battery claim be tried first. 
The chancellor would then be bound by the jury's finding in deciding 
the issues involved in the divorce action. It may be argued that any 
rule which requires legal claims to be tried prior to the divorce claims 
constitutes an affront to the legislative grant of divorce jurisdiction to 
equity.404 In any event, in order to avoid unseemly delay, the divorce 
claim should be tried first. If punitive damages are claimed for assault 
and battery, the trial judge as chancellor should not clean up the as-
396. See Mo. FAM. LAW CoDE ANN.§ 7-102 (1984). 
397. Kemp v. Kemp, 287 Md. 165, 411 A.2d 1028 (1980). 
398. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1101 (1981). 
399. See McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 469 A.2d 1256 (1984). 
400. Mo. ANN. CooE art. 16, § 1 (Supp. 1983). See Mo. FAM. LAW CoDE ANN.§ 11-
101 (1984) for current version. 
401. Mo. ANN. CooE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1983). See Mo. FAM. LAW CoDE ANN. § 7-
103 (1984) for current version. 
402. Mo. CTs. & Juo. PRoc. CooE ANN.§ 3-6A-01 to -07 (1984). See Mo. FAM. LAw 
CODE ANN. §§ 1-201, 7-102, 7-103, 8-201, 8-213 (1984). 
403. Capron v. DeVries, 83 Md. 220, 34 A. 251 (1896). 
404. Such jurisdiction was conferred by 1841 Md. Acts, ch. 262 (1842) (Mo. CoDE 
ANN. art. 16, §§ 24, 25 (Supp. 1983)). See Mo. FAM. LAW CoDE ANN. § 7-103 
(1984) for current version. 
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sault and battery claim. If such a claim is not precluded by the findings 
of the court in the divorce claim, a separate trial by jury should be 
held.405 
A variation of this problem would arise in an action in which the 
plaintiff joins a claim for absolute divorce406 and property disposi-
tion407 with a claim for conversion of property subject to disposition by 
the court. Beacon Theatres would require that the conversion action be 
tried first to the jury. In Maryland, however, according priority to the 
jury claim with a consequent preclusive effect as to the property dispo-
sition flies in the face of the legislative determination that equity should 
determine ownership of marital personal property and severely under-
mines the power of the court to divide the property expeditiously.408 
The trial judge, as chancellor, could not award punitive damages for 
conversion, although such damages do not appear to be readily avail-
able in an action for conversion.409 If the findings of the trial judge do 
not preclude such damages, a separate trial may be held. Subordinat-
ing the legal claim where there is a clear legislative grant of equitable 
jurisdiction prevents any delay caused by jury adjudication which 
would interfere with the legislative intent of expeditious adjudication. 
Consideration of these factual possibilities indicates that the rigid 
rule of Beacon Theatres does not always yield the best results. It would 
be preferable for the post-merger Maryland judiciary to order trial of 
claims to protect trial by jury except in cases where equitable interven-
tion has traditionally been regarded as essential. 
C Actions Involving Legal and Equitable Claims Asserted by 
D!!ferent Parties 
The former Maryland Rules of Procedure permitted defendants to 
assert any claims they had against an opposing party,410 to assert tran-
sactionally related cross-claims against co-parties411 and to implead 
third party defendants, without any apparent limitation as to whether 
such additional claims are legal or equitable. Because of the rigid his-
toric dichotomy between law and equity, there is some doubt as to 
whether a law court could entertain an equitable claim or an equity 
court could entertain a legal claim filed by a defendant.412 There is 
405. Mo. R.P. 2-503(b). 
406. Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§ 7-103 (1984). 
407. Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.§§ 1-201, 7-102, 7-103, 8-201, 8-213 (1984). 
408. Mo. CTs. & Juo. PRoc. CooE ANN.§ 3-6A-03(b)(l); cf Katchen v. Landy, 382 
U.S. 323 (1966) (post-Beacon case in which the Supreme Court appears to have 
authorized equitable cleanup of legal claims relating to the bankrupt's estate in 
order to effectuate the congressional scheme for expeditious resolution of bank-
ruptcy proceedings). 
409. Bender v. Bender, 57 Md. App. 593, 471 A.2d 335 (1984). 
410. Md. R.P. 314a (1977). 
411. Md. R.P. 314b (1977). 
412. See Brown, The Law/Equity Dichotomy in Maryland, 39 Mo. L. REv. 427, 472 
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evidence that if a defendant were to respond to an equitable claim with 
a legal counterclaim, equity would clean up the whole case without 
affording the defendant a right to jury trial as to the counterclaim.413 
In merged systems, the response to the issue of preservation of the 
right to trial by jury in this situation is varied. After Beacon Theatres, it 
seems clear that no matter what type of relief is sought first or is 
thought to predominate, a federal court must accord the parties the 
right to jury trial on all issues common to the claim and the 
counterclaim. 
A number of states have taken a similar viewpoint. In Western 
Community Cemetery v. Lewis,414 the plaintiff initially filed an unlawful 
detainer action. The defendant counterclaimed in equity to quiet title. 
The plaintiff then dismissed his detainer claim and counterclaimed for 
ejectment. The Florida court held that, since resolution of either claim 
would be tantamount to adjudication of the other, the ejectment claim 
must be tried first. 
Other states have also followed Beacon Theatres in this respect.415 
Still others, using less sweeping rationales than Beacon Theatres, have 
attempted to secure jury trial rights in counterclaim situations. The 
Supreme Court of Arkansas, which retains separate law and equity di-
visions, has held that it was error to transfer an action for ejectment to 
chancery following assertion by the defendant of an equitable claim 
because such transfer would allow the defendant to oust courts of law 
from jurisdiction over claims of title.416 In Ohio, where courts have 
discretion to characterize actions as essentially legal or essentially equi-
table, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the defendant's right to trial 
by jury on a counterclaim for breach of contract in an action by the 
plaintiff to foreclose a mechanic's lien.417 Alabama has held that a jury 
(1980) (equity may not entertain claims at law by the defendant). Of course, law 
could entertain equitable defenses, Md. R.P. 342dl (1977), including set-offs and 
transactionally related recoupment, which were always available at law, see C. 
CLARK, CoDE PLEADING § 100, at 634-36 (2d ed. 1947), and which could be as-
serted in Maryland under a plea to the general issue. At law, if a defendant 
wished to assert a non-transactionally related defense, or wished to obtain an af-
firmative judgment, he had to do so by way of counterclaim. E. J. Smith Constr. 
Co. v. Burton, 262 Md. 62, 277 A.2d 84 (1971); District Agency Co. v. Suburban 
Delivery Serv., Inc., 224 Md. 364, 167 A.2d 874 (1961). In equity, where joinder 
rules have historically been liberal, setoffs asserting what are essentially legal 
claims are commonplace. See, e.g., Singer v. Steven Kokes, Inc., 39 Md. App. 
180, 384 A.2d 463 (1978). 
413. See Vulcan Waterproofers, Inc. v. Maryland Home Improvement Comm'n, 253 
Md. 204, 211, 252 A.2d 62, 66 (1969) (dictum). 
414. 293 So. 2d 373 (Fla. App. 1974); see also Barth v. Florida State Constructors Serv., 
Inc., 327 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976). 
415. See Harada v. Burns, 50 Haw. 528, 445 P.2d 376 (1968); Evans Financial Corp. v. 
Strasser, 99 N.M. 788, 664 P.2d 986 (1983); Landers v. Goetz, 264 N.W.2d 459 
(N.D. 1978); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980); Merchants Bank v. 
Thibodeau, 143 Vt. 132, 465 A.2d 258 (1983) (dictum). 
416. Rice v. Rice, 206 Ark. 937, 175 S.W.2d 201 (1943). 
417. Carl Sectional Home, Inc. v. Key Corp., l Ohio App. 3d 101, 439 N.E.2d 915 
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must try legal issues in a suit for specific performance of construction of 
a house in which the defendant counterclaimed for the plaintiff's re-
fusal to pay increased construction costs caused by changes in the 
plans.418 
Many other courts permit equity to clean up the legal issues, thus 
dispensing with trial by jury of legal claims or counterclaims. A few 
courts simply hold that, once any equitable claim is filed, the entire 
case becomes subject to exclusively equitable adjudication.419 A larger 
number of jurisdictions limit equitable cleanup to subsidiary420 or de-
pendent421 legal claims or provide that the determination of jury trial 
rights is within the discretion of the trial court. 422 Still others adhere to 
( 1981 ). The Ohio rule may be based on statutes which preserve the right to trial 
by jury on issues of fact necessary to recover money or to obtain specific real 
estate. See Romanowski v. Dziedzick.i, 35 Ohio App. 384, 172 N.E. 446 ( 1930). 
418. Poston v. Gaddis, 335 So. 2d 165, 167 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 335 So. 2d 169 
(Ala. 1976). The court noted that damages had been sought as an alternative 
rather than as an incidental remedy. More broadly, it relied on Beacon for the 
proposition that, with the consolidation of legal and equitable claims, it is no 
longer necessary for equity to try incidental damages. Subsequently, the Alabama 
Supreme Court held that equitable issues in mixed claims should not be submitted 
to a jury. Finance, Inv. and Rediscount Co. v. Wells, 409 So. 2d 1341 (Ala. 1981). 
419. See, e.g., Grandon v. Ellingson, 259 Iowa 514, 144 N.W.2d 898 (1966) (action 
involving contract for sale of stock which provided for return of stock and restitu-
tion of deposit on failure to obtain loan; the court held that equity, having been 
invoked to order specific performance of return provision, could adjudicate de-
fendant's legal counterclaim for damages); Kuhlman v. Cargile, 200 Neb. 150, 262 
N.W.2d 454 (1978) (equity, having been invoked to declare a constructive or re-
sulting trust over land held by defendant, can clean up counterclaim for damages 
for breach of contract); see also Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Ross, 401 N.E.2d 74 
(Ind. App. 1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Clark, 226 Kan. 619, 602 P.2d 1299 (1979). 
420. See, e.g., Anderson v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 112, 227 P.2d 351 (1951) (no jury trial 
right on defendant's claim for damages and plaintiff's claim for possession and 
rents where plaintiff also sought to quiet title against adverse claimants); Fogel-
strom v. Murphy, 70 Idaho 488, 222 P.2d 1080 (1950) (in action to foreclose a 
mortgage and appoint a receiver for plaintiff's property, no right to jury trial on 
counterclaim for damages for appointment of receiver because primary relief 
sought was equitable); cf Carl Sectional Home, Inc. v. Key Corp., 1 Ohio App. 3d 
101, 439 N.E.2d 915 (1981) (in action to foreclose mechanic's lien in which de-
fendant disputed the amount of materials furnished and counterclaimed for 
breach of contract, the court held that the right to jury trial obtains where pre-
dominant relief sought is money damages). In Colorado, if the initial action is 
fairly characterizable as essentially equitable, subsequent claims brought by 
others will be tried without a jury. See, e.g., Federal Lumber Co. v. Wheeler, 643 
P.2d 31 (Colo. 1981) (action to foreclose lien; no trial by jury although all parties 
agree). 
421. See, e.g., Skoglund v. Staab, 312 N.W.2d 29 (S.D. 1981) (in action for specific 
performance of contract of sale and damages, and counterclaim for expenses and 
attorney's fees, the court held there was no right to jury trial on defendant's coun-
terclaim or plaintiff's claim for damages because outcome of both is dependent 
upon the outcome of the specific performance claim). 
422. See Johnson v. Johnson, 272 Minn. 284, 137 N.W.2d 840 (1965) (in action for 
accounting involving affairs of family business, trial court's denial of right to jury 
trial upheld). 
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the traditional view423 that a defendant, by filing a legal counterclaim 
to a bill in equity, waives whatever claim to jury trial he may have 
had.424 In such jurisdictions, it is by no means clear that a plaintiff has 
no jury trial right on a defendant's counterclaim.425 With the advent of 
compulsory counterclaim rules,426 the waiver theory has generally col-
lapsed,427 except with regard to permissive counterclaims.428 New 
York, which does not have a compulsory counterclaim rule, has abro-
gated the waiver theory by statute.429 
Experience in the federal and state courts thus demonstrates sev-
eral possible approaches for trial of actions involving claims by differ-
ent parties seeking legal and equitable relief. The rule of Beacon 
Theatres would require that the legal claim be tried first to a jurj if it 
involves factual issues common to the equitable claim. Another ap-
proach would require the trial judge to protect the trial by jury if the 
case is essentially legal. A third approach would treat assertion of a 
legal counterclaim in an action begun in equity as a waiver of the right 
to trial by jury. A variation or combination of the latter two ap-
proaches would determine the applicability of the right to trial by jury 
on the basis of the nature of the first claim asserted. 
Experience in the federal courts before Beacon Theatres indicates 
423. This view was set forth in American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 260 U.S. 
360 (1922), where the defendant counterclaimed for contractual damages in an 
action filed by the plaintiff to set aside the contract based on fraud. Obviously, 
this view has been invalidated by Beacon Theatres. 
424. Savings Bank of New London v. Santaniello, 130 Conn. 206, 33 A.2d 126 (1943); 
Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 276 Pa. Super. 203, 419 A.2d 167 (1980); Aiken Mort-
gage Co. v. Jones, 197 S.C. 245, 15 S.E.2d 119 (1941); Mortgage Assoc., Inc. v. 
Monona Shores, Inc., 47 Wis. 2d 171, 177 N.W.2d 340 (1970). 
425. Indeed, the early federal cases held that plaintiffs did have such a right. American 
Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 260 U.S. 360 (1922). 
426. Most such rules are modeled on FED. R. C1v. P. 13(a) which provides: 
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of 
serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it 
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of 
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the 
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. 
But the pleader need not state the claim if (I) at the time the action was 
commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) 
the opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other 
process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a per-
sonal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counter-
claim under this rule 13. 
427. See, e.g., Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1948), aff'd, 337 
U.S. 254 (1949); Hightower v. Bigoney, 156 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1963); Landers v. 
Goetz, 264 N.W.2d 459 (N.D. 1978). 
428. Colorado does permit waiver in these circumstances. See Miller v. Dist. Court, 
154 Colo. 125, 388 P.2d 763 (1964); see also Citizens State Bank v. Duus, 154 
Mont. 18, 459 P.2d 696 (1969). 
429. See N.Y. C1v. PRAc. LAW § 4102(c) (McKinney 1963). The counterclaimant 
waives his right to jury trial if he joins his claim for legal relief with a transaction-
ally related claim for equitable relief. In re Lacon's Estate, 38 Misc. 2d 869, 296 
N.Y.S.2d 711 (1968). 
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that application of a test which determines applicability of the right to 
trial by jury based upon the essential nature of an entire action is quite 
unpredictable.430 The waiver theory has a superficial appeal in a juris-
diction such as Maryland which does not have a compulsory counter-
claim rule. Ostensibly, a defendant in a suit by a plaintiff to rescind a 
contract would not be required to counterclaim for damages. Given 
the expansive view of res judicata in the Maryland decisions discussed 
in Part I, the defendant would be well advised to assert his claim if it 
involves the contract the plaintiff is seeking to have rescinded. Never-
theless, adoption of the rule in Beacon Theatres might inappropriately 
restrict the scope of equitable adjudication and expand the availability 
of trial by jury. Again, consideration of a few hypothetical situations 
may be useful. 
1. Actions Involving a Suit to Foreclose a Mechanic's Lien and a 
Counterclaim for Breach of Contract 
In the case of Singer v. Steven Kokes, Inc.,431 the plaintiffs' suit 
against a builder of their home for negligence and breach of warranty 
was held to be barred by the judgment in a prior action by the builder 
to enforce a mechanic's lien.432 The contraCtor in the earlier action had 
sued to establish and enforce a mechanic's lien when the buyers refused 
to release the final draw on the construction mortgage. In that first 
action, the buyers were allowed a credit against the lien for alleged 
construction defects and for alleged untimely completion of the house. 
They were barred by res judicata from maintaining a second suit based 
on an allegation of additional defects. The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland clearly treated the assertion of the claim in the first action as 
tantamount to a counterclaim.433 
Under the revised rules, a defendant in an equitable action to fore-
close a mechanic's lien may assert a counterclaim against a contractor 
for breach of contract in performing the construction or furnishing 
materials despite the legal character of such a claim.434 A question 
arises as to whether assertion of such a claim would entitle the defend-
ant to a trial by jury and whether a trial judge would be required to 
order trial of claims so as to protect the right to trial by jury. 
Under Beacon Theatres, since resolution of the same issues would 
determine whether the contractor is owed money or whether he is liable 
in damages to the other contracting party, the breach of contract claim 
would generally have to be tried first to the jury. If a jury trial could 
430. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text. 
431. 39 Md. App. 180, 384 A.2d 463 (1978); see supra notes 38-42 and accompanying 
text (discussion of pre-Beacon merger right to jury trial). 
432. The establishment and enforcement of a mechanic's lien was governed by Md. R. 
P. BG70-77 (1977). The statutory basis for these rules was MD. REAL PRoP. CoDE 
ANN.§ 9-101 to-ll4 (Supp. 1983). 
433. Singer, 39 Md. App. at 183, 384 A.2d at 465. 
434. MD. R.P. 2-303(c). 
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not be held promptly, application of the rule of Beacon Theatres to this 
situation would clearly frustrate the policy of the legislature that such 
liens be adjudicated promptly.435 Again, attentiveness to established 
Maryland principles concerning the scope of equity provides a more 
sensible answer than does a rigid rule such as Beacon Theatres. Since 
the legislature has established equitable jurisdiction over a suit to en-
force a mechanic's lien,436 the right to jury trial should yield to the need 
for expeditious adjudication in equity. The claim to enforce the lien 
should be tried first, even if it resolves some of the issues involved in 
the counterclaim. 
It is possible, of course, that the counterclaim may exceed the 
amount sought in the claim to establish the lien. Thus, even an adverse 
resolution of the contractor's lien claim may not establish the amount 
of contract damages owed by the contractor. Since equitable jurisdic-
tion was appropriately assumed in the first instance, the chancellor 
would retain discretion to resolve the remaining issues or to order a 
separate jury trial of the remaining issues under his established cleanup 
powers.437 
With respect to this first hypothetical situation, resort to the tradi-
tional scope of equity yields a result more consistent with the legisla-
ture's intent than would the rule of Beacon Theatres. 
2. Actions Involving a Claim to Quiet Title and Legal 
Counterclaims 
One who is in peaceable possession of land is able to maintain a 
suit in equity to quiet or remove any cloud from the title when his title 
is denied or disputed.438 This remedy has been created in equity be-
cause of the inadequacy of the remedy at law: one in possession was 
not entitled at common law to maintain an action in ejectment.439 
Early American equitable principles permitted such an action only 
against a defendant who was seeking to establish legal title by repeated 
435. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.§ 9-l06(b)(3) (Supp. 1983) provides that, if the court 
cannot determine from the pleadings and affidavits that the lien should attach, it 
shall establish an interlocutory order which "[a]ssigns a date for the trial of all the 
matters at issue in the action, which shall be within a period of six months." The 
purpose of the statute is to "encourage construction by ensuring that those who 
contribute work or materials to the construction of a project [are] compensated." 
Note, Maryland's Mechanic's Lien Law, 6 U. BALT. L. REv. 181, 193 (1976) (foot-
note omitted). 
436. Mo. REAL PROP. CoDE ANN.§ 9-l06(d) (1981) provides: "Until a final order is 
entered either establishing or denying the lien, the action shall proceed to trial on 
all matters at issue, as in the case of any other proceedings in equity." 
437. See Katz v. Simcha Co., 251 Md. 227,246 A.2d 555 (1968). The exercise of clean-
up jurisdiction over all claims in the action could be analogized to the summary 
equitable jurisdiction which federal bankruptcy courts may exercise over claims 
asserted in bankruptcy proceedings in furtherance of the congressional purpose of 
expeditious adjudication. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1966). 
438. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.§ 14-108 (1981). 
439. Romney v. Steinem, 228 Md. 605, 180 A.2d 873 (1962). 
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actions of ejectment and against whom the plaintiff had been successful 
in at least one action at law.440 It must also be borne in mind, however, 
that the Maryland courts have expressed a strong preference for adjudi-
cating land titles at law.441 Part of this preference has been based on a 
clear desire to preserve the right to trial by jury.442 
Assume that, in an action to quiet title by a plaintiff in possession, 
the defendant counterclaims for ejectment or trespass quare clausum 
fregit. The issue becomes whether trial of the claims should be ordered 
to preserve the right to trial by jury on issues common to both claims. 
In both an action for ejectment and an action for trespass, the issue of 
title to realty may be determined.443 The assertion of a legal counter-
claim which would allow the issue of title to be tried, as is now permis-
sible under the revised rules, would provide the plaintiff with an 
adequate remedy at law. When the remedy at law is adequate, equity 
has been reluctant to intervene,444 in part because of the right to trial 
by jury. Thus, where the counterclaim has the effect of creating an 
adequate remedy at law for the plaintiff, it should be tried first to the 
jury.445 Any additional equitable relief may be ordered by the trial 
court consistent with the jury's findings. According priority to trial by 
jury of the legal claim of trespass would permit adjudication in that 
proceeding of any claim for punitive damages. 
If a legal counterclaim by the defendant in an action to quiet title 
does not raise the issue of title, it would not create an adequate remedy 
at law with respect to the plaintiff's claim. Such a counterclaim would 
probably not involve factual issues common to the plaintiff's claim. In 
such a case, prior adjudication of the equitable claim by the court 
would not serve to preclude the jury trial right of the legal claim. Thus, 
the order of trial would not be an issue of great consequence. 
3. Suits Involving a Claim for Accounting and a Claim for a Legal 
Remedy 
In Johnson & Higgins v. Simpson,446 a company president's con-
tract of employment provided that his estate was to be paid one year's 
440. Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U.S. 314, 321-22 (1894). 
441. See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text. 
442. McCoy v. Johnson, 70 Md. 490, 17 A. 387 (1889). 
443. Gore v. Jarrett, 192 Md. 513, 64 A.2d 550 (1949). 
444. See supra notes 185-98 and accompanying text. 
445. Of course, the mere designation of a counterclaim as one for ejectment does not 
necessarily make it so. In Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Bokum Corp., 453 F.2d 1067 
(lOth Cir. 1972), the plaintiff, a lessee of uranium mining land, brought an action 
for declaratory judgment with respect to certain provisions of the lease. The les-
sor counterclaimed for ejectment under state law on the basis that the lease had 
been terminated because of the lessee's breach. The defendant demanded a jury 
trial. The court rejected this demand. Although the claim was styled in eject-
ment, the court determined that the defendant was actually seeking cancellation 
of the lease, a claim in equity. 
446. This controversy involved two separate suits and two separate appeals. The first, 
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salary in the event of his death while in the employment of the com-
pany. Following the president's death, the employer refused to pay the 
death benefit. The president's administratrix sued for breach of con-
tract. One of the company's special pleas was that the president had 
failed to perform his duties faithfully and diligently as agreed, in that 
he had embezzled a considerable sum of money. The company elected 
to treat the contract as having been rescinded by this conduct.447 The 
company then filed a bill to enjoin the administratrix's prosecution of 
the action at law on the basis that an accounting was necessary. The 
company so contended on the basis that the president "had so juggled 
the books that it was impossible for the jury to determine with certainty 
the true state of the accounts between it and [the president]."448 As 
discussed previously,449 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
accounting was not appropriate, partly because the party seeking the 
accounting controlled the records and partly because adjudication of 
the issues common to both actions, whether the president had embez-
zled money and thus had not faithfully performed his duties, would 
preclude the company's right to trial by jury in the action at law. 
Under the revised rules, the company could have counterclaimed 
for an accounting in the administratrix's contract action. The issue 
would then have been whether it would be appropriate for the trial 
court to try the contract action to a jury to preserve the jury trial right. 
If the employer's liability depended upon faithful performance of the 
employee, Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen would require that the 
legal claim be tried first. Although Maryland has permitted equity to 
preclude the right to trial by jury when there is an inadequate remedy 
at law, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has recognized that the avail-
ability of discovery in an action at law may eliminate the need for an 
accounting.450 Under the facts of Johnson & Higgins, the trial judge is 
faced with the choice of whether law or equity will decide the critical 
factual issues. In deciding whether preclusion of the jury trial by equity 
is appropriate, the trial court should limit equitable adjudication to in-
stances where the remedy at law is inadequate. Using such analysis, 
the trial court would order a jury trial, reaching the same result as in 
Dairy Queen and preventing the claim for accounting from serving as a 
basis for sidestepping trial by jury. 
an action at law, is reported at 163 Md. 574, 163 A. 832 (1933). The second, an 
action in equity, is reported at 165 Md. 83, 166 A. 617 (1933). 
447. 163 Md. 574, 163 A. 832 (1933). An earlier verdict was set aside on a motion for 
new trial. 
448. Johnson & Higgins, 165 Md. at 88, 166 A. at 619. 
449. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text. 
450. Johnson v. Bugle Coat, Apron & Linen Service, 191 Md. 268, 60 A.2d 686 (1948); 
see supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text. 
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D. Actions in Which Adjudication of Equitable Issues is a 
Prerequisite to Adjudication of Claims Triable by Jury 
Under the new merged procedure, it will be necessary for Mary-
land to decide the extent to which the right to trial by jury will be 
preserved in actions in which a traditionally equitable issue or issues 
must be resolved before legal issues may be tried. This question may 
arise in actions in which essentially legal rights are asserted in proceed-
ings of equitable origin, such as a class action, interpleader or a share-
holders' derivative suit. It may also arise when a plaintiff seeks an 
equitable remedy as a prerequisite to obtaining legal relief, such as an 
action to reform a contract and for damages on the contract as 
reformed. 
The revised rules accommodate the right to trial by jury on an 
issue-by-issue basis. Revised Rule 2-325(b) more closely resembles 
Federal Rule 38(b)451 than did former Maryland Rule 343(a), in that 
Rule 2-325(b) contemplates trial by jury of particular issues rather than 
actions. The "action" orientation of the former Maryland Rules did not 
entirely preclude resolution at law of issues which were of equitable 
origin. The discovery rules supplant the need for bills of discovery in 
equity. Former Rule 342(d)(l) permitted assertion of equitable de-
fenses in actions at law, thereby eliminating the need for a bill in equity 
to enjoin prosecution of the action at law.452 While the matter was not 
entirely free from doubt, it appeared that the trial judge regulated pro-
cedural questions concerning equitable defenses in actions at law,453 
and the jury in some instances was able to adjudicate issues related to 
the equitable defenses.454 
As discussed supra, equity once had the power to refer disputed 
factual issues to law courts for trial by jury.455 In addition, Maryland 
practice has mandated transfer from equity to law of various questions 
of fact.456 The former Maryland Rules continued this practice in a few 
45 l. FED. R. C1v. P. 38(b): 
Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by 
jury by serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at 
any time after the commencement of the action and not later than lO 
days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue. Such 
demand may be indorsed upon a pleading of the party. (Emphasis 
added). 
452. Mountain Lake Park Ass'n v. Shartzer, 83 Md. lO, 34 A. 536 (1896). 
453. For instance, a trial judge may have to decide whether an equitable defense may 
be asserted without a special plea. See, e.g., McGrath v. Peterson, 127 Md. 412, 96 
A. 551 (1916). 
454. See Stiegler v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 146 Md. 629, 127 A. 397 (1925) (the court 
held that a question of fraud in the inducement of a life insurance policy may be 
triable to a jury in an action on the policy filed after the incontestability period 
has run as long as the insured has notified the insurer of an intent to treat the 
contract as void and has proffered the premium within the incontestability 
period). 
455. See supra note 221. 
456. See E. MILLER, EQUITY PROCEDURE 292-93 (1897). These included questions of 
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instances. 457 
These traditional practices provide some guidance as to whether, 
under the revised rules, Maryland will protect the right to trial by jury 
as to legal claims which must be tried after equitable issues. Preserva-
tion of the right to trial by jury in such actions requires a separate jury 
trial of legal issues after the equitable issues have been resolved rather 
than equitable cleanup of the legal claims. 
The case for a separate trial is strongest when legal claims are as-
serted in historically equitable actions which are essentially joinder de-
vices. These actions include class actions, intervention, interpleader, 
subrogation, and receivership. In such actions, there are preliminary 
questions which must be resolved by a court of equity, such as the ap-
propriateness of suit for class action treatment458 or whether a party 
may intervene in a suit.459 In Allender v. Ghinger,460 discussed supra, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the mere fact that a re-
ceiver had been appointed in equity to pursue claims of a defunct cor-
poration's creditors against its stockholders did not deprive the 
stockholders of their right to trial by jury of the receiver's claims.461 
Although the Maryland courts have not addressed the issue, it ap-
pears that the former Maryland Rules, which explicitly provided as-
signees462 and subrogees463 the opportunity to maintain actions at law, 
strongly indicate that the right to trial by jury would obtain in such 
cases. The same could be said of legal claims asserted in class actions 
and through intervention since the former Maryland Rules pertaining 
to such devices were applicable to both law and equity actions.464 On 
the other hand, the former rules strongly suggested that there was no 
right to trial by jury as to interpleader actions465 which are strongly 
debt, vel non, prior to setting aside fraudulent conveyances, issues of fact in at-
tachment proceedings under decrees in equity, issues of devasit vel non in will 
contests and declaratory judgments. Miller also noted that in actions by judgment 
creditors of a corporation against its debtors, the debtors had a right to trial by 
jury. . 
457. See Md. R.P. F5 ( 1977), which mandated that equity transmit cases of attachment 
to courts of law when a jury trial had been demanded. See also Md. R.P. W75b 
(1977) which provided the plaintiff in a foreclosure action with the option of ob-
taining a deficiency decree or pursuing his remedy at law. Md. R.P. BU73 (1977) 
provided that, if a party seeking interpleader asserted a claim to one of the claim-
ants, any claimant other than the interpleading party could demand a jury trial. 
Upon such demand, the court transferred the action to a court of law for separate 
trial under Md. R.P. 515 (1977). The Maryland interpleader rule is now Mo. R.P. 
2-221. 
458. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a). 
459. See FED. R. C1v. P. 24(a), (c). 
460. See supra notes 199-202. 
461. See also National Park Bank v. Lanahan, 60 Md. 477 (1883); Dillon v. Conn. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 44 Md. 386 (1876). 
462. Md. R.P. 240 (1977). 
463. Md. R.P. 243 (1977). 
464. Md. R.P. 208, 209 (1977). 
465. Md. R.P. BU70 (1977) authorized interpleader actions, and Md. R.P. BU74 (1977) 
74 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 14 
rooted in equity.466 
The United States Supreme Court confronted this problem in 
Ross v. Bernhard,461 which involved a shareholders' derivative suit. Al-
though that action's equitable heritage reflects the rigidity of common 
law joinder rules,468 such actions are also rooted in the law of trusts and 
fiduciary relations.469 It is quite plausible to view the entire claim, 
rather than simply the issue of the shareholder's ability to represent the 
corporation,470 as equitable. So viewed, there would be no right to trial 
by jury. Nevertheless, the Court in Ross treated the shareholders' de-
rivative action as a simple joinder device and held broadly that, since 
the federal rules mandated trial by jury of legal issues, there would be a 
right to trial by jury as to factual issues regarding liability and damages 
in suits seeking legal relief.471 
Maryland cases like Allender v. Ghinger 412 employ reasoning 
which is almost identical to that of Ross. Such cases support the view 
that the applicability of the right to trial by jury is determined by the 
nature of the issues rather than the pedigree of the proceeding in which 
they are asserted. The revised rules, however, are not supportive of 
such a view. For example, the revised interpleader provision, Rule 2-
22l(c), provides a trial by jury for those issues ''triable of right by a 
jury." This rule could be construed as continuing the policy of former 
Rule BU73, which provided for trial by jury only when demanded by 
the defendant as to a claim by the plaintiff. The limited extension of 
the right to trial by jury might be regarded as an exclusion of such right 
with respect to all other aspects of the interpleader suit. 
Allender and Ross suggest that, in actions in which equitable issues 
must be resolved first, it is appropriate to have the trial judge resolve 
provided that "proceedings subsequent to the entry of the interpleader decree 
shall be according to the usual procedure in equity." Md. R.P. BU73 (1977) 
provided the right to jury trial to defendants in interpleader actions in which the 
plaintiff has, in addition to seeking relief from possible multiple liability, asserted 
a claim to the property or against one or more of the defendants. The origins of 
the Rule BU73 jury trial reservation are obscure. It is clear that under traditional 
equity practice, interpleader would not lie in such circumstances. See E. MILLER, 
EQUITY PROCEDURE 824-25 (1897). It is possible that rulemakers felt ~hat, in such 
circumstances the plaintiff should be held to have waived right to jury trial by 
seeking the aid of chancery, but that the defendants should not be divested of jury 
trial rights in what amounts to a reverse action at law. If so, BU73 represents a 
limited effort to restrict equitable cleanup. 
466. H. GINSBERG, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AND PROCEDURE IN MARYLAND 166 
(1928). 
467. 396 U.S. 531 (1970). See supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text. 
468. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2307 (1971). 
469. See Prunty, The Shareholder's Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 980 (1957). 
470. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. 
471. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text. 
472. 170 Md. 156, 183 A. 610 (1936); see also Bachman v. Lembach, 192 Md. 35, 63 
A.2d 641 (1949) (relief sought was not in its nature equitable because sole purpose 
is recovery of misappropriated jewelry and cash). 
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such issues and then to have the jury hear the balance of the case. It is 
clear that Maryland's courts have limited Allender to situations in 
which a narrow procedural determination must be made. When the 
equitable relief required is more substantial, many cases indicate that 
once equity has assumed jurisdiction it may clean up the balance of the 
action. 
The clearest lines of such cases are those involving cancellation473 
and reformation of contracts.474 In this area, a fairly rigid separation of 
law and equity has been maintained. Historically, a defendant could 
not defend an action at law on a contract or instrument because of 
fraud or mutual mistake. He was instead limited to bringing a bill in 
equity for rescission or reformation. While fraud was available in 
Maryland as an equitable defense to an action at law,475 mutual mis-
take was not.476 It was long held that relief such as rescission or refor-
mation was available only in equity and may not be ordered by a judge 
at law.477 Once the case was in equity, the chancellor, having granted 
rescission, might also order restitution "damages" without honoring a 
demand for jury trial.478 In reformation actions, the court of appeals 
has consistently held that the equity court, having reformed the con-
tract, did not need to transfer the parties to law on triable issues of 
liability and damages but could instead provide full relief.479 
This sort of cleanup was not limited to rescission and reformation 
cases. In a long line of cases, the court of appeals upheld the power of 
equity, once it entertained a claim for discovery and accounting,480 to 
grant damages relief.481 Although the court of appeals held that discov-
473. See Creamer v. Helferstay, 294 Md. 107, 448 A.2d 332 (1982); Ridgley v. Beatty, 
222 Md. 76 n.l, 159 A.2d 651 n.l (1960); Gibula v. Sause, 173 Md. 87, 194 A.2d 
826 (1937); Conner v. Groh, 90 Md. 674, 45 A. 1024 (1900); Baltimore Sugar Ref. 
Co. v. Campbell & Zell Co., 83 Md. 36, 34 A. 369 (1896). 
474. See Aetna Indemnity Co. v. Baltimore, S. P. & C. Ry. Co., 112 Md. 389, 76 A. 251 
(1910); Maryland Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Kimmell, 89 Md. 437, 43 A. 764 (1899). 
475. See Stiegler v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 146 Md. 629, 127 A. 397 (1925); McGrath v. 
Peterson, 127 Md. 412, 96 A. 551 (1916). 
476. Annapolis Mall Ltd. Partnership v. Yogurt Tree Inc., 299 Md. 244, 473 A.2d 32 
(1984). 
477. Creamer v. Helferstay, 294 Md. at ll4, 448 A.2d at 336; Ridgley v. Beatty, 222 
Md. 76, 159 A.2d 651 (1960); Connor v. Groh, 90 Md. 674, 45 A. 1024 (1900). 
478. See Gibula v. Sause, 173 Md. 87, 194 A. 826 (1937) (court held that while an 
action for money had and received was ordinarily the appropriate remedy for the 
return of purchase money, equity would order such relief where equitable juris-
diction had attached); Baltimore Sugar Ref. Co. v. Campbell & Zell Co., 83 Md. 
36, 34 A. 369 (1896) (court held that equity is not divested of jurisdiction in a case 
where the legal relief becomes adequate). 
479. Aetna Indemnity Co. v. Baltimore, S. P. & C. Ry. Co., 112 Md. 389, 76 A. 251 
(1910); Maryland Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Kimmell, 89 Md. 441; 43 A. 764 (1899). 
480. See supra notes 266-74 and accompanying text (circumstances in which an action 
for discovery and accounting is appropriate). 
481. See, e.g., Dormay Const. Corp. v. Doric Co., 221 Md. 145, 156 A.2d 632 (1959); 
Spangler v. Dan A. Sprosty Bag Co., 183 Md. 166, 36 A.2d 685 (1944); Legum v. 
Campbell, 149 Md. 148, 131 A. 147 (1925). 
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ery alone may not be the basis of a resort to equity,482 it did not restrict 
accounting as a basis for resort to equity to nearly the same degree as 
did the Supreme Court in Dairy Queen.483 
The cleanup of legal claims in these lines of authority was predi-
cated less upon such legal claims being subsidiary than upon the notion 
that such cleanup fosters judicial economy. The avoidance of bifur-
cated proceedings, with their increased costs and delays, was a constant 
theme. Fundamental to this sort of equitable cleanup were judicial no-
tions of what constitutes affirmative equitable relief, combined with a 
relatively rigid view that once equity jurisdiction attached, it may not 
be ousted by subsequent events. 
A review of Maryland cases involving actions in which resolution 
of traditionally equitable issues is necessary before adjudication of 
claims which might otherwise be triable by jury reveals that two ap-
proaches may be justified. Where the basis of equitable relief is one of 
the joinder devices, such as a class action or interpleader, the approach 
of the Supreme Court in Ross has sound and sufficient justification in 
Maryland practice. The issues in a class action should be triable by 
jury if they would be so triable in individual suits by the class mem-
bers. The issues raised by an intervenor's claim are triable by jury if 
they would be so triable had they been raised by the intervenor as an 
original plaintiff or defendant. 
Where the basis of equitable jurisdiction is a particular remedial 
competence of equity, such as rescission, cancellation or specific per-
formance, the question is more difficult. Maryland has demonstrated a 
willingness to take a hard look at the bases for equitable jurisdiction, 
such as discovery, accounting, and multiplicity, in light of expanded 
procedures in actions at law. Maryland practice has not heretofore re-
quired a separate jury trial as to additional, nonequitable relief. The 
use of equitable cleanup in these situations, however, was either justi-
fied by the need to avoid bifurcated proceedings or to hasten the final 
resolution of the case. 
This latter view may be examined in light of the facts of Damazo v. 
Wahby,484 a suit in which the defendant sought, inter alia, to have a 
fraudulent conveyance set aside.485 The plaintiff was a real estate bro-
ker who had procured a purchaser for Willowbrook, a corporation 
owned by the defendants. In a previous action, the plaintiff had ob-
tained a judgment for a commission against the corporation.486 The 
plaintiff contended that Willowbrook had transferred a note to the de-
482. Cf Perlmutter v. Minskoff, 196 Md. 99, 75 A.2d 129 (1950). 
483. See supra notes 139-41. 
484. 269 Md. 252, 305 A.2d 138 (1972). 
485. A creditor whose claim has matured may maintain an action under Mo. CoM. 
LAW CoDE ANN. § 15-209 (Repl. Vol. 1983). This statutory right has been held 
not to deprive a creditor of his right to have a fraudulent conveyance set aside in 
equity. Lipskey v. Voloshen, 155 Md. 139, 141 A. 402 (1928). 
486. Damazo v. Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970). 
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fendants, rendering it insolvent. Testimony revealed that the defend-
ants had transferred the note to another corporation which it owned 
and which, in turn, pledged the note as collateral for a loan. The trial 
court, however, entered judgment against the defendants for the 
amount of the plaintiff's commission. 
On appeal, the defendants argued that a personal judgment could 
not be entered against them in an action to set aside a fraudulent con-
veyance. The court held that such a judgment against the transferee 
was proper so long as it was sought in the complaint.487 Speaking of the 
broad powers exercisable by the chancellor, the court held that: 
where the transferee allows or causes the property to depreci-
ate in value or parts with the property without sufficient con-
sideration or puts it beyond the reach of the court, equity will 
not allow itself to be frustrated but will adapt itself to the exi-
gencies of the case and will enter a money judgment if this 
will achieve an equitable result.488 
Clearly, equity possesses broad cleanup power with respect to fraudu-
lent conveyances. 
No question as to the right to trial by jury was raised in Damazo. 
If the defendants had demanded a jury trial as to the claim against 
them by the plaintiff for personal judgment, the issue would have been 
whether a separate trial by jury would be required under the revised 
rules after the trial court determined that it could not satisfy the plain-
tiff's claim by setting aside the fraudulent conveyance. Given the 
broad sweep of powers available to a court in such a suit,489 the court of 
appeals would not be likely to re-evaluate the appropriateness of af-
firmative equitable relief in such a case. It seems that such a re-evalua-
tion would preclude the chancellor from deciding the entire case once 
equitable jurisdiction has attached. Indeed, it was established long ago 
that once equitable jurisdiction attached, it would persist until the debt 
was satisfied, regardless of the availability of any action at law.490 
Thus, a separate jury trial as to a claim for a personal judgment would 
be held only at the chancellor's discretion. 
With this final category of actions, as with the two preceding cate-
gories, resort to established Maryland procedure rather than federal 
post-merger practice would often yield a result less than fully protective 
of the right to trial by jury. 
487. Damazo, 269 Md. at 256, 305 A.2d at 141. 
488. Id. at 257, 305 A.2d at 142. 
489. For example, Mo. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 15-210(b)(l), (2) (Repl. Vol. 1983) 
permits injunctive relief or the appointment of a receiver in the case where a claim 
has not matured. 
490. Atlantic Lumber Corp. v. Waxman, 162 Md. 191, 159 A. 593 (1932). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In certain cases, the merger of law and equity presents a threat to 
the right to trial by jury. The federal courts have met this threat in 
ways which expand the right to trial by jury. In Maryland, equitable 
intervention has long presented a similar threat. The Maryland courts 
have for the most part responded to this threat by limiting equitable 
jurisdiction to cases in which it is clearly needed. Once equitable juris-
diction had attached, however, equity often decided the whole case in 
order to foster judicial economy. Economy considerations may some-
times be less acute in a merged system than in a bifurcated system, but 
they do not entirely disappear. Fidelity to the historic right to trial by 
jury after merger demands not blind subservience to Beacon Theatres, 
but a common sense attentiveness to Maryland's established limitations 
on the appropriate exercise of equitable jurisdiction. 
